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  1 
“The Guide is definitive. Reality is frequently inaccurate.” –The Hitchhiker’s Guide to 
the Galaxy1 
 
“The ultimate model of a cat is of course another cat, whether it be born of still another 
cat or synthesized in a laboratory.” –Norbert Weiner2 
Chapter 1: Artificial: An Introduction 
 
Introduction 
We are living in the future. I find myself consistently taken aback by this realization: 
startled at the things increasingly made possible by the technology that surrounds me, as 
well as the speed at which these developments occur. This is certainly due, at least 
partially, to the decade of my birth; born in 1980, I grew up in a household with both an 
electric typewriter and a Commodore 128. I learned to type on the latter, booting the 
PaperClip word processing program from a 5¼ inch floppy disk—but still took 
Typewriting my freshman year of high school, counting the letters in a given line in order 
to manually center them. My family first had the Internet at home that same year, keeping 
a hand-written record of our dialed-up online hours to avoid going over the 40 free 
offered by providers like America Online and CompuServe. I don’t remember ever 
seeing my father express as much disappointment in me as he did when, having read the 
headline on the Prodigy home screen, I inadvertently gave away the victor of the tennis 
match he’d been taping off TV but had yet to watch. Talk about living in the future. 
 In October of 2012, I took a step further into this brave new world when I became 
the owner of the just-released iPhone 5, the fifth generation of a handheld technological 
marvel that has been revolutionizing social and technological interaction since 2007. In 
March of 2012, smartphones officially edged out dumb ones as the majority of U.S. cell 
                                                 
1
 Adams, Douglas, The Ultimate Hitchhiker’s Guide (New York: Random House, Inc., 1986), 174. 
2
 “Behavior, Purpose, and Teleology,” in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 1943), 23 . 
  2 
phone subscriptions—at the time just 50.4% of the market,3 but as of February of 2013, 
already 53%.4 The iPhone 5 was my own first smartphone, replacing a Samsung Rant 
whose primary claims to fame were a sliding qwerty keyboard; its survival of and 
recovery from a 20-foot plummet into a semi-frozen puddle; and the fact that at its 
retirement—still working, if a bit quirkily—it was, at nearly four years old, a veritable 
antique. The 5’s claims to fame, on the other hand, are myriad and were highly praised at 
its release. The New York Times’ technology columnist David Pogue, reviewing the 
phone before its general release, praises its “gleaming, black-on-black, glass-and-
aluminum body” as “carr[ying] the design cues of a Stealth bomber,” and its “startling” 
thinness. He mentions improvements to the impossibly high-definition Retina screen and 
calls the updated camera “among the best ever put into a phone.” A feature introduced in 
the phone’s predecessor, the 4s, returns: Siri, an Artificial Intelligence assistant, 
recognizes voice commands and performs tasks accordingly (though “thought 
recognition,” as Pogue quips, “will have to wait for the iPhone 13”).5 
I had been wary of joining the ranks of smartphone users, who seem to share a 
disconcerting dependence on their devices, constantly consulting the miniature screens in 
their palms and getting twitchy when separated from them. As awkward as it is being the 
only person in a group not staring at a smartphone screen, I didn’t relish the prospect of 
becoming one of them. Nonetheless, the sleek metal carapace and silky screen of my new 
device immediately entranced me, and I experienced more frequent “living in the future” 
moments as I explored its possibilities: depositing checks with a click of the camera 
                                                 
3
 Nielsen, “America’s New Mobile Majority: A Look at Smartphone Owners in the U.S.” 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/newswire/2012/who-owns-smartphones-in-the-us.html  
4
 Nielsen, “How the Mobile Consumer Connects Around the Globe.” 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/newswire/2013/how-the-mobile-consumer-connects-around-the-globe.html  
5
 “The iPhone Scores Well, with a Quibble.” New York Times, September 18, 2012. 
  3 
button; video chatting with my sister and her infant daughter; live mapping a run, 
complete with pace and elevation data; “listening” to and identifying a song played over 
the speakers at a restaurant; being instructed, in real time, how to drive to a given 
destination.  
This phone is eerily similar to a gadget presciently envisioned by one of the great 
future-imaginers, science fiction author and humorist Douglas Adams, to whom I now 
turn for a moment. Though known primarily for the rather wacky wit and creativity of his 
bestselling Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy series, which endeared him to me when I 
discovered him as a high school sophomore, Adams was in fact “deeply read in 
science”—according to none other than evolutionary biologist and best-selling author 
Richard Dawkins. Dawkins, who became friends with Adams after writing the latter a fan 
letter and learning the admiration was mutual, described Adams’ “sophisticated humor” 
as “founded in a deep, amalgamated knowledge of literature and science.”6 It is perhaps 
not surprising, then, especially given his equally well-known love of Macintosh 
computers, just how prescient his eponymous Hitchhiker’s Guide proved to be. Looking 
“rather like a largish electronic calculator,” with a small screen and lots of tiny buttons, 
the Guide is what one of its contributors, Ford Prefect, describes as “a sort of electronic 
book [that] tells you everything you need to know about anything.”7 Though it holds 
“several inconveniently large buildings”’ 8 worth of information on, as might be assumed, 
the entire galaxy, earthling protagonist Arthur Dent is dismayed, however, to learn that 
the entry on his beloved home planet comprises just two words: “Mostly harmless.”9 
                                                 
6
 “Epilogue,” The Salmon of Doubt (New York; Random House, Inc., 2002), 290. 
7
 Ibid, 37. 
8
 Adams, Hitchhiker’s Guide, 20. 
9
 Ibid, 44. 
  4 
Indeed, throughout the series, Adams displays little reverence for the “utterly 
insignificant little blue-green planet whose ape-descended life forms are so amazingly 
primitive that they still think digital watches are a pretty neat idea.”10  
Adams was, however, certainly impressed by the technology he saw emerging in the 
1980s, and was an early devotee of Apple products, named one of their “AppleMaster” 
celebrity ambassadors. His fondness for his Macs, as well as his awareness of living in 
the future, is captured in a 1989 essay for MacUser, in which he writes, “I adore my 
Macintosh, or rather my family of however many Macintoshes that I’ve recklessly 
accumulated over the years. I’ve adored it since I first saw one at [software company] 
Infocom’s offices in Boston in 1983.” 11  Just six years later, he finds himself moving 
between multiple machines, one of them “my portable Mac (I know, I know, you hate 
me. Listen. We’ll all have one in the end. They’ll bring the price down, trust me.).”12 
Living in the future means that even as technology changes rapidly, the price and size 
continue to drop. This is evident in today’s machines that function so like Adams’ 
imagined Guide. In the conclusion to his 2010 Time magazine cover story praising the 
newly-released iPad, Adams’ longtime friend, British actor and comedian Stephen Fry, 
wrote, “One melancholy thought occurs as my fingers glide and flow over the surface of 
this astonishing object: Douglas Adams is not alive to see the closest thing to his 
Hitchhiker's Guide that humankind has yet devised.”13 It was science fiction in 1979; a 
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faint possibility when I first encountered the book 15 years later; and reality merely 15 
years after that. 
Adams died unexpectedly in 2001, very shortly after a lecture he gave at the 
University of Santa Barbara entitled “Parrots, the Universe, and Everything”—a lecture 
not surprisingly, given our residence in the future, available to view online.14 In it, Adams 
discusses what he calls his favorite of the books he’s written, Last Chance to See, a 
collaborative effort with zoologist Mark Carwardine.15 In his lecture, he describes several 
of the rare and endangered species the two studied: the Madagascan aye-aye lemur; the 
Komodo dragon; the flightless New Zealand kakapo parrot; and the nearly-blind baiji, or 
Yangtze River dolphin. The latter two represent particularly interesting cases of animals 
that have evolved to fit a particular environment and are incapable of surviving when that 
environment changes rapidly. In the case of the former, parrots in a protected, predator-
free environment, had become fat and lost the ability to fly—resulting in their near-
eradication when Europeans, with their attendant dogs, cats, stoats and rats, arrived on 
their formerly secluded island. In the latter, dolphins in the impenetrably turbid Yangtze 
evolved a highly sensitive sonar ability to compensate for their near-complete lack of 
sight, which served them well until the advent of motorized vessels introduced pervasive 
sound pollution that resulted in the essentially blind and now-deafened dolphins’ 
extinction. The Kakapo’s extraordinarily complex and drawn-out reproductive process, 
the perfect solution to maintaining a stable population in the absence of predators, “seems 
like absurd behavior to us,” Adams says, “but it’s only because its environment has 
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changed in one particular and dramatic way that is completely invisible to us”—leaving 
the kakapo “completely out of tune with the environment it now finds itself in.”16 
In the lecture, Adams turns from these discussions of out-of-tune animals to a species 
in a changing environment that he doesn’t discuss in the book: humans. A 1992 interview 
with journalist Steve Homer in the Independent, however, reveals that although the book 
doesn’t make it explicit, the concept has long been on Adams’ mind: “There are very 
nice, neat parallels you can make,” Adams says, “between the way in which the kakapo 
perceives its world—the nature of the world it lives in, how it comes to perceive it in that 
way, and how it comes to behave in the way it does in relation to the world that it thinks 
it sees—and us.”17 Like the kakapo, humans find themselves in a changed world: this one 
characterized by an increasing ability to collect and use information, Adams says, and, 
more recently, to use the computer to “start putting things together to see how they 
work… to see actual processes at work, and… begin to see how very very simple things 
lead inexorably—by iteration after iteration—to enormously complex processes emerging 
and blossoming.”18 For Adams, this visualization of the process of the emergence of life 
is deeply compelling—and significantly decentering of the human, who, despite knowing 
more about life and the world than ever before, is increasingly bringing about its 
destruction. Humans are in danger of being caught, kakapo-like, in a mindset that evolved 
under different environmental conditions and is no longer tenable.  Adams illustrates this 
with the metaphor of a puddle “waking up” and considering that, given how perfectly he 
                                                 
16
 Adams, “Parrots,” n.p. 
17
 “Mankind as Sickly as a Parrot: Douglas Adams Leaves His Apple Macs to tell Steve Homer how 
Technology can Rescue a Human Race That is Stranded Like a Flightless Bird.” October 5, 1992.  The 
article was published on the release date of the fifth book in Adams’ Hitchhiker’s Guide series, entitled 
Mostly Harmless. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/mankind-as-sickly-as-a-parrot-douglas-
adams-leaves-his-apple-macs-to-tell-steve-homer-how-technology-can-rescue-a-human-race-that-is-
stranded-like-a-flightless-bird-1555585.html.  
18
 Adams, “Parrots,” n.p. 
  7 
fits the indentation in which he finds himself, it could only have been designed 
specifically for him—a thought he maintains right up until he evaporates into oblivion. 
“[I]f we think that the world is here for us,” Adams concludes, “we will continue to 
destroy it in the way that we’ve been destroying it, because we think we can do no harm.” 
It is from this space of awareness—that human beings are not at the center of the 
universe, masters of their own domain—that posthumanism, and the posthuman, the 
subjects of my study in this project, emerge.  
 I began this chapter with a claim to which I’ve repeatedly returned: “We are living in 
the future.” Our everyday lives, that is, are increasingly mediated by technologies so new, 
so relentless in their onslaught, and so different from what was the norm only a few years 
ago, that we are more keenly aware than ever of the gap between how they so recently 
were and how they now are. To live in the future is to experience the doubling gesture of 
projecting oneself backward in time (recognizing today’s present as that past’s future) 
while understanding the future as an onrushing force shaping the present even as it leaves 
it behind—the post-present. It is precisely in this sense that I posit the “post” of the 
posthuman. My “post-” doesn’t delineate a firm boundary or radical after. This 
posthuman doesn’t emerge to wipe out and replace the human as we know it. Rather, it 
both adapts to and shapes the future-present:  a corrective to the limits of the liberal 
humanist subject and borne on waves of futuristic technological development, including 
cybernetics, robotics, Artificial Intelligence, and the Internet. 
 As an art historian, I am concerned, naturally with vision and representation. As one 
living in the future, I’m also concerned with their unnatural aspects: the way technology 
presents certain things to sight; the conclusions offered by particular kinds of “seeing”; 
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the idea of the real in an age of hyperreality; the meaning of the body when it’s seen as 
machine. This project represents my attempt to understand, through the lens of 
contemporary art, what it means to live in the future—and where the future goes from 
here. It is a question I’ve approached specifically through the concept of posthumanism—
an orientation to the world that thinks beyond the centrality of the liberal humanist 
subject. Against this liberal humanist subject, I posit the figure of the posthuman: a 
product, symbol, and mindset of posthumanist future-living. Like Donna Haraway’s 
iconic cyborg, the posthuman is an imagined, rhetorical figure that navigates the 
contemporary techno-social milieu, reflecting both the dreams and fears of the 
contemporary and coming age.  
 Although these posthuman themes have been identified and analyzed in literature, 
perhaps most notably by literary critic N. Katherine Hayles in How We Became 
Posthuman, (1999), art historians have been slow to explore visual representations and 
imaginings of the posthuman in contemporary art. Whether the figure of the posthuman 
suggests boundless potential or entrapment in a tight web of capital and its attendant tools 
of regularization and surveillance; technologies for augmenting and extending the body, 
or abandoning it altogether; I argue that it bears thinking about what it might look like, 
and the role the visual plays in conceiving the posthuman. The lens of posthumanism 
offers the opportunity to think about how contemporary art—particularly through ideas of 
the body and its relationship to technology—shapes and is shaped by a world in which a 
rational humanist subject no longer reigns supreme, but is increasingly open to the 
opportunities and perils of intermixture with multiple organic and digital entities. 
  9 
In the chapters that follow, I address works of art that I argue embrace a complex 
posthuman perspective, and that imagine, from different angles, the posthuman figure. 
These projects neither celebrate the posthuman as triumphalist, technologically-enhanced 
superhuman, nor fear it as representing the impending destruction of the embodied, 
feeling human. They are much more nuanced, particularly because while the respective 
artists’ rhetoric may at times veer toward the hyperbolic, it is countered (arguably 
calculatedly) by the “failure” of the technology and bodies involved to support it. I read 
these projects as displaying a particular intimacy between bodies and technology unique 
to the posthuman milieu: a decentering of an exultant liberal humanist subject in favor of 
a networked, interdependent, contingent being. Existing as they do outside the realm of 
the pristine laboratory or the science fiction plot, these artworks represent—perhaps 
ironically, given their inherent “artifice”—the “real.”19 I’ve chosen them because of the 
questions they allow me to ask about what it means to live, see, and be embodied in the 
future: What happens when sci-fi ideas, futuristic technology, and living bodies collide? 
What does it mean to be posthuman, and what does that figure look like? What is the role 
of the body from a posthumanist perspective? Is there a particularly posthuman way of 
seeing? What does living in the future mean for our relationships with each other and our 
non-human organic others? What are the benefits, or dangers, of embracing a 
posthumanist perspective?  
In the first chapter following this one, Skin, I focus on the French performance artist 
Orlan’s 1990-1993 series The Reincarnation of Saint Orlan, in which she uses plastic 
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surgery to open and rework her skin, and Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr’s 2004 Victimless 
Leather: A Prototype of Stitch-less Jacket Grown in a Technoscientific Body, a “semi-
living sculpture” grown in a bioreactor. I examine the idea of skin as a metaphor for a 
bounded, rational humanist subject, and how these two projects interrogate that notion. I 
read Orlan as a cyborg in the mold of Donna Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto,” and argue 
that her gesture of opening the skin, making of it an indeterminate, unfixed, porous 
border, is a patently posthuman one. Victimless Leather, like Orlan herself, represents an 
amalgamation of multiple organisms and technology, revealing the sort of “impure 
mingling” that allows us to see the posthuman environment. 
In Chapter 3, Immersion, I address Canadian artist Char Davies’ Virtual Reality (VR) 
projects—or, as she prefers, “immersive virtual environments”— Osmose and Ephémère.  
Although these projects were developed with cutting-edge technology, I argue that they 
are undergirded by a persistent binarism that makes them seem much more old-fashioned 
than simply their vintage technology. I contrast the experience they offer of the virtual—
drawing clear divisions between male/female, self/other, body/machine, real/virtual with 
today’s porous experience of the digital environment—an experience I maintain is closer 
to the science fiction imaginings of virtual space that I discuss early in the chapter than it 
is to the structured, encapsulating one offered by Davies’ projects. 
In the final chapter, I attempt to bridge two apparently competing definitions of 
posthumanism, one offered by Hayles and one by Cary Wolfe, through the work of 
Australian performance artist Stelarc. I attempt a synthesis of what Wolfe calls the 
transhumanism inherent in Hayles’ posthuman and the systems theory that defines his, 
arriving at the rather tongue-in-cheek label of  posttranshumanism to capture the 
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transhumanist tendencies in Stelarc’s rhetoric and the posthumanist ones visible in his 
performances. Stelarc offers a model for living in the future that moves as easily between 
Hayles’ science-fiction analysis and Wolfe’s complex theoretical webs—a truly agile 
“new barbarian” of the posthuman imagined by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. 
Before I move on to these individual case studies, however, I wish to focus on the 
historical emergence of the posthuman, reviewing the literature and addressing the social, 
scientific, and cognitive foundations of this shift in thinking. I am aware that the term 
posthuman may at first evoke negative reactions; aren’t we all, after all, still just humans? 
Indeed, cultural theorist Neil Badmington, in the introduction to his Posthumanism 
(2000), selects as his epigram the following exchange from the film Don’t Look Back:20 
Bob Dylan: We’re different. We come from two different worlds. You come 
from England; I come from the United States. 
Interviewer: That’s true, that’s true, but we’re still human beings, so there’s 
some sort of connection between us. 
Bob Dylan: No, I’m just a guitar player, that’s all.21   
 
We’re still human beings. Certainly we (still—nearly 50 years later) are, though as the 
oft-abstruse folk philosopher22 suggests, that has never meant being the same—or even 
being able to relate to one another. What hope can remain for us then, if, as the “post-” 
seems to suggest, we have actually entered an era that leaves behind even that tenuous 
connection of humanity? I wish to emphasize that I see the posthuman perspective as an 
emphatically positive and uniting one, with the potential to form much stronger 
connections than simple recourse to “we’re still human beings.” It by no means denies 
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the experience of being an embodied human (an embodiment experienced distinctly 
differently by each of us, anyway), but widens our awareness that our seemingly 
“different worlds” are in fact richer, and more connected, than we ever before realized.  
Following my brief overview of this literature, I conclude this chapter with a 
discussion of Christa Sommerer and Laurent Mignonneau’s 2006 interactive artwork Life 
Writer, an elegantly simple and intuitive project in which letters produced by typing on a 
vintage Royal typewriter transform into “creatures” that interact with the user and each 
other based on their unique “genetic” code. Life Writer combines technologies separated 
by nearly a century into a single, playful, evocative object23 that is as powerful for what it 
doesn’t show as what it does. As a fundamentally hybrid project, Life Writer is also a 
useful model for this chapter itself, which finds itself frequently trying to weave together 
disparate histories of technology and thought, pursuing the figure of the posthuman not 
through the intimate body-machine interfaces to which I will turn in subsequent chapters, 
but through the history that grounds and makes possible such interfaces. Life Writer 
allows me to outline the history of ideas and technology that forms, largely through the 
figure of the cyborg, the basis for thinking the posthuman. I use this piece as an entry 
point into the world of Artificial Life (AL), tracing its history through the work of 
Sommerer and Mignonneau’s earlier collaborator, biologist Thomas Ray, and as far back 
as the mathematicians and scientists who, around the end of the second World War, were 
attempting to make sense of the meaning of life through digital models. I examine the 
implications of understanding human life in terms of these computer models, particularly 
as our technological abilities and communications networks increase. I conclude by 
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considering one projected outcome of this increase, a scenario called the Singularity, in 
which exponentially-growing machine intelligence finally outstrips human intelligence. 
This chapter, like the piece at its center, is a hybrid, as I strive to introduce to the idea of 
the posthuman, review the science and philosophy that ground its imagining, and 
highlight the role of art history in understanding it. I weave these stories to ground the 
case studies that form the following three chapters. 
The Emergence of the Posthuman: Reviewing the Literature 
 In 1977, literary theorist Ihab Hassan noted the beginning of “a potential in our 
culture… a tendency struggling to become more than a trend.”24 In facing this change, he 
noted, “We need to understand that five hundred years of humanism may be coming to an 
end, as humanism transforms itself into something that we must helplessly call 
posthumanism.”25 As “helpless” as he may have felt in assigning that term, and as wary 
as he is to suggest what “may appear variously as a dubious neologism, the latest slogan, 
or simply another image of man's recurrent self-hate,”26 Hassan understood the label as a 
useful framework for understanding the decentering of the liberal humanist subject. This 
subject may be understood as fully self-determined, rational, possessed of a fixed and 
coherent identity and—as paradigmatically a white, European male—superior to all 
“others.” As early as 1916, Sigmund Freud was identifying cracks in that liberal humanist 
edifice: the Copernican revelation that the earth was not the center of the universe; the 
Darwinian theory of evolution and hence humans’ small distance from other animals; and 
                                                 
24
 Quoted in Neil Badmington, “Introduction: Approaching Posthumanism” in Posthumanism, Neil 
Badmington, Ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2000), p. 2. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid. 
  14 
his, Freud’s, pronouncement that man is not even the master of his own mind.27 To 
Freud’s three “major blows at the hands of science” to “the naïve self-love of men,” 28 
feminist scientist, philosopher, and historian Donna Haraway, one of the strongest 
opponents of understanding the world in terms of rigid binaries and repressive 
boundaries, adds a fourth. She calls this fourth wound “the informatic or cyborgian, 
which infolds organic and technological flesh and so melds that Great Divide as well.”29 
Not only, that is, is the human not at the center of the universe, not the result of a 
“privileged place in creation,” and the ego “not even master in its own house,” but finds 
itself enmeshed in and defined by technology it may not even understand. 
 In what remains perhaps her best-known work, the essay “the Cyborg Manifesto,” 
Haraway employs the cyborg, an amalgamation of organism and machine, as a metaphor 
for exploring agency in an ever-more wired and networked world. Because the cyborg is 
the product of an impure mingling of organism and machine, without a natural origin 
story and untraceable to a mythical Garden of Eden, it represents “transgressed 
boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities.”30 Instead of cowering in the face 
of the “informatics of domination,” which Haraway sees as usurping “the comfortable old 
hierarchical dominations,”31 and which represent the webs of power present in an 
increasingly technologically-mediated social reality, the cyborg, illegitimate and resistant 
hybrid, has the power to navigate. “Cyborg imagery,” Haraway writes, “can suggest a 
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way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to 
ourselves.”32 The cyborg, as not merely human or machine, organic or technological, 
presents ways of thinking inbetweenness.  
 Haraway's cyborg, intimately connected to technology and an “illegitimate [fusion] of 
animal and machine,”33 bears a strong resemblance to what Hayles calls the posthuman in 
How We Became Posthuman. Hayles defines the posthuman as “an amalgam, a collection 
of heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo 
continuous construction and reconstruction.”34 Haraway describes the cyborg as variously 
“a fiction mapping our social and bodily reality,”35 “an imaginative resource suggesting 
some very fruitful couplings,”36 “ether, quintessence”37 and a “floating [signifier].”38 It is, 
then, a discursive figure, but with real-world implications. Hayles, alternatively, frames 
the posthuman as “a point of view,” but insists that although this outlook tends to 
privilege information over substance, to view the body as merely a prosthesis for the 
mind, and to imagine the human as “configure[d]... so that it can be seamlessly 
articulated with intelligent machines,”39 subjects in a real posthuman future must 
necessarily remain embodied. For Hayles, the idea that thought can be separated from the 
body that houses it is patently ridiculous, involving a series of logical gaps and 
forgettings in the story of scientific and technological development that allow for the 
imagination of disembodiment that she sees as impossible and absurd. Her project, 
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however, is not a rehabilitation of the liberal humanist subject, which she sees as “deeply 
entwined with projects of domination and oppression.”40 Instead, she argues that 
embodiment is a necessary and productive aspect of a posthuman future, and writes that 
If my nightmare is a culture inhabited by posthumans who regard their 
bodies as fashion accessories rather than the ground of being, my dream is 
a version of the posthuman that embraces the possibilities of information 
technologies without being seduced by fantasies of unlimited power and 
disembodied immortality, that recognizes and celebrates finitude as a 
condition of human being, and that understands human life is embedded in 
a material world of great complexity, one on which we depend for our 
continued survival.41 
 
A professor of literature as well as a scientist, Hayles draws examples of posthuman 
figures from (primarily science-fiction) literature, reading them in an attempt both to 
point out the ways in which disembodied figures are abstracted textual productions at 
odds with the embodied materiality that comprises the real world, and to compare them to 
scientific theories.42 Something very like her “dream” posthuman is to be found in the 
works I analyze in this project, although hiding, at times, behind rhetoric that does 
proclaim the obsolescence of the body. 
 It is predictable that in an area of study entitled “posthumanism,” the focus would be 
on the new, and such is often the case. If an attempt at a lineage is made, it is often 
perfunctory, briefly addressing a Cartesian dualism and Enlightenment automata as 
predecessors of the cyborg. However, two important books, both published in 2007, insist 
upon the importance of understanding that ideas of posthumanism and the cyborg do not 
spring fully formed from contemporary thinking and technology, but emerge from a long 
tradition of understanding the human mind and body through the metaphors of 
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contemporary technology. Genesis Redux is a collection of essays that trace what editor 
Jessica Riskin calls “the Sistine gap,”43 that mysterious space between the body as 
machine and the self, a problem that long preceded, though it did inform, Descartes’ 
understanding as the body as “an earthen machine”44 animated by a “rational soul.”45 As 
technology and scientific knowledge have increased in subsequent centuries, 
developments in genetics, microbiology, and digital culture have, rather than resolving 
these questions, further complicated them. In The Enlightenment Cyborg, author Allison 
Muri articulately refutes the idea that the cyborg is entirely a post-World War II 
invention, as well as that a simple Cartesian mind-body dualism sufficiently explains 
Enlightenment thought so often linked to cyborg imaginings. Instead, Muri examines the 
complex ways in which Early Modern thinkers conceived of the human body, often using 
developing technology (especially of communication) as a metaphor, and exploring 
whether, or how, an immortal soul existed, through anatomical and philosophical 
treatises. Although a cyborg proper could not have been imagined in the Enlightenment, 
then, the thinking that would lead to them, post-WWII, had its origins in a more complex 
Enlightenment thought than is often understood. 
 It was in the wake of the second World War that scientific discovery and 
technological advances, combined with the trends in thought mentioned above that 
achieved particular salience during the Enlightenment, precipitated the creation of the 
cyborg, the hybrid product of machine and organism that would inspire Haraway’s 
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powerful metaphor and the idea of the posthuman. A crucial development in the 20th 
century was the idea of the gene. As historian and philosopher of science Evelyn Fox 
Keller explains in The Century of the Gene, the concept that the gene was a code that 
acted as a unit of hereditary transmission as well as the blueprint for each individual 
exerted a powerful lure that shaped thinking about the body and its potential legibility.46 
It was physicist Erwin Schrödinger who in 1945 first proposed the idea of a “code-script” 
in the chromosomes that could act as both “law code and executive power—or to use 
another simile,… architect’s plan and builder’s craft in one.”47 The idea of gene as code 
remains potent, Keller describes, even as scientists who completed the project of mapping 
the human genome in 2003 are still largely baffled about how the gene (which is more 
effective as an idea than a material entity) works. Keller stresses that human life is not 
reducible to a code, but that embodiment is not only a result of the gene, but a very 
necessary prerequisite for the gene’s own creation and functioning.  
 Richard Doyle, a professor of English, and formerly Keller’s student and advisee,  
makes a similar argument in On Beyond Living (1997), introducing the idea of “rhetorical 
software” to describe the framework in language that makes imagining certain concepts 
possible through a necessary erasure of other important factors. For example, 
Schrödinger’s imagined code-script is supposed to contain the plans for the organism 
through all the stages of its development—but that conclusion is drawn retroactively from 
the fact of the mature organism’s body. It is this rhetorical software, Doyle, argues, that 
allows certain ideas to be conceived at all, and sets the stage for imagining things such as 
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life independent of embodiment, and programs run on a computer as “life.” The idea of 
rhetorical software will form an important aspect of my analysis of Life Writer. 
 In addition to scientific discoveries and theories that cast the body as the legible 
product of a written code, the cyborg and posthuman become possible in what Charlie 
Gere calls “digital culture.” In his 2002 book Digital Culture, Gere’s thesis is that “digital 
technology is a product of digital culture, rather than vice versa”; that certain ways of 
thinking and cultural forces precede the technologies that actualize them. Technological 
developments in the last century have been the product of the thinking demanded by 
capitalism—in particular, increasing trends toward abstraction, communication, 
miniaturization and representation—and are particularly indebted to the funding and 
militarization of WWII. These technologies, which experienced another boom with the 
Cold War, have come to form the basis of a culture that provides a new metaphor for 
thinking about the mind and body: the computer and software. Claude Shannon’s 
Information Theory, developed in the 1940s, was important for these developments as it 
allowed for the conceptualization of the “message” as separate and distinct from either its 
content or its delivery system.  
  Information Theory also influenced the field of Cybernetics, the name of which 
was coined by its major proponent, MIT mathematician Norbert Wiener, based on “the 
Greek word κυβερναν meaning to govern, as essentially the art of the steersman,”48 and 
which Gere identified as “a general theory of…‘control and communication in the animal 
and machine’ with particular concern for issues of feedback and self-regulation.”49 In 
1960, Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline introduced the term “cyborg,” a shortening of 
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“cybernetic organism,” to explore the possibility of a self-regulating union of organism 
and machine that would allow for survival in space. The Cyborg Handbook (1995) edited 
by Chris Hables Gray, Heidi J. Figueroa-Sarriera and Steven Mentor, an impressive tome 
collecting half a century of cyborg research, theory, and imaginings, contains this story 
and a picture of the first cyborg: a lab rat fitted with an automatic pump to administer 
medicine based on feedback mechanisms (fig. 1).50 Needless to say, since then the cyborg 
has become a pervasive force in theory, as well as a formidable presence in reality, 
especially if one is to count as a cyborg all organisms modified with technology, as some 
do, from individuals with pacemakers to those who have received immunizations. 
 Views of whether the cyborg and the posthuman and the digital culture they occupy 
are a positive or a negative thing have been mixed. At one end of the spectrum is Donna 
Haraway, who sees an increasingly technologized world as an opportunity for 
individuals—especially ones, such as women and minorities, who have traditionally been 
repressed by “hierarchical dominations”51—to exert agency and freedom of movement in 
a world relieved of oppressive boundaries that have for too long naturalized dominance. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard, who sees 
technology as facilitating the replacement of the real with its simulacra, and repressively 
isolating and alienating individuals. Baudrillard argues in “Prophylaxis and Virulence” 
that in an increasingly digital world of sped-up networks of communication, humans, 
“conceived of as digital machines,” as well as thought itself, are at risk in a world 
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increasingly sterilized by technology, where viruses may be the system’s reaction to 
protect itself from the greater threat of overabundance of communication.52 
 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri also see the world as increasingly networked, in 
interlocking webs of global capital that they call Empire. For them, the posthuman 
represents a figure that, although still bound to operate within the rules of the system of 
Empire, can exercise agency and movement, both navigating and resisting this 
overarching world order. This resistance requires a remaking of the self, a “creative 
evolution” 53 that resists biopolitcal controls on the ability to produce in order to circulate. 
Thus, like Haraway’s cyborg, the posthuman renders indistinct and consequently 
denaturalizes the assumed boundaries “between the human and the animal, the human 
and the machine, the male and the female, and so forth; it is the recognition that nature 
itself is an artificial terrain open to ever new mutations, mixtures, and hybridizations.”54 
To some extent, this transformation can be revealed physically, such as by dressing in 
drag, and Hardt and Negri write that  
[w]e do certainly need to change our bodies and ourselves, and in perhaps 
a much more radical way than the cyberpunk authors imagine. In our 
contemporary world, the now common aesthetic mutations of the body, 
such as piercings and tattoos, punk fashion and its various imitations, are 
all initial indications of this corporeal transformation, but in the end they 
do not hold a candle to the kind of radical mutation needed here.55 
 
This physical description of posthuman possibilities is uncommon for the theoretical 
discourse, and, as Hardt and Negri emphasize, only begins to hint at the transformations 
required in becoming posthuman. Although these themes have been analyzed in 
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literature, especially the cyberpunk and science fiction Hardt and Negri reference here, 
far less attention has been paid to imagery. 
 In fact, the question of what the posthuman might look like, or what visual 
characteristics might reveal the ideas of blurred boundaries, impurity, agency, or intimacy 
with digital technology that tend to characterize it, has been little examined, particularly 
by art historians. Amelia Jones’ book Self/Image, of 2006, provides one way of thinking 
about these concerns, emphasizing the “never enough” of photography and digital media 
in capturing the essence of the self.56 In addition, it discusses subjects and bodies that 
might, though she only uses the term once, be considered posthuman: whether a resistant 
faction reclaiming and revealing their inhabited, postmodern, urban environment, such as 
the artists’ group Asco; women performing bodily transformations before a camera or on 
video, such as Renée Cox or Pipilotti Rist; or an artist using visible technology to 
augment the body, such as Stelarc. This book is a more revealing and in-depth study than 
collections like Posthuman Bodies (1995), edited by Judith Halberstam and Ira 
Livingston,57 or Virtual Futures (1998), edited by Joan Broadhurst Dixon and Eric J. 
Cassidy,58 both of which seem enthralled primarily by sexual difference and provide 
little, if any, visual analysis. The Prosthetic Impulse: From a Posthuman Present to a 
Biocultural Future (2006), another collection of essays, edited by Marquard Smith and 
Joanne Morra, does provide more visual exploration of posthuman possibilities, 
particularly through pursuing the concept of the prosthetic, which ranges in focus through 
the volume from physical limbs to extensions of memory or thought.59 
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 Although the visual has been little studied in understanding the posthuman and the 
possibilities it represents, artists have been engaging with posthuman themes of 
boundary-crossing and productive intermixture, as well as explorations of the current 
digital culture and webs of capitalist control, for decades. Certain kinds of art, by their 
very indefinability and refusal to be productized, highlight the resistant possibilities of 
visual expression. Performance art is a particularly potent example of this, as 
performance historian Peggy Phelan describes in “The Ontology of Performance.” Phelan 
writes that since performance is necessarily ephemeral, existing only in the present, it 
refuses easy cooption into a capitalist cycle of exchange value. “Performance’s 
independence from mass reproduction,” she writes, “technologically, economically, 
linguistically, is its greatest strength.”60 Beyond that, performance is a play between 
presence and absence: it depends explicitly on the body of the performer, while that body, 
for all its availability, disappears as it becomes art.61 It is a form of language that cannot 
be captured in writing. It leaves no trace or triumphant product of a mythical 
Author/father figure—a figure which, theorist Roland Barthes argued in his seminal 1967 
essay, is dead. This Author’s heroic product, the “work,” is replaced by the “text,” which 
is now open to a multiplicity of readers.62 The work of art is no longer restricted to a 
material object, but actually occurs within individual viewers/participants. One early 
piece to explore this theme was John Cage’s 1951 4’33”, which, though it appears to 
consist of silence, in fact encompasses the intentional and unintentional sounds of the 
audience itself. Alan Kaprow’s 18 Happenings in 6 Parts (1959) (fig. 2) is another, more 
overt example, of a work that blurs the distinction between performer and audience, by 
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actually assigning viewers parts in the performance. Digital media also allow for the 
creation of works that leave no material trace, but are seemingly given existence only 
through the arrangement of pixels on a screen, such as Simon Biggs’ online, interactive 
The Great Wall of China (1999) (fig. 3). Finally, if the physical body had also been seen 
as a discrete and bounded entity, art challenged this as well, from French artist Orlan’s 
opening and transformation of her body via surgery in her series La Reincarnation de 
Sainte-Orlan (1990-1993) to Eduardo Kac’s genetic modification of the rabbit Alba, the 
glow-in-the-dark GFP Bunny (2000) (fig. 4). 
Life Writer 
 I turn now to another work that relinquishes authorship, quite literally, to its audience: 
Christa Sommerer and Laurent Mignonneau’s 2006 Life Writer (fig. 5). Life Writer’s 
connection to the body is not as immediately visible as it is in the other works I address, 
such as projects by Orlan, Stelarc, or even Char Davies. What is on display in Life Writer 
is not an intimate interface between flesh and machine, but an even deeper 
correspondence: it posits life itself as an encoded, machinic, phenomenon. This is not an 
idea unique to Life Writer: the idea of the mystery of life as somehow scripted goes at 
least as far back as Schrödinger’s “code-script” metaphor, and persists in popular 
understanding of the gene.63 What Life Writer highlights is the invisible. In a classic 
scene in the 1987 film The Princess Bride,64 the hero, Westley, presents his nemesis 
Vizzini with a tiny vial, which the latter sniffs and hands back, saying, “I smell nothing.” 
“What you do not smell,” returns Westley, “is called Iocaine powder. It is odorless, 
tasteless, dissolves instantly in liquid, and is among the more deadly poisons known to 
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man.” (Later, the villainous Prince Humperdink, examining the abandoned scene and the 
now-dead Vizzini, sniffs the same vial and pompously declares, “Iocaine. I bet my life on 
it.”) The very essence of this substance is what is doesn’t reveal. What we do not see, in 
Life Writer, is the actual code—the DNA, as its artists call it—that programs the creatures 
brought to “life” by viewers interacting with the artwork. More importantly, what we do 
not see is the rhetorical software that allows us to understand life as something that can 
be encoded, recoded, and transferred between media.65 This understanding of life as 
software and body as hardware is just the “how” Hayles identifies in How We Became 
Posthuman. It is with this in mind that I dig deeper into the writings of life represented in 
Life Writer. 
 The Museum of Contemporary Art Tokyo (MOT) is a modestly-sized, but stylishly 
contemporary building of white stone and steel, built in 1995 (fig. 6). It is nestled 
between an elegantly angular fountain courtyard and swath of green space in a quiet 
corner of the Koto ward, east of the bustle of metropolitan Tokyo. In the spring of 2010 
its cozy basement galleries were home to “Cyber Arts Japan,” an exhibition celebrating 
the 30th anniversary of the ARS Electronica festival and its special relationship to 
Japanese artists.66 It is here, past the large glass cases housing the eccentric electronic 
instruments (“Nonsense Machines”) of Japanese musician-performers Maywa Denki67; 
past the robotic tail that, when strapped to a participant, curls and twitches in concert with 
the wearer’s own movements68; and past the clicking, motorized teddy bear who sits on a 
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pedestal in front of a digitally projected montage of the videos shot through cameras in its 
eyes69; that one encounters Life Writer. 
 Situated in the center of its own darkened, three-walled room, haloed in a bluish 
digital glow, Life Writer beckons irresistibly (fig. 7). A wooden chair pulled up to the 
table invites close contact, although the museum attendant has to encourage some of the 
shyer viewers, reassuring them—often through a brief demonstration—that the chair is 
indeed to be sat upon, the art interacted with. An antique typewriter rests in the middle of 
the table, a long sheet of white paper fed through its rollers and curving gracefully over 
the edge of the table. The paper itself seems to glow brightly, like a screen, though it is in 
fact illuminated by an overhead digital projector. 
 The typewriter is a shiny black manual with a silver Royal logo emblazoned above 
four banks of round glass keys.70 The keyboard design’s open framework reveals the 
lever beneath each silver-ringed key, as well as the surface of the desk visible between 
them. Through the central opening in the dust shield above the keyboard, one can see 
phalanxes of corresponding typebars, their visual and functional symmetry clearly 
indicating their purpose. A few clues indicate the typewriter’s European origin, including 
the QWERTZ keyboard layout; “umschalter” where an English-speaker would expect to 
find the word “shift”; and three additional keys for the umlauted vowels Ö, Ä, and Ü. 
This model, officially called the Royal Portable Standard, but also referred to as the 
“Model O” after its serial number, or the “Touch Control,” after the key tension selector 
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here located below the Royal insignia, dates from the mid-1930s. 71 Its small scale and 
enticingly fingertip-sized round keys, positioned to receive input from one hand or two, 
give it a particularly intimate aesthetic. 
 This well-preserved, old-fashioned machine provides an interface in contrast with the 
“cyber” aspect of the work, which plays out on the aforementioned glowing surface of 
the paper. Despite being nearly a century old, the typewriter retains a familiarity and 
immediacy absent in similarly-aged technology,72 due in large part to its unchanged 
QWERTY key arrangement. Although today’s computer keyboards are readily 
reconfigurable—not constrained by the one-to-one mechanical relationship that 
characterizes typewriter keys—most of them, including the virtual one on the touchscreen 
of my own smartphone, keep the QWERTY layout. Given the ubiquity of keyboards in 
contemporary life, Life Writer’s interface is particularly intuitive. 
 If the integration of antique and contemporary technology is subtly achieved, 
however, the results are thus perhaps even more striking. The stroke of a key sends the 
corresponding typebar clacking against the platen, where—if struck with sufficient force, 
naturally—the expected letter appears on the paper. When the paper is advanced forward 
in the machine, however, either by turning the platen knob or advancing the line space 
lever, any similarity to a standard typed page disappears. Hovering above the type guide, 
the letters appear to take on a life of their own, pausing for a split second on the page 
before beginning to transform. A series of typed letters melts into one another, shrinking 
down to a speck before reemerging as an insect-like creature. A single letter drifts and 
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spins upward, developing into a simple creature if it is not first summarily devoured by 
another hungry creature on the page.  
 The resulting creatures are surprisingly evocative, and definitively buggy (fig. 7). 
Every creature that develops from the text consists of a body and at least one pair of legs, 
the flat black silhouettes mirroring the look of the characters from which they evolved. 
Body size and shape vary, as do the legs; the simplest creature looks at first like a single 
line, its body the tiny dot connecting the two legs. Others have small bodies with long, 
articulated legs positioned at the back, making them fast and froglike in their movements; 
or round bodies with legs sticking straight out to the sides that seem to row across the 
page, sometimes bumping up against the side of the page and spinning themselves in 
circles against its edge. Creatures’ morphologies—some reminiscent of water striders, 
others of crabs or spiders—shape their movements. They skitter, swim, limp, crawl, or 
row through or over each other, swarming in masses around the type guide, from which 
food—in addition to, and sometimes in the form of, new creatures—emerges when the 
viewer types letters.  
 When two compatible creatures meet, they “mate,” producing offspring that combines 
features from each. The meeting between the two is generally very brief, occasionally 
occurring after what appears to be only the merest crossing of paths. A tiny speck appears 
between them, developing into a creature that is more complex, and often larger, than 
either parent, and, depending on the morphology of the two, even asymmetrical. This 
creature’s shape determines its own movement and speed, and its mating with another 
creature will create an even larger and more complex offspring. As mating occurs very 
rapidly and the creatures seem generally disinclined to eat others of approximately their 
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own size, a blank page can quickly become filled, particularly at the hands of an 
enthusiastic typist, with a swirling mass of legs and bodies. 
 The typist-viewers frequently are quite enthusiastic, once they’ve crossed—often 
assisted and encouraged by the attendant—the barrier of understood museum behavior, 
which generally prescribes that artworks be viewed but not touched. Some strike the keys 
rapidly, causing the typebars to jam and onlookers to laugh at the excess of energy. The 
typebars are easily disentangled, however, and such frantic outbursts of text quickly 
result in the page teeming with a dense mass of creatures. These can be cleared (and 
frequently are, by an attendant demonstrating the piece to a new viewer) by turning the 
platen knob to advance the creatures to the far edge of the page. This is technically, of 
course, to the edge of the projection, which coincides with the point where the paper, 
supported horizontally thus far by a frame hidden beneath it, hangs off the edge and curls 
toward the floor. As the creatures reach the edge of the page/projection, they seem to 
cling there, as if resistant to being rolled into oblivion. A few more clicks, though, and 
they are gone, the page glowing pristinely in anticipation of the next user’s input.  
Visibility and Invisibility 
 Life Writer is a project that seamlessly integrates visible and invisible elements; it 
consists in what we do not see, yet it is first and foremost a work of art. It is its visual 
elements—the graceful typewriter, the emphatically buggy “creatures”—that are 
immediately arresting and engaging, with the invisible machinery of only secondary 
concern. Its power lies in its ability to show what we otherwise do not see, and to invite 
the interaction that highlights it. The history of typewriter design itself has also been 
concerned with the idea of visibility and non-visibility, to which I turn briefly now. 
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In his history of the typewriter, The Writing Machine, Michael H. Adler describes in 
detail the proliferation of typewriter designs that flourished between the early part of the 
nineteenth century and the 1930s, by which point the “standardization on the 
conventional design had become ubiquitous.”73 By the first years of the twentieth century 
this design included “front-stroke, type-bar machines with four-row keyboards,”74 though 
it also “suffered the severe handicap of non-visible typing.”75 Adler describes an intense 
debate, in fact, between proponents of “visible” and “blind” machines—that is, whether 
or not the machine allowed for viewing of the typing produced. No less reputable a 
reference than the contemporary Encyclopedia Britannica (fig. 9) weighed in on the 
debate, stating in its entry on the typewriter that  
doubtless the novice who is learning the keyboard finds a natural 
satisfaction in being able to see at a glance that he has struck the key he 
was aiming at, but to the practical operator it is not a matter of great 
moment whether the writing is always in view or whether it is only to be 
seen by moving the carriage, for he should as little need to test the 
accuracy of his performance by constant inspection as the piano-player 
needs to look at the notes to discover whether he has struck the right 
one…76 
 
 The “visible” design did win out, in what Adler calls a “foregone conclusion,” for its 
superiority as far as error detection and correction and operations such as underlining. 
The Royal used in Life Writer, following a by-then entirely standardized design (fig. 
10), does allow the viewer to see each letter as it is typed, and, as is paradigmatic of the 
entire project, presents itself as visible in other ways as well. Especially compared to the 
computer, in which inner workings are hidden from view, the typewriter is itself an 
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eminently visible machine. Each key bears a direct correspondence to the letter it 
produces, which is evident not only in the metal bars extending from beneath each key 
and directly connecting to the appropriate typebar but in the direct relationship between 
the force with which a key is a struck and the force with which the letter is impressed on 
the page. Even the tangle of typebars that results from an overenthusiastic punching of 
the keys—especially by contemporary fingers, trained in speedy keyboarding by online 
search and chat—attests to the graceful simplicity of the machine and its ability to 
translate from fingertip to printed character. 
In Life Writer, the typewriter’s elegant, intuitive design and operation extend into the 
larger project itself. If one assumes of a typewriter that it will just work—as indeed early 
user testimonials,77 as well as the ease with which one can still obtain a functional old-
fashioned model, would indicate—it is perhaps surprising to find that the attendant 
technology, in this case, does as well. In her meditation on literature in new media and 
medium specificity, Writing Machines, N. Katherine Hayles recalls a colleague 
describing to her the “various outrages to which the computer subjected her”78—outrages 
that would never occur with a printed volume, but were potentially perilously present in a 
literary work whose medium was digital. Indeed, few of us have been spared subjection 
to the computer’s outrages—a particularly apt term for the singular frustration evoked by 
the “blind” machine mysteriously, but emphatically, refusing to perform as directed. Yet 
in Life Writer, the technology does, seemingly almost as if by magic, work. 
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When the typebar strikes the platen, it leaves a character on the glowing page, which 
moves with the paper as if it were actually printed there and not a digital projection. On a 
standard typewriter, this impression would be mediated by the typewriter ribbon, the ink 
from which would remain on the paper as the printed character, while the ribbon itself 
remained visible just below the line of text, ready to ink the next character. Unlike on a 
standard typewriter, in Life Writer there is no ribbon, and thus no physical trace—no 
matter how faint—of the letters that have been typed. The characters projected onto the 
page remain letters only until they are advanced up the page, at which point they begin to 
transform into the tiny, insect-like creatures that soon overrun the glowing surface. 
 In this “visible” machine, one can instantly see the characters that typing produces, as 
well as watch those letters transform themselves into lifelike creatures, yet the 
mechanisms that facilitate these feats of technology are artfully hidden. The writing desk 
on which the Royal rests, although it varies from installation to installation, is always a 
simple affair, a four-legged table whose height the artists specify at approximately 70 cm 
and whose own clean lines and transparency of form further emphasize Life Writer’s 
elegant simplicity.79 A single cord extends from the back of the typewriter and over the 
edge of the table before disappearing at the floor. Close inspection reveals other smaller 
cords connecting works inside the machine with the platen and framework that supports 
the paper, but even these, their dull silver covering camouflaging them amidst the 
typewriter’s steel components, are integrated so subtly as to be nearly invisible. The 
overhead projector, bolted to the ceiling, is the most obviously high-tech piece of 
equipment, yet the audience’s attention is far more absorbed with the sheet of paper the 
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projector effective turns into a computer screen, and on which most of piece’s action 
occurs. So seamless is the interaction between the analog and digital here—the surface of 
the paper, and everything on it, corresponding so directly to the users’ interactions with 
the typewriter—that the technology necessary to accomplish it, already subtle, becomes 
essentially invisible. 
 Even better hidden—in fact, completely invisible—is what might fancifully be called 
the soul of the project, the genetic algorithm that animates the creatures and distinguishes 
them as “artificial life forms.” (That very designation itself implies the use of another 
kind of “software,” to which I will return later.) The catalog for the All Digital exhibition 
at the Museum of Contemporary Art Cleveland (2006) even includes “code” among its 
list of materials for the piece.80 That code is the invisible link between the text that 
viewers enter on the keys of the typewriter and the creatures that emerge, individual in 
morphology, size, and speed, yet highly familiar and evocative in their life-like behavior.  
The artists write that users’ “text is transformed into the DNA of artificial life forms that 
appear on the real paper of the typewriter,”81 “genetic” programming that renders them 
“semi-autonomous and [able to] follow their own internal rules of metabolization and 
reproduction.”82 This code and its specifications are not revealed to the viewers, nor is it 
evident by what logic the characters typed turn into the creatures that fill the page. 
Although longer strings of letters appear to create larger creatures, some randomness also 
intervenes between the characters typed and the creatures that emerge; the spacing 
between individual letters in a single string of characters or “word” may mean that 
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instead of uniting to form a single character, the letters join, or split, with unpredictable 
results. This code, invisibly shaping the outcome of the visible text, is integral to 
understanding these creatures as artificial life forms. 
Making Life 
 Sommerer and Mignonneau met and began their artistic collaboration when they were 
students at the Städelschule Institute für Neue Medien in Frankfurt, under the mentorship 
of Professor Peter Weibel. Sommerer had studied botany and modern sculpture, and 
Mignonneau’s background was in “video, improvisation and performance.”83 The two 
first collaborated on the project Interactive Plant Growing (1992), in which viewers 
could “grow,” shape, and create new combinations of three-dimensional virtual plants 
projected on a screen via their interaction with live, physical, plants in the gallery space. 
It was the first of many projects that would involve unique and often organic interfaces, 
situate the physical body in relation to digital technology, and explore the creation and 
manipulation of “life” in an online environment. It was in their project A-Volve, of 1994, 
that Sommerer and Mignonneau first began deliberately working with the ideas of AL. 
For this project, they collaborated with biologist and AL researcher Thomas S. Ray.84 
 Ray is perhaps best known for his work on the Tierra system, a model of artificial life 
in which the evolution of a simple string of code inside the designated computer led to a 
complex “ecosystem” within the simulator’s virtual universe. Ray, a tropical biologist 
who studied biodiversity in the Costa Rican rain forest, was frustrated by the length of 
time that would be required to observe evolution at work in nature, as well as its 
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necessary restriction to life on earth.85 He designed Tierra as “a practical alternative”—as 
a model of “evolution in a bottle” in which the development of life forms and ecosystems 
could be closely observed independent of the usual limitations of time and carbon-based 
life forms. Ray explicitly states that his purpose in creating Tierra was “to synthesize 
rather than simulate life,” which necessitated a definition of the latter in “a way that does 
not restrict it to carbon-based forms.”86 He goes on to do just that, writing simply, “I 
would consider a system to be living if it is self-replicating, and capable of open-ended 
evolution. Synthetic life should self-replicate, and evolve structures or processes that 
were not designed-in or preconceived by the creator.”87 According to his own definition, 
then, Tierra does meet the requirements of a living system.88 Each creature in the system 
“consists of a self-replicating assembler language program”—a string of code executed 
by its own central processing unit (CPU) within the larger virtual computer, and derived 
from a single “ancestor” program.89 Ray designed the code paying close attention to the 
“structural and functional properties of the informational system of biological molecules: 
DNA, RNA, and proteins.”90 Whereas in molecular biology proteins fit together by 
shape, in Tierra shape is simulated by a binary pattern: the template 1 1 0 1, for example, 
would find, and fit to, 0 0 1 0.91 With a mutation function that “randomly flips bits in the 
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soup”92 and introduces copying errors during the replication process, as well as a “reaper” 
that culls the oldest/most error-generating creatures to prevent overpopulation, the self-
replicating creatures quickly produce a diverse and integrated ecology as they compete 
for limited resources (in this case, CPU time), developing—based solely on their 
interactions with each other and with the environment, and not by external direction—
varied and often quite complex ecologies. These include configurations of code that Ray 
calls parasites, hyper-parasites, and even hyper-hyper-parasites: programs that have, 
without any intervention by Ray, evolved to compete in very specific ways. A parasite, 
for example, is a program that has lost its own ability to replicate itself, but in turn has 
gained the ability to latch onto another organism and appropriate its copying procedure. 
A hyper-parasite has evolved to take advantage of the parasites, waiting to be invaded by 
one and then using the latter’s allotted computer time to accomplish its own replication. 
Based on her conversations with Ray, Hayles writes that when he “set his program 
running overnight, he thought he would be lucky to get a 1- or 2-byte variation from the 
80-byte ancestor. Checking it the next morning, he found that an entire ecology had 
evolved, including one 22-byte organism.”93 This story may evoke the image of a petri 
dish teeming with a rich variety of bacteria after being left alone for a short time, but of 
course the “ecologies” at play here exist solely as code in a computer—mini-programs 
running on a larger program. 
The world of Tierra and the “life” that resides there comprise code inside a computer, 
but various techniques have been used to make the “creatures” and processes visible. One 
of the ways Tierra’s data have been displayed is through visualizations created by Marc 
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Cygnus’ Artificial Life Monitor (ALmond) program.94 In these images, each creature is 
represented by a bar in a grid, its length corresponding to its size (that is, the length of its 
code, or, its “genome”), and its color to its type—host, parasite, hyper-parasite, etc. A 
chronological progression of these images, taken at various points during the ecosystem’s 
development, shows the proliferation of various types of organisms and the system’s 
varying composition over time (figs. 11-14). In the captions, Ray narrates the images to 
tell a story: “Hosts, red, are very common. Parasites, yellow, have appeared but are still 
rare.” “Hosts are now rare because parasites have become very common. Immune hosts, 
blue, have appeared but are rare.” “Immune hosts are increasing in frequency, separating 
the parasites into the top of memory.” “Immune hosts now dominate memory, while 
parasites and susceptible hosts decline in frequency. The parasites will soon be driven to 
extinction.” This grand dramatic narrative is best described, as Hayles puts it, as “epic.”95 
 Whereas the ALmond images translate data into graphic representations, another 
means altogether was used to visually simulate the actions that occur within Tierra for 
the creation of the short film “Tierra: Evolution in Another Universe: (1995). In these 
digital animations, which Ray and early collaborator Dan Pirone emphasize are merely a 
way to visualize the processes of Tierra, the “creatures” are represented by brightly-
colored, toy-like shapes that fit together in three sections, not entirely unlike ants (figs. 
12-18).96 The mutation function is illustrated by periodic flashes of lightning, which 
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illuminate the scene and contribute to the creation of parasites, which look similar to the 
original creatures except for their cyan color and generally shorter length. The reaper is 
illustrated as a solid skull, surrounded by tornado-like swirling lines, which spins over the 
scene, touching down on selected creatures which then explode. 
  Tierra is work of science, not of art; visualizations of the project function simply as a 
way to display and explain the workings of the project itself, otherwise visible only in 
tables of code. In Sommerer and Mignonneau’s artwork A-Volve, however, on which they 
collaborated with Ray, the project consists precisely in what is seen (figs.19- 20). Like 
Tierra, A-Volve focuses on the evolution of digital creatures and their fitness within a 
particular environment, but in the latter, users play a direct role in this evolution, from the 
creature’s appearance to its interaction with other creatures. Sommerer and Mignonneau 
write that “The concept of A-Volve is to let the installation visitors discover how to 
design good and fit creatures, as the creature’s fitness will determine its survival in the 
pool.”97 Although in A-Volve, as in Tierra, the creatures exist, on a certain level, 
primarily as strings of code, their visible manifestation as colorful, moving objects, both 
makes them seem more life-like and brings them more firmly into the world of the 
viewers with whom they interact. 
 Viewers create the three-dimensional creatures in A-Volve by drawing on a touch-
sensitive screen: first a side view, and then a cross-section. The resulting creature—its 
color assigned randomly and its texture based on the pressure of the user’s touch98—is 
then “born,” via a hidden projector, into a small water-filled glass pool (approximately 
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three feet square), where an overhead video camera detecting users’ movements allows 
them to interact with their creatures (fig. 21). A creature’s shape and size influence its 
speed and movement within the pool, and in turn the creature’s “fitness,” a value relative 
to the other occupants of the pool and which establishes whether, in a given pairing, a 
creature will find itself as predator or prey, as well as its potential mating partners. 
According to the artists, “a good design will become a fast and fit creature, whereas a 
poor design will be slow,” and a “creature’s fitness and swimming speed significantly 
influence its survival in the pool and how successfully it can reproduce and evolve.”99 
Viewers thus have the opportunity to view this evolution in action, and, “given that the 
visitors spend enough time observing and learning the internal structures of A-Volve, the 
system will become selective based on speed.”100 Fitter creatures will survive to eat, 
rather than be eaten by, other creatures, and to pass on their genetic material to their 
offspring. 
 The genetic material in A-Volve consists of each creature’s 90-parameter “genetic 
string,” which determines its size, length, shape, color, brightness, and texture, and in 
turn the way it moves, and thus its speed. Initially, this code is derived from the user’s 
converted input on the touch screen, and in subsequent generations results from “cross-
over” between the genetic strings of both parents, with some mutation randomly 
applied.101 In the artists’ 1996 project GENMA—Genetic Manipulator, viewers can once 
again interact with virtual digital creatures in simulated three-dimensional space, yet in 
this case, the creatures’ genetic code is not only visible, but modifiable: viewers can edit 
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the creatures’ genetic code to effect immediate changes in their appearance.102 Their 
project Life Spacies II (1999) (figs. 21-22)103, the direct precursor to Life Writer,104 again 
focuses on virtual creatures based on genetic codes, but in this case, as in Life Writer, 
those codes derive directly from text entered by viewers. Directly, that is, but not 
necessarily intuitively: although a longer text message does result in a more complex 
creature than a short one does, the text’s translation into genetic code makes it difficult, if 
not impossible, to determine the relationship between the content of the text and the 
creature generated. 
 The artists write that the “text-to-form editor” they developed to turn visitors’ 
messages into the genetic code of creatures was “based on the idea of linking the 
characters and syntax of a text to specific parameters in the creature’s design.”105 In this 
process, the computer program first converts each character of the typed message into a 
standard ASCII value. The resulting integers are then plugged into random seed (rseed) 
functions that in turn each generate a string of random numbers (or, rather, pseudo-
random, as if the same rseed is called again, it will generate the same sequence of 
numbers). These series of numbers are then used to point to specific functions in a 50-
item “design function table,” each of which modifies the creature’s body from the default 
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“module”—a colorless, textureless, basic sphere—into a unique one, its individual 
complexity based upon the originating text. The creatures, “born” into the virtual 
environment when the message is sent, seek food to gain energy, which in turn allows 
them to mate and create offspring. Users can aid creatures by placing food—in the form 
of text characters (for which each creature has varying individual preferences, based on 
the letters of its own genetic code)—close to them, thus directly influencing the evolution 
of the system. 
 Like Life Writer, A-Volve allows users to generate and interact with their digital 
creations, though the latter allows for much more direct (hands-on, as it were) 
intervention. In neither project does the viewer see the complex genetic codes that shape 
the creatures’ behaviors. However, in Life Writer, even as the creatures themselves—two-
dimensional and monochromatic—are simpler, the faster pace of evolution reveals a 
greater complexity. 
 In all of these AL projects, strings of code, whether given visual form or not, are 
described as “beings,” with lifelike “behaviors” such as eating, mating, and dying. Ray 
emphatically states that Tierra represents synthesized, not simulated, life; he describes 
these patterns of action, rather than any “restriction to carbon-based forms,” that 
constitute life. Sommerer and Mignonneau’s approach is more subtle, invoking the L-
word in many of their artworks’ titles, yet largely leaving interpretation of whether or not 
their projects indeed manufacture life to their audiences. The idea that life can be created 
in non-organic form is a product of the technology able to serve as its supporting 
medium, but foremost of the idea that life itself is a coded phenomenon. The earliest AL 
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research, on which I now focus for a moment, explored the idea of life as code far before 
technology such as the computers used by Ray or Sommerer and Mignonneau existed.  
Life as Code: Early AL Research 
 The origin of AL research is often traced back to John von Neumann, a Hungarian-
American physicist and mathematician, who in the early 1950s posed the question: can 
machines reproduce? As theoretical biologist Claus Emmeche writes in his book The 
Garden in The Machine: The Emerging Science of Artificial Life, von Neumann sought a 
solution to whether, purely logically, machines could exhibit this oft-cited unique 
characteristic of life. “Von Neumann had neither the possibility of nor interest in 
simulating a living system at the biochemical or genetic level,” Emmeche writes. “At that 
time virtually no one, including von Neumann, knew that DNA was the genetic material. 
Rather, von Neumann hoped that he could abstract the logical form of process from the 
natural material self-reproduction.”106 In order to do this, von Neumann focused on 
“cellular automata,” themselves an abstraction of machines to their most basic 
components—a “set of physically unspecified states, input, output, and operational 
rules.”107 A cellular automaton, a model suggested to von Neumann by his friend and 
colleague, the mathematician Stanislaw Ulam, consists of a grid in which each cell 
changes its own state based on the state of its neighboring cells, according to the rules 
established for the model. With the initial start pattern and rules established, changes in 
state occur simultaneously across the entire matrix of cells at every step, with the effect 
that certain patterns may be interpreted as moving or growing across the grid.  
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 Von Neumann’s model, a highly complex one in which each cell had twenty-nine 
potential states, was to be a purely formal logical sequel to his earlier “physical-
mechanical” formalization of life processes, which his student Arthur Burks dubbed the 
“kinematic model” because the imagined apparatus floated about a “pond” of raw 
materials from which it could fabricate a reproduction of itself.108 In contrast, later 
models of AL based on cellular automata provided significantly simpler and more 
accessible visualizations of the processes von Neumann sought to describe. One of the 
most popular of these is the “Game of Life,” or simply “Life,” a game developed by 
British mathematician John Conway in the 1970s and still popular today (fig. 23). In 
Conway’s model, “cells” are spaces on a grid. Each cell has just two potential states, 
alive or dead, defined by three rules based upon its eight neighboring cells: a cell with 
two or three neighboring cells survives to the next “generation”; a cell with more or 
fewer neighbors dies (of “overpopulation” or “isolation,” respectively); and a cell is born 
into any empty space bordered by exactly three neighbors.109 Although the game was 
introduced as one to play on a checkerboard or with graph paper and pencil, Conway also 
mentions the usefulness of using “a PDP-7 computer with a screen” for observing the 
changes of longer-lived populations. These days, there are many ways to play the game 
online, including in HTML5 and Java formats in which one can select one’s preferred 
speed and grid size, as well as participate in active forums for discussing the game and 
new developments.110 
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 These cellular automata are characteristic of AL research generally, which 
approaches complex problems by reducing them to their most elementary components 
and working from the bottom up. Whereas research on Artificial Intelligence (AI) has 
started at the top, so to speak, with attempts to replicate such intelligent human behavior 
as chess-playing or conversation, AL starts at the bottom, with the most simplified 
components, and anticipates emergence, the process by which lower-level interactions 
lead to more complex phenomena at higher levels.111 Both “Bottom-up construction” and 
“Allowance for emergence” are points in the “seven commandments of artificial life” 
identified by Emmeche, coming in at commandments five and seven, respectively. The 
others in his list of characteristics of what he calls “artificial life in its strongest, most 
ambitious form,” are, in order: The biology of the possible (the idea that the study of life 
needn’t be limited to carbon-based forms); Synthetic method (a focus on assembling 
components to create “life-resembling processes,” rather than simply analyzing them); 
Real (artificial) life (although the parts may be artificial, the systems and behavior are 
real); All life is form (life is a logical process, and “fundamentally independent of the 
medium”); and Parallel processing (classical computing runs programs sequentially, but 
life, and thus AL, depends upon multiple smaller processes running simultaneously).112 
 Emmeche identified these “commandments” based on the vision of AL that began to 
emerge at the Interdisciplinary Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living 
Systems (which came to be known as Artificial Life I), held in September of 1987 at the 
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Los Alamos National Laboratory. The international conference was convened and 
organized by computer scientist Christopher Langton, who is credited with inventing the 
label Artificial Life, and who sought to bring together researchers who had been working 
in relative isolation but shared certain themes in common. Langton’s own research 
examined cellular automata, notably his eponymous Ant—a program in which a 
computerized “ant,” following two simple instructions, leads to complex patterns (fig. 
24)—and Loops, self-reproducing automata in which cells have eight potential states (fig. 
25).113 It was at the second of these workshops (Artificial Life II) that Thomas Ray 
presented his work on the Tierra system. 
The Meaning of Life 
 I step backward for a moment, away from the models used to describe or create life, 
to an even more fundamental shift in understanding what it is that comprises human life. 
Generating lifelike behavior from artificial materials or considering a program running on 
a computer as itself life are certainly ways of thinking borne of and shaped by the 
approach of AL. Yet even before Ray unleashed “evolution” in his PC or von Neumann 
sought to formulate in mathematical language what characterizes life, changes were 
occurring in how life was perceived and described. Tracing the roots of some of these 
changes is instructive for understanding how life came to be seen as formalizable in code, 
reproducible in a machine, or independent of medium, as is looking at how machines and 
changing technology have facilitated this thought. This understanding of human life and 
inheritance as fundamentally encoded lays the basis for the concept of cybernetics, and in 
turn the cyborg, precursor of the figure of the posthuman. 
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  In 1945, physicist Erwin Schrödinger published a book provocatively entitled What 
is Life? The Physical Aspects of the Living Cell.114 Although the question of what defines 
life, or separates the living from the nonliving, is ostensibly within the purview of 
biologists, Schrödinger sought an answer through his expertise in physics. His conclusion 
to the question posed in his title was firmly rooted in the gene—that component of the 
cell that attains “a durability or permanence that borders on the miraculous.”115 
Schrödinger outlines the metaphor of “code-script” in the chromosomes, which acts as 
both “law code and executive power—or to use another simile,… architect’s plan and 
builder’s craft in one.”116 For Schrödinger, life is literally encoded in the genes: a set of 
instructions that not only define and create the individual, but are transmissible through 
infinite generations. 
 Evelyn Fox Keller writes that although “Schrödinger, alas, did not find the secret of 
life,” even in his failure, “the very effort of so prominent a physicist to solve so 
fundamental a biological problem served as powerful inspiration for an entire generation 
of young physicists and biologists, encouraging them in their own efforts to find the 
molecular structure of the gene. And soon they succeeded.”117 That solution, cemented 
with James Watson and Francis Crick’s 1953 discovery of the double-helical structure of 
DNA, came to define an understanding of life based on a gene that, as the title of Keller’s 
book suggests, is both potent and intensely persistent. However, as Keller points out, the 
gene works much better as an idea than as a physical structure for explaining the secret of 
life. Schrödinger’s code-script is a temptingly neat and tidy metaphor for the cell reading 
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and executing instructions, and as such has continued to captivate imaginations. Keller  
emphasizes, however, that although literary models for the gene abound, imagining 
genetic material as merely a logical, legible code is misleading; in fact, the “body” of the 
cell itself (supposedly autopoietic via the DNA’s instructions) has a strong and largely 
unknown influence on the proteins created, which is “where computers and organisms 
part ways.”118 That is, the physical, material, “stuff” of the cell is as important for the 
growth of the organism as any (imagined) pristine code—a code which, in the case of 
DNA, continuing research reveals to be far less stable, monolithic, and passive, than itself 
originally imagined.119 Keller suggests that the time has come for a new vocabulary, one 
that both reflects and shapes new thinking in genetics and the life sciences—that sees 
“gene,” for instance, as a term that, while certainly once inspirational as a concept, fails 
to explain current understandings of how cells and heredity work, and focuses not on 
static “programs,” but on “evolvability” and “developmental robustness.”120 
 Richard Doyle also focuses on the role of language in his book On Beyond Living, 
examining the role of rhetoric in shaping what, exactly, “we are studying, when we study 
life, today.”121 He too looks at Schrödinger’s thesis in What is Life, contending that by 
identifying life with a genetic code—a “pattern” encompassing an organism's entire 
development plus the means for creating the organism—Schrödinger set the stage for 
science imagining life independent of embodiment. In fact, he claims that rhetorical 
“tricks” like this are not uncommon, and that they are a result of “the age of World 
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Scripture,” whereby the entire world is seen not just as Heidegger's “world picture,” but 
as transformed into language—“appear[ing] available in its entirety in code.”122 
Doyle traces this encoding impetus through molecular biology, which he claims 
has tended, from Schrödinger onward, to frame life as code or pattern and, subsequently, 
the body as mechanical. This leads to what he calls the “postvital body”:  “the body that 
fits, and is fitted to, molecular biology.”123 Of this body, Doyle writes:  
While the modern body of the organism announced, through its character 
and anatomy, the deep unity at work in its depths, the postvital body is a 
memorial. It is a site of the memory of the modern body, where the 
characteristics and the behavior of organisms can be found. If under the 
modern regime life, hidden in the body, was ‘perceptible beyond disease,’ 
the postvital body is a transparent sequence that has nothing behind or 
beyond it.124 
 
This flattening and “revealing” of the body in code is an example of what Doyle calls 
“rhetorical software,” the language tools that make invisible certain assumptions while 
providing the framework to think others. This software facilitates the forgetting of some 
things and the imagining of others, of which one notable example, to which he devotes 
the final chapter of his book, is Artificial Life.  
Doyle writes that “While the regime of molecular biology, which under 
Schrödinger, literally forgot the body as it contained it in the code-script, artificial life 
operates on a memory of the body.”125 Indeed, it operates on a memory of the body in 
that AL separates the idea of “life” from the physical materiality of bodies, yet ignores 
that the life it attempts to replicate exists only in, through, and as those very bodies. This 
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erasure of the “stuff”126 of life in AL parallels the move Keller describes by which the 
mysterious “stuff” of the cell is rendered invisible in favor of the imagined clear, legible 
code of the DNA that runs like a computer program. It is “one-half of the central 
problematic of the rhetorical software of artificial life,” Doyle writes, “the knot of 
contradiction formed when an essentialist project gets intertwined with simulation.”127 To 
discuss the other half, Doyle turns to Baudrillard, who has famously argued that the real 
disappears at it is replaced by its simulacra; the real becomes “that of which it is possible 
to give an equivalent reproduction.”128 Thus, although AL may demonstrate “lifelike 
behavior,” as Doyle writes, “these artificial life constructions are models of nothing, no 
thing. Vitality, as a contested series of effects rather than a determinate, localizable 
essence, is the result not of mimesis but of simulation, where simulation need not refer to 
any stable original.”129 AL, by presenting code and its resultant simulation as life, again 
reinforces the idea that the physical and material is somehow merely a side effect of life 
itself—not the stuff of which and from which it is. 
Thinking Through Machines: AL as Life 
 From my initial description of Life Writer, I have been working my way backward, 
tracing the philosophical and cultural developments that made possible not just AL 
projects in science and art, or the mathematical bases for such projects, but the 
understanding of life that allows these projects to be called “life” at all. I now focus for a 
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moment on how technology itself allows us to understand life and the body—an 
understanding that has developed and evolved alongside that changing technology. 
 Understanding DNA as a sort of software run by the cells to create life, and in turn 
calling computer programs whose own code exhibits lifelike behaviors “alive,” are the 
direct result of increasingly advanced technology, as well as, to use Emmeche’s phrase, a 
certain “landscape of ideas.” Emmeche is referring particularly to the influences on von 
Neumann’s thought in determining a logical structure for life, including the work of Alan 
Turing, Alonzo Church, Kurt Gödel, and Emil Post, and which had, collectively, “led to a 
crucial new insight: that the essence of a mechanical process was not so much material-
physical, as it was its program or control structure, which via an abstract set of rules—a 
formal specification—could capture the process’s functionality.”130 The focus shifted, as 
it were, from hardware to software.  
 Technology has long shaped our understanding of the world and particularly of the 
human body; in her 2007 book The Enlightenment Cyborg, Allison Muri points out that 
metaphors for understanding the body as machine were in play during the Enlightenment 
and even before. In his Digital Culture of 2002, Charlie Gere offers the complementary 
hypothesis that not only do machines shape thinking, but that certain ways of thinking 
must precede the technology that actualizes those machines. Gere likewise argues that 
what he calls digital culture “is neither as new as it might appear, nor is its development 
ultimately determined by technological advances. It would be more accurate to suggest 
that digital technology is a product of digital culture, rather than vice versa.”131 
Technological developments in the last century have been the product of the thinking 
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demanded by capitalism—in particular, increasing trends toward abstraction, 
communication, miniaturization and representation—and are particularly indebted to the 
funding and militarization of WWII. Tracing its roots from developments in the late 18th 
and early 19th centuries, such as the collection of census data and the development of the 
Jacquard loom, Gere produces an impressive array of results of and contributions to the 
developing digital culture, including “avant-garde art practice; counter-cultural techno-
utopianism; postmodernist critical theory; [and] new wave subcultural style.” 132 These 
trends in culture have been aided by machines, but have arisen from trends in thought that 
prefigured the machines themselves. 
 What, then, does this thinking through machines, from the man-machine of 
Muri’s “Enlightenment cyborg” through Gere’s digital culture, mean for the meaning of 
life—particularly as viewed through the lens of machine-mediated/created A-life? Firstly, 
depending on one’s perspective, understanding AL as life reflects either a very broad or a 
very narrow idea of what life is. In turn, it may be taken as evidence of either humans’ 
ultimate power over their environments, or of their total inability to recreate, with the 
apex of their technology, what nature seems to do so effortlessly. It also suggests, in a 
turn that will be discussed later at greater length, a transferability between “media” of life 
forms: an inherent essence or impulse that is independent and separable from the medium 
that supports it, whether carbon or silicon. In the AL projects discussed—Life Writer, 
Tierra, A-Volve, and Life Spacies—I identify three particular elements that comprise the 
definition of life. Life is understood in each project as, firstly, existing in the individual 
organisms in the form of the genomic code of each; secondly, in the interactions of the 
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complex system as a whole; and, finally, in the strategies of visualization that enable the 
creators to talk about their projects as life.  
 That the “life” of the organisms is equated with the genetic code that comprises each 
is perhaps most evident in Tierra. This is revealed particularly clearly in a statement Ray 
makes regarding the “ecosystem” that develops in Tierra’s designated computer:  
Most observations on the diversity of Tierran creatures have been based 
on the diversity of size classes. Creatures of different sizes are clearly 
genetically different, as their genomes are of different sizes. Different 
sized creatures would have some difficulty engaging in recombination if 
they were sexual; thus, it is likely that they would be different species.”133 
 
 Ray’s description conflates the genotype and phenotype of the organisms, revealing that 
the creatures’ “bodies” consist solely in code. It also inverts the more typical experience 
of the world, in which one sees from the different physical characteristics of their bodies 
that members of two different species are unfit to mate, rather than recognizing this 
incompatibility from their (invisible) genetic code. This inversion reveals again the 
rhetorical software at play here, reinforced by what Hayles identifies as the piece’s 
narrative, which includes the aforementioned characters of the ancestor, parasites, and 
hyper-parasites, as well as a “plot” that describes “the emerging story of the struggle of 
the ‘creatures’ for survival and reproduction.” Hayles continues, “More than an analogy 
or an image, this is a drama that, if presented in a different medium, one would not 
hesitate to identify as an epic.”134  Although Ray does specify that “The ‘body’ of a 
digital organism is the information pattern in memory that constitutes its machine 
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language program,”135 understanding these patterns as creatures is essential to 
understanding Tierra as having achieved Ray’s goal of “synthesizing life.” 
 In addition to “deploy[ing] a model of the body in which genetic sequences are 
bodies,” as Richard Doyle puts it,136 AL defines life by the interaction of those sequences 
in complex systems.  As discussed earlier, one of the principles of AL is the possibility 
for emergence, which occurs when organisms—or programs—operating by a set of 
simple rules begin, as a result of their interactions with each other and the environment, 
to display more complex patterns of organization and/or behavior. Formation of these 
complex systems is a critical part of the “life” that occurs in Sommerer and 
Mignonneau’s pieces. However, they point out that although there is “now an 
understanding that when a set of evolving autonomous particles or agents interact, the 
resulting global system displays emergent collective properties, evolution and critical 
behavior that have universal characteristics,” 137 there exists “no unified complex systems 
theory or a ‘manual’ for how to create complex systems as such.”138 In their introduction 
to Life Spacies and Life Spacies II, they provide a condensed but extensive overview of 
the literature on measuring and defining organization in these systems, briefly 
summarizing theories of complexity ranging from the Kolmogorov-Chaitin-Solomonof 
definition of Algorithmic Information Complexity to so-called Shannon entropy. They 
conclude that for their own purposes—“to create a complex interactive artwork that could 
constantly change, adapt and evolve as users interact with the system”— they were most 
aided by the theories of Stuart Kauffman and Langton and Packard, which “suggest 
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complex adaptive systems, systems at the ‘edge of chaos’ where internal changes can be 
described by a power law distribution.”139  
 In Sommerer and Mignonneau’s work, such as in Life Spacies, the complexity arises 
from users’ input to, and interaction with, the works of art. The artists describe their 
artistic approach with the phrase “Art as Living System.” Here, “Creation is no longer 
understood as expression of the artists[’] inner creativity or ‘ingenium’ (according to 
Hegel) but becomes itself an intrinsically dynamic process that represents the interaction 
between the human observer, his/her consciousness and the evolutionary dynamic and 
complex image processes of the works.”140 Thus, the code of the “organisms” comprises 
part of the system’s complexity, but itself exists as part of an even larger and more 
complex system. 
 The third and final characteristic these AL works share in defining “life” is a 
strategy of visualization that enables the creators to talk about their projects as such. In 
the case of Tierra, although life ostensibly exists solely in the genetic sequences that 
comprise the “creatures” and in their interaction with the environment and one another, it 
is the visualization provided, to some extent by the ALmond images, but to a much 
greater degree by the animations created to illustrate and promote the system, that the 
story of the piece as life really takes shape. As Hayles writes,  
To the extent that the ‘creatures’ are biomorphized, their representation 
reinforces the strong claim that the ‘creatures’ are actually alive, extending 
the implications of the claim. Nor do the transformations appear only in 
the video, although they are particularly striking there. As the discussion 
above demonstrates, they are also inscribed in published articles and 
                                                 
139
 Ibid, 101. 
140
 Sommerer and Mignonneau, “Art as Living System,” in Art@Science, Sommere and Mignonneau, Eds. 
148. 
  55 
commentary. In fact, they are essential to the strong claim that the 
computer codes do not merely simulate life but are themselves alive.141 
 
These visualizations, Hayles argues, though clearly nonscientific—as Ray and others 
would also hasten to emphasize142—contribute strongly to the piece’s narrative of 
aliveness. Even if understood as merely an illustration of the underlying process in which 
the real life of the piece consists, they make those unseen interactions and evolutions all 
the more plausible as instances of life in a different medium. 
 In Sommerer and Mignonneau’s pieces, such as Life Writer, the creatures’ genetic 
code is manifested only in the projected phenotype, and it is the latter that looks, 
sometimes startlingly, lively and alive; the emphatic bugginess of the skittering creatures 
in Life Writer causes some viewers to recoil in disgust. This may be “artificial” life, but it 
looks remarkably close to the real thing. These creatures—unlike their colorful, showy 
Life Spacies predecessors, which appear to have more in common with what one might 
find in Ray’s rain forests—are, like their text ancestors, flat and black against the glowing 
screen. Partly because, as a result, they look like silhouettes, and partly because of their 
realistic size, however, they are far “buggier” than the Life Spacies creatures. Further 
emphasizing their realism is the way the creatures move, which varies based on their 
body shape (“Behavior in space is, so to speak, an expression of form,” the artists 
write143), but is consistently, convincingly, bug-like.  
 The idea of behavior is one Hayles criticizes in her analysis of Tierra. She writes, 
“Even granting emergence, it is still a long jump from programs that replicate inside a 
computer to living organisms. This gap is bridged largely through narratives that map the 
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programs into evolutionary scenarios traditionally associated with the behavior of living 
creatures.” She continues that these narratives, which “make sense of the program logic,” 
transform binary operations that “amount to changing electronic polarities… into the high 
drama of a Darwinian struggle for survival and reproduction.” 144 It is in the stories told 
about Tierra, then, and not in the actions within, or outcomes of, the computer program, 
that life is understood to exist, narratives that Hayles attributes to Ray: 
By representing [the computer codes] as phenotypes, visually by giving 
them three-dimensional bodies and verbally by calling them ‘ancestors,’ 
‘parasites,’ and such, Ray elides the difference between behavior, properly 
restricted to an organism, and execution of a code, applicable to the 
informational domain. In the process, our assumptions about behavior, in 
particular our thinking of it as independent action undertaken by purposive 
agents, are transported into the narrative.145 
 
For Hayles, attribution of behavior to the computer codes is a function of the observer’s 
interpretation rather than intrinsic to the program, an interpretation shaped by the 
language and imagery. 
 Interestingly, Hayles uses the word “phenotype” to describe the representations of the 
computer codes, a usage that is not precisely accurate, and one Ray would almost 
certainly dispute. A phenotype, as described by the Oxford Dictionary of Biology, is 
“The observable characteristics of an organism. These are determined by its genes (see 
genotype), the dominance relationships between the alleles, and by the interaction of the 
genes with the environment.”146 An organism’s phenotype is thus the physical expression 
of its underlying genetic coding, whereas the images in the video were created simply to 
illustrate the processes in Tierra.  
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 In Life Writer, on the other hand, the creatures projected on the typewriter’s page may 
genuinely be considered phenotypes. The genetic code derived from the viewers’ 
keyboard inputs corresponds directly to the creatures’ morphology and subsequent 
interaction with the typewriter, page, and other creatures. As in Tierra, commonly cited 
characteristics of life are at play here, including reproduction, mutation, and evolution, 
but Life Writer’s mobile, lively, creatures take AL to an entirely new level: a directly 
visible one. Instead of code, one sees creatures that consume floating letters or their 
smaller fellows, and whose offspring clearly resemble a combination of both parents. 
Whether or not these interactions can be interpreted as “behavior” (which may, in turn, 
depend upon whether they can be considered organisms), Life Writer makes visible a 
certain way of understanding life—one increasingly emerging from the ideas of 
Schrödinger’s code script, from contemporary molecular biology, and from more recent 
investigations into Artificial Life. This view of life, together with concurrent and 
complementary developments in communications and other reach-extending 
technologies, led to an imagining of the human beyond its current limitations and 
possibilities: the imaginary, and potential-filled, posthuman.  
Serious Cybernetics: 147 The Human as Machine 
 We arrive now at the crux of this chapter, the point at which ideas of life as code, 
software as life, and body as machine intertwine in the powerful idea of cybernetics, from 
which develops the cyborg—the cybernetic organism of Haraway’s metaphor and 
precursor of the posthuman. Although the artificial life forms that swarm across Life 
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Writer’s page are perhaps the piece’s most striking and immediately engaging (or 
repulsing) feature, those creatures’ origin in language—via the symbolic, abstracting 
interface of the typewriter keyboard—and the connection they highlight between 
metaphors of writing and the creation of life, have their roots in the tenets of cybernetics 
and its attendant technologies of communication and control. I have traced, following 
Keller and Doyle, the ways in which a conception of the gene as, per Schrödinger, a set 
of coded instructions, leads to an understanding of life in turn that allows for that code to 
be labeled, in AL, as life itself. In cybernetics, whose history is closely entwined with 
that of AL and shares many of the same cultural influences, institutions, and major 
players, man and machine are first imagined as, at their most fundamental level, 
compatible and transferrable. This is a large part of the “how” of Hayles’ “becoming 
posthuman,” and a potent image will prove tenacious and productive in imagining the 
posthuman. 
 In her book Who Wrote the Book of Life, published in 2000, historian of science Lily 
E. Kay examines the scientific and cultural forces at work in shaping the metaphor—an 
old one, yet transformed in a particular way in the mid-20th century—of the Book of Life, 
specifically the way it came to be seen as inscribed within the genome. Building on the 
work of Keller and Doyle (both of whom she cites), as well as many others, Kay provides 
an in-depth examination of the scientific developments and conversations that framed the 
development of “a genomic ‘Book of Life.’”148 Kay considers the contributions of 
individual scientists and institutions that, influenced by wartime and postwar thinking, 
funding, and technology, catalyzed a cultural shift that began to frame molecular biology 
as an increasingly cryptographic endeavor. This shift to “information-thinking” led to the 
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development, increasing ubiquity, and eventual literalization of the metaphor of gene as 
code.149 
 Although the “who” of Kay’s title encompasses a large number of research 
laboratories and individual scientists, from the relatively well-known to those history has 
tended to leave behind, she makes clear that larger factors were at play in this “writing.” 
Many of the same influences that Charlie Gere identifies as comprising his earlier-
discussed “digital culture” background what Kay calls “the postwar world order, [in 
which] the material, discursive, and social practices of molecular biology were 
transformed.”150 This new world order was particularly shaped by what she calls the 
“military-industrial-academic complex,”151 which continued, even after the war, to 
provide the bulk of the funding for scientific and communications research. Kay writes 
that the primary patrons of scientific research in the 1950s were the United States 
Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA). “Monies were spent on nuclear-weapons research, 
space research, ever-faster electronic computers, germ warfare, biological research on 
radiation, and techniques of social control, thus placing scientific research in the fields of 
physical, life, and social sciences at the center of cold-war knowledge production.”152 In 
addition, Kay continues that molecular biology, and genetics in particular, received 
significant funding from military sources. 153  
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 Not only did funding from military sources continue, but along with it, Kay argues, a 
particular state of mind and accompanying rhetoric. During the war, the military’s focus 
had been on defense and code-breaking, one which continued as scientists turned their 
skills toward attempting to crack the genetic code. Attempts to “break” the genetic code, 
which is neither language nor cryptograph, necessarily failed, but left the legacy of “a 
powerful metaphor… [whose] informational and scriptural representations of heredity set 
roots and proliferated,…[setting] the conceptual framework and discursive structures” 
that would continue to dominate the field.154 
 Information theory was one of the most important ideas to develop from this milieu 
and, along with cybernetics, to permanently shape how life, as well as relationships 
between humans and machines, was understood. One of its founders and a notable code-
breaker, whose research moved from top-secret wartime missions to postwar 
communication studies at Bell Laboratories (which Kay identifies as leading “the 
industrial sector in volume of military contracts”155), was Claude Shannon. In 1948 he 
published “The Mathematical Theory of Communication,” in the Bell System Technical 
Journal, but reached a broader audience the next year with the release of his book of the 
same title.156 The latter was co-authored by Warren Weaver, then head of the Natural 
Sciences division of the Rockefeller Foundation, and contains a long interpretation by 
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Weaver of Shannon’s far shorter article. The other founder of information theory was 
MIT professor of mathematics, Norbert Wiener, whose Cybernetics was released the 
same year and whose name for a time joined Shannon’s in the Wiener-Shannon theory of 
communication.157  
 Shannon’s information theory, arising from his work on cryptology and in pursuit 
of Bell Labs’ goal of delivering clear and efficient telephone communication, is, as the 
title suggests, an approach to understanding the components involved in communication 
systems as mathematical equations. Although he had been and continued to be concerned 
with the practical matter of sending messages, this theory deals in the abstract. As he 
states early in the article, “We wish to consider certain general problems involving 
communication systems. To do this it is first necessary to represent the various elements 
involved as mathematical entities, suitably idealized from their physical counterparts.”158 
The concern, then, is not with the physical components that comprise a communication 
system, but rather a schema of their various functions, expressed as equations. The real 
innovation in Shannon’s theory, however, and the idea that would prove the most 
intriguing and influential across disciplines, was that not just the parts of the 
communication system, but the message itself, could be separated from not only the 
medium carrying it, but its very meaning. He writes: 
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The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point 
either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point. Frequently 
the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according to 
some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These semantic aspects 
of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. The significant 
aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of possible messages. 
The system must be designed to operate for each possible selection, not just the 
one which will actually be chosen since this is unknown at the time of design.159 
Information in Shannon’s information theory is simply the degree of probability that 
separates it from other potential messages that might be sent, and has no connection to 
meaning or medium. Weaver further emphasizes this point in the book version of 
Mathematical Theory, writing, “The word ‘information’ in this theory is used in a special 
sense that must not be confused with its ordinary usage. In particular, information must 
not be confused with meaning.”160  
 This freeing of information from any material substrate forms a crucial part of the 
history N. Katherine Hayles describes in her 2000 book How We Became Posthuman. 
The “becoming” she outlines involves what she calls three stories: how information lost 
its body, how the cyborg was created, and how the liberal humanist subject became 
today's posthuman. This first move, of seeing information as disembodied—“[s]tripped 
of context,… a mathematical quantity weightless as sunshine, moving in a rarefied realm 
of pure probability, not tied down to bodies or material instantiations”161—is crucial for 
the latter two transitions, and certainly doesn’t remain solely within the realm of 
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communication theory. Information theory itself, with its intriguing and wide-ranging 
imaginative potential, was likewise freed from its contextual moorings, over the protests 
of Shannon, for application in any number of disciplines. “Shannon himself frequently 
cautioned that the theory was meant to apply only to certain technical situations,” Hayles 
writes, 
not to communication in general. In other circumstances, the theory might 
have become a dead end, a victim of its own excessive formalization and 
decontextualization. But not in the post-World War II era. The time was 
ripe for theories that reified information into a free-floating, 
decontextualized, quantifiable entity that could serve as the master key 
unlocking secrets of life and death.162 
 
In an era of code-breaking, of triumph of technology, and of unprecedented funding for 
discovery and knowledge-production, this elegant formulation was destined to spread. 
Indeed, Kay writes that “The synergy of [Shannon’s] concurrent projects—improving the 
fidelity of information transmission and the design of secret coding systems—seemed to 
generate a theory applicable, in principle, to any system, physical or biological, in which 
information can be properly coded, quantified, and manipulated through time and 
space.”163 Kay’s project traces the way the theory was applied to molecular biology; 
Hayles’ focuses on the ways that its privileging of pattern over materiality led to 
conceptualizations of the body and the self that she defines as posthuman. 
 The other half of the Wiener-Shannon theory of communications and of the 
foundation of cybernetics is mathematician Norbert Wiener, who did not share Shannon’s 
compunctions regarding the necessity of keeping information theory context-specific and 
indeed embraced its application, and the application of cybernetics, across numerous 
disciplines and areas of study. Wiener, like Shannon, had been employed by the military 
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during WWII, where he first developed, as historian of science Peter Galison describes it, 
the technology that would form the basis of his cybernetic understanding of the mind, 
body, “vast array of human proprioceptive and electro-physiological feedback systems,” 
and ultimately “the universe itself.” 164This device was the “antiaircraft (AA) predictor 
(fig. 26), which Galison writes was “designed to characterize an enemy pilot's zigzagging 
flight, anticipate his future position, and launch an antiaircraft shell to down his plane.” 
Through these complex information feedback loops, Wiener came to see thought, 
communication, and even the world itself as likewise controlled by the exchange of 
information. As Galison puts it: 
Where Darwin had assiduously tracked the similarities between human 
and animal in order to blur the boundary between them, Wiener's efforts 
were devoted to effacing the distinction between human and machine. 
Darwin's dog suffered remorse; Wiener's AA predictor had foresight.165 
 
In 1943, Wiener co-authored an essay with electrical engineer Julian Bigelow and 
cardiologist Arturo Rosenblueth, entitled “Behavior, Purpose, and Teleology,” in which 
they define behavior as “any change of an entity with respect to its surroundings,” which, 
in its “purposeful” form, “may be interpreted as directed to the attainment of a goal—i.e., 
to a final condition in which the behaving object reaches a definite correlation in time or 
in space with respect to another object or event .”166 They describe this purposeful 
behavior, self-guiding as being achievable by machines equipped with feedback 
servomechanisms. Throughout, the authors draw parallels between the “behavior” and 
“purpose” of both machines and organisms, at one point even referring to the “main 
function of the cerebellum [as] the control of the feed-back nervous mechanisms involved 
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in purposeful motor activity.”167  In 1950 Brown University philosopher Richard Taylor, 
responding in the same venue, took issue with the idea that machines could ever be 
meaningfully judged, based upon their behavior, as “intrinsically purposeful”168—that 
even a “target-seeking” missile, as in the example given by Wiener, et. al, is guided by 
sound waves emanating from its particular object and not “seeking” the target at all. 
 In their response, published in the same volume, Wiener and Rosenblueth offer their 
most emphatic defense yet of machine behavior—and of organic/machinic parallelism. 
They conclude their essay: 
We also wish to explain why we use the humanistic terms purpose and 
teleology in the description of the behavior of some machines. The 
question of whether machines are or can be like men or the higher animals 
does not guide our choice. This question is on the main irrelevant for 
scientific objectives. We believe that men and other animals are like 
machines from the scientific standpoint because we believe that the only 
fruitful methods for the study of human and animal behavior are the 
methods applicable to the behavior of mechanical objects as well. Thus, 
our main reason for selecting the terms in question was to emphasize that, 
as objects of scientific enquiry, humans do not differ from machines.169 
 
For the purpose of science, that is, it doesn’t matter why machines or organisms exhibit 
certain actions (though Wiener and Rosenblueth strongly defend that machines do, in 
fact, exhibit purposeful behavior)—only that the “programming” underlying them are not 
fundamentally different: humans do not differ from machines.  
 Galison points out that it is crucial that this assertion, like the development of 
cybernetics itself, came from a specifically martial origin; “Wiener's image of the human 
and natural world is, in the end,” he writes, “a globalized, even metaphysical, extension 
of the epochal struggle between the implacable enemy from the sky and the Allies' 
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calculating AA predictor that did battle from the ground.”170 Remnants of the 
unknowability of the enemy remain in Wiener’s cybernetic formulation of the mind as a 
“black box” (a term, according to Galison, derived from the boxes housing radar 
equipment during the war and in Wiener’s formulation representative of “a unit designed 
to perform a function before one knew how it functioned”) and of the world as 
information exchange between other black boxes.171 Wiener, deeply shaken by the usage 
of the nuclear bombs and the blame he might deserve for his involvement, was not 
exactly rosy about the future of this cybernetic world. 
 Time magazine’s January 23, 1950 feature story, “The Thinking Machine” (its 
cover bearing a whimsical “portrait” of the Mark III computer), focuses on the rise of 
computers, and Wiener’s (rather dark) view of the future they portend (fig. 27). The 
article cites Wiener as pointing out that “The newest machines… already have an 
extraordinary resemblance to the human brain, both in structure and function.” Though 
they lack “senses or ‘effectors’ (arms and legs),” it continues, “there are all sorts of 
artificial eyes, ears and fingertips (thermometers, strain gauges, pressure indicators, 
photo-electric tubes) that may be hooked up to the machines,”172 allowing them to 
operate not just the typewriters they already do, but “valves, switches and all of the other 
control devices common in modern industry.”173 Such development, bound to occur, 
would mark, in Wiener’s words,  
‘the second industrial revolution,’ which will devalue the human brain as 
the first industrial revolution devalued the human arm. He points out that 
only a few hand workers can now compete with power-driven machines. 
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Soon, he warns, there will be wholly automatic factories with artificial 
brains keeping track of every process. They will order raw materials, 
inspect them, store them, route them through the plant. They will pay bills, 
blow the factory whistle and pay the help (if any). 174 
 
With computers artificial human brains that can be equipped with sensors and actuators 
for more efficient working, there seems to be little hope for the meager, weakly human. 
It’s a familiar story; the article even mentions R.U.R, the tale of robot uprising that I 
discuss in further depth in Chapter 4. If Weiner’s predictions of factories run by artificial 
brains haven’t come to fruition, however, his legacy of understanding humans as 
machines, and vice-versa, has been instrumental in the conception of the cyborg, to which 
I’ve continued to return to as a useful metaphor. That legacy of the idea of human-
machine interchangeability has emerged more recently—and seems to echo some of his 
direr predictions—in the more recent idea of the Singularity. 
The Singularity 
I wish to conclude this already rather protracted history with one more idea about 
living in the future, one that also allows me to touch briefly on two aspects that have 
shaped my own worldview and thinking on the posthuman: eschatology and 
correctibility.  This is the Singularity movement, one of the more extreme projections of 
the cybernetic legacy. Again, Time magazine steps in to gloss the topic for the masses, 
dedicating their February 21, 2011 feature story to the topic. The cover (fig. 27) features 
an image of an androgynous, hairless human head, chalky white and with a woven metal 
cable emerging from a port at the base of the skull, illuminated by the single LED 
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glowing greenly just above it (fig. 28). Emblazoned across the image is the headline 
“2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal.” A red asterisk at the end of the line leads the 
reader to the lower right-hand corner of the cover, where smaller text reads, “*If you 
believe humans and machines will become one. Welcome to the Singularity movement.” 
The cover story focuses on futurist Ray Kurzweil, and his belief that, in the words of 
author Lev Grossman, Time’s book critic and technology writer, “we’re approaching a 
moment when computers will become intelligent, and not just intelligent but more 
intelligent than humans. When that happens, humanity—our bodies, our minds, our 
civilization—will be completely and irreversibly transformed.”175 The label “singularity,” 
borrowed, Grossman says, from astrophysics, indicates “a point in space-time—for 
example, inside a black hole—at which the rules of ordinary physics do not apply.”176 It 
is impossible, that is, to predict what would follow the moment in which machine 
intelligence outstripped human intelligence, changing all the rules.  
Grossman quotes computer scientist and sci-fi author Vernor Vinge as declaring, at a 
1993 NASA symposium, that “within 30 years, we will have the technological means to 
create superhuman intelligence. Shortly after, the human era will be ended.” Indeed, the 
title of Vinge’s paper, delivered at the NASA-sponsored VISION-21 symposium, and 
from which the previous sentences were drawn, is “The Coming Singularity: How to 
Survive in the Post-Human Era.”177 In case the “how to survive” of the title didn’t give it 
away, Vinge is not particularly optimistic about the prospects for human life after the rise 
of superhuman intelligence. He imagines several possibilities, ranging from the worst-
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case scenario of “the physical extinction of the human race” to the best-case scenario of a 
“golden age” of development, with the possibility of human immortality. Even in the 
“brightest and kindest world” of the latter, however, Vinge points out philosophical 
problems: an immortal mind that remains at a fixed capacity would ultimately become 
little more than a “repeating tape loop;” one with the capacity to grow would become a 
very different entity than whatever it was at the beginning, with little affinity for that past 
self. 
If my perspective on living in the future is shaped by my birth in the early 1980s and 
the attendant experience borne of using such rapidly developing technologies, it is also 
influenced by the guiding paradigm that the world was going to end—soon. I was raised 
in a church tradition that has been expecting the Second Coming of Christ, and with it the 
destruction of the world as we know it, since its formation in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Though the world would be destroyed, however, believers would be granted immortality; 
in the words of the Apostle Paul:  
Behold, I shew you a mystery; We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be 
changed,  
In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet 
shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be 
changed.   
For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on 
immortality.178  
 
This tradition, then, while expecting the destruction of the known world, was also looking 
forward to a singularity of sorts: a change, in the twinkling of an eye, of what it means to 
be human. As this change would occur at the end of a period of suffering and tribulation, 
it was anticipated with as much anxiety as excitement. A dark vision of the future is 
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certainly not limited to Christians, though the historical pervasiveness of Christian 
thought in American culture suggests that its legacy may be at least partially to blame.  
 Time produced a Web video that accompanies Grossman’s article, with a title that 
highlights and pokes fun at this persistent fear response: “Singularity: How Scared 
Should We Be?”179 In it, self-proclaimed “science comedian” Brian Malow points out 
that our popular culture imaginings suggest we believe “our creations will turn against 
us”—whether from our “psychology of abuse,” guilty conscience, or fear of 
Frankensteinian overreach. This mythology cautions against the hubris that would result 
in our own destruction at the hands of such creations—though, given the generally 
triumphant endings of such films, film theorist R.L. Rutsky and others have identified 
these stories as particularly humanist.180  
 Indeed, if the Singularity is primarily concerned with the ascension of superhuman 
intelligence, it nonetheless contains distinctly humanist aspects, particularly in the 
concept of human perfectibility—or at least correctibility. Grossman writes that at the 
2010 Singularity Summit, held by the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, “the 
most-talked about topic,” after AI itself, “was life extension.” He explains, “Biological 
boundaries that most people think of as permanent and inevitable. Singularitarians see as 
merely intractable but solvable problems. Death is one of them. Old age is an illness like 
any other, and what do you do with illnesses? You cure them.”181 The computer models 
that Adams identifies as helping us understand what life is—where we came from, what 
we’re made from—cause people like gerontologist and theoretician Aubrey de Grey to 
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view aging as unnecessary and preventable. “People have begun to realize,” Grossman 
quotes him as saying,  
that the view of aging being something immutable—rather like the heat 
death of the universe—is simply ridiculous. It’s just childish. The human 
body is a machine that has a bunch of functions, and it accumulates 
various types of damage as a side effect of the normal function of the 
machine. Therefore in principal that damage can be repaired 
periodically.182 
 
De Grey’s assertion that the body is a machine is certainly a more believable prospect 
that it might have been before technology made the leaps visible over simply the past 
three decades—becoming smaller, faster, and more pervasive. 
 I’ve long been fascinated by the idea of the body being, if not perfectible, at least 
correctible, having begun my own corrections at a young age. I was prescribed my first 
pair of glasses at eight, and contact lenses at nine. A few years later, my parents took me 
to an orthodontist who fitted me with a palatal expander, headgear, and braces. I was 
made aware of the significance of this venture: my mother, the eldest of four children, 
had longed for braces but had had to settle for a retainer with a rubber band instead of a 
guiding wire; my father had had braces, in the dark days of the early 1960s when a full 
metal band encircled each tooth. The braces my siblings and I wore represented advances 
in technology as well as our parents’ histories. I also felt particularly linked to the past 
through my corrected vision, realizing that, uncorrected, my eyesight (which deteriorated 
as I grew) would have rendered me an invalid in a less technologically advanced age. 
Thanks to modern optometry, I was able to enjoy life as a fully sighted person despite my 
physiological failings. 
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  The obsession with correcting and improving the body goes beyond my personal 
fascination, deep into American culture. A rash of so-called reality television shows 
released over the past decade have focused on beautification through makeovers of 
clothing, hair, and cosmetics; weight-loss; and even surgery. Among the most radical of 
these are ABC’s Extreme Makeover, which ran between 2002 and 2007, and E!’s The 
Swan, which ran between 2004 and 2005. In both cases, participants undergo invasive 
and occasionally dangerous procedures (revealed, somewhat graphically, for the viewing 
audience, though the “swan” isn’t allowed even a mirror) to better match societal beauty 
norms.183 Though the desire for beautification is nothing new, the means of achieving 
it—as highlighted in these shows—are: cosmetic injections, laser resurfacing, plastic 
surgery, LASIK vision correction, cosmetic dentistry, and more. The message of these 
shows is that an ideal of beauty and youthfulness is achievable, no matter what one is 
born with. Living in the future, with its increasingly-accessible technologies of youth and 
beauty, means there is no need to be constrained by one’s given face or body. In the 
following chapter, I examine this idea—pushed in a rather different direction—in more 
depth through the work of the French performance Orlan. 
 We are, it bears repeating once more, living in the future.  This idea is not a new one, 
though the pace of acceleration in the technology we use daily, namely our phones and 
computers, has certainly increased to an unprecedented pace, intensifying the sensation 
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(if current trends hold, my Samsung Rant, a functioning antique at its retirement after 
only four years, will be my last phone to have lasted that long). As early as 1970, futurist 
Alvin Toffler described an effect he identified as “future shock,” which, like its namesake 
culture shock, was characterized by the “shattering stress” 184 due to “the superimposition 
of a new culture on an old one”—even when that old one is in the same location.185 
“Future shock,” Toffler writes, “is the dizzying disorientation brought on by the 
premature arrival of the future. It may well be the most important disease of 
tomorrow.”186 Our future of today, as well as the disease of tomorrow, are the direct 
result of a technological boom  in the middle of last century, the story to which I have 
attended as I traced the history of Life Writer, and particularly its use of AL. That story 
continues in the chapters that follow. 
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Figure 1.1 Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline’s "Cyborg,” 1960 
 
Figure 1.2 Allan Kaprow, 18 Happenings in 6 Parts (the artist during the performance) 
  75 
 
Figure 1.3 Simon Biggs, Great Wall of China (screenshot), 1999.  
 
Figure 1.4 “Eduardo Kac and Alba, the 
fluorescent bunny.” Photograph by Chrystelle 
Fontaine. 
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Figure 1.5 Sommerer & Mignonneau. Life Writer, Museum of Contemporary Art, Tokyo, March 20, 
2010. 
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Figure 1.6 Entrance, Museum of Contemporary Art, Tokyo. March 20, 2010. 
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Figure 1.7 Sommerer and Mignonneau, Life Writer, Museum of Contemporary Art, Tokyo, March 
20, 2010. 
 
Figure 1.8 Sommerer and Mignonneau, Life Writer (detail of “bugs”), Museum of Contemporary Art, 
Tokyo, March 20, 2010. 
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Figure 1.9 "Typewriter," Encyclopedia Britannica, 1911.Digitized and hosted online by Google 
Books. http://books.google.com/books?id=yf0a3OFlq3sC&pg=PA502&dq    
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Figure 1.10 Royal Portable Standard, Serial # O-605667, 1936. 
http://machinesoflovinggrace.com/royals.htm
 
Figure 1.11 Marc Cygnus, ALmond visualization of Tierra. “Hosts, red, are very common. Parasites, 
yellow, have appeared but are still rare.” 
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Figure 1.12 Marc Cygnus, ALmond visualization of Tierra. "Hosts, are now rare because parasites 
have become very common. Immune hosts, blue, have appeared but are rare." 
 
Figure 1.13 Marc Cygnus, ALmond visualization of Tierra. "Immune hosts are increasing in 
frequency, separating the parasites into the top of memory." 
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Figure 1.14 Marc Cygnus, ALmond visualization of Tierra. "Immune hosts now dominate memory, 
while parasites and susceptible hosts decline in frequency. The parasites will soon be driven to 
extinction. " 
 
Figure 1.15 Anti-Gravity Workshop (design and animation by Thomas Hollier and Tim Wilson), 
Tierra: Evolution in Another Universe "The Ancestral Program - consists of three ``genes'' (green 
solid objects). The CPU (green sphere) is executing code in the first gene, which causes the program 
to measure itself." 
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Figure 1.16 Anti-Gravity Workshop (design and animation by Thomas Hollier and Tim Wilson), 
Tierra: Evolution in Another Universe "A Parasite (blue, two piece object) uses its CPU (blue sphere) 
to execute the code in the third gene of a neighboring host organism (green) to replicate itself, 
producing daughter parasite (two-piece wire frame object)."
 
Figure 1.17 Anti-Gravity Workshop (design and animation by Thomas Hollier and Tim Wilson), 
Tierra: Evolution in Another Universe "A Hyper-parasite (red, three piece object) steals the CPU 
from a parasite (blue sphere). Using the stolen CPU, and its own CPU (red sphere) it is able to 
produce two daughters (wire frame objects on left and right) simultaneously." 
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Figure 1.18 Anti-Gravity Workshop (design and animation by Thomas Hollier and Tim Wilson), 
Tierra: Evolution in Another Universe. "The Digital Environment: Self-replicating computer 
programs (colored geometric objects) occupy the RAM memory of the computer (orange 
background). Mutations (lightning) cause random changes in the code. Death (the skull) eliminates 
old or defective programs”
 
Figure 1.19 Sommere and Mignonneau, A-Volve, 1994-5. Visitors interacting with A-
Volve InterCommunication Center Tokyo, Japan. 
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Figure 1.20 Sommerer and Mignonneau, A-Volve, 1994-5. 
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Figure 1.21Sommerer and Mignonneau, Life Spacies II, 1999. 
 
Figure 1.22 Sommerer and Mignonneau, Life Spacies II, 1999. A viewer interacts with the project. 
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Figure 1.23 "Tetromino" forms and their progression in John Conway's Game of Life . 
http://www.math.cornell.edu/~lipa/mec/lesson6.html 
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Figure 1.24 "Ant 2 building a highway at time 10,647." Scott Sutherland, “Generalized Ants,” 
http://www.math.sunysb.edu/~scott/ants/ . 
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Figure 1.25 Gianluca Tempesti, "Propagation pattern of Langton's loop," from A Self-Repairing 
Multi-plexer Based FPGA Inspired by Biological Processes. 
http://lslwww.epfl.ch/pages/embryonics/thesis/Chapter3.html 
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Figure 1.26 Norbert Weiner, The antiaircraft predictor. From Wiener to D. I. C. 5980 A. A. 
Directors, "Summary Report for Demonstration." Reprinted in Galison, "The Ontology of the 
Enemy," 239. 
  91 
 
Figure 1.27 Time magazine cover, January 23, 1950. "Mark III: Can Man Build a Superman?" 
Cover credit Boris Artzybasheff. 
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Figure 1.28 Time magazine cover, February 10, 2011. "2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal," 
Photo-Illustration by Phillip Toledano for Time. Prop Styling By Donnie Myers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  93 
“This stuff moves all the time, between actual, imagined, lived, living, day dreams and 
other dreams, all other living things that I have planted in tissue culturing flasks in dark 
warm spaces.”—Kira O’Reilly187 
 
“But stop, stop your iron pelt of words, lest you flay us all alive, and yourself, too!”—
Virginia Woolf188 
Chapter 2 : Skin 
 
Introduction 
 The photographs of Omniprésence, despite their sometimes gruesome subject matter, 
are arresting and entrancing: not just for their curious and at-times disturbing content, but 
for their luminous, glowing colors and velvety textures. In these images, captured by 
Vladimir Sichov, the French performance artist Orlan appears cool and collected, 
whether smiling for the camera in full makeup near the beginning of the performance, 
holding still as the surgeon traces the contours of her face, or posing with open text in 
front of a molded skull that supports the implants destined for insertion into her own face  
(fig. 1). Even in the images from midway through the surgery, where her skin is peeled 
back, blood soaks her hair, or a needle pierces her upper lip, she is bathed in ethereal 
light, her eyes bright and alert (fig. 2). She is calmly confident and in control, both 
presiding over the operating theater and fully present as the art object in the center of the 
performance. 
 The video of the event, however, complicates that interpretation, presenting a 
markedly different perspective, one of danger and drama. The tiny operating room is 
overcrowded, chaotic, and crackling with nervous energy. The surgeon, Dr. Marjorie 
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Cramer, struggles to work around cameras, monitors, and communications equipment, as 
well as the artist’s retinue, which includes elaborately-garbed translators for English and 
American Sign Language. A cacophony of voices, in multiple languages, fills the room as 
Orlan receives and answers questions and comments arriving via fax, telephone, and live 
satellite connection. The colors that lend vibrancy and depth to the photographs seem 
garish and oppressive in the small space, emphasizing and intensifying the room’s 
frenetic atmosphere.  
 The video captures the anxiety and pain the photographs largely belie, reminding the 
viewer of the very real danger attendant at what was, indeed, a momentous undertaking. 
Any surgery is fraught with risk, and the presence of extraneous persons in the operating 
room, let alone a patient under only local, rather than general, anesthesia, increases the 
danger. Although Orlan uses analgesics during and after surgery, and emphatically denies 
that pain plays an important role in her work, the video captures clues, some faint and 
some more overt, to her undeniable distress: her shallow breathing, a gasp, a glistening of 
the eyes, a furrowing of the brow, the ever-so-slight pulling of the eyebrow that betray 
the trauma she is experiencing. The face, filling the frame in inescapable close-up, is 
alien and alienated as the surgical tools move under and stretch the skin, yet its 
unmistakable humanity awakens in the viewer an immediate and visceral identification 
and empathy.  
 In addition to the hectic tumult of the operating theater itself, the video captures the 
act and gesture of Orlan’s flaying, including the tension inherent in the decision to risk 
opening the skin, transgressing its boundaries, and making of the face something alien. 
We see, in a way difficult for the photographs—as discrete, aestheticized, completed 
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objects—to capture, the in-betweenness that Orlan claims as her goal. The skin, as it is 
peeled, mask-like, away from the face, generates, as Parveen Adams has argued, a new, 
in-between space. Separated from its substructure, the skin becomes an indeterminate 
object: once a surface to the self (or itself, self), but now, something other, neither inside 
nor outside, before nor after, body nor object. This flaying gesture, undertaken not as 
punishment, but at Orlan’s own will, and while she remains conscious and speaking, is a 
patently posthuman one. Orlan presents the body as not merely given, reflective of a 
single, fixed identity, but, machine-like: as openable, modifiable and even upgradeable. 
Yet what her opened skin reveals is not the wiring of an automaton, coldly metallic and 
immune to pain, but the fleshly tangle of the human body—pulled away like a mask, 
while the rest of her face still speaks.  
 I identify Orlan’s project as cyborgian because of her embrace of the “impure” 
mingling of the organic and the machinic, in the tradition of Haraways’s iconic cyborg. 
She emphatically refutes the notion of the body as given or inviolable, choosing instead 
to incorporate technology into her body in a way that neither bows to beauty norms nor 
hides the process. Though her rhetoric often veers toward the hyperbolic, with claims 
that, for example, “the body is a costume,” it is countered by the inherently messy, carnal 
nature of her performances, in which her opened body is emphatically vulnerable and 
non-triumphant. Nonetheless, Orlan embodies the sort of “creative evolution” that Hardt 
and Negri posit as defining the posthuman; she represents not perfection but possibility, 
an early generation in the reach toward the future in which we already find ourselves 
living. What Orlan’s project allows us to see is a physical, physiological interpretation of 
posthumanist ideas of mingling and exchange with organic and technological others. 
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This chapter laminates skin and self to think about the body as technology, 
modifiable, upgradable, and not limited to the state in which it was born or currently 
finds itself.  The skin, as visible surface and ostensible border of the body, hiding the 
what we do not see of the interior body Orlan’s body, is pulled back to reveal those inner 
workings. Her body in surgery is unfinished, in flux, replete with potential (at the hands 
of an empowered subject exercising complete agency), yet it also suffers, responds 
unpredictably to the trauma, and reveals the limits of the real, versus imagined, human 
body. The posthuman skin that Orlan presents to view and shapes through her rhetoric is 
indeterminate, unfinished, and not necessarily truthful; it blurs the borders between body 
and machine, male and female, self and object. Her surgical performances are difficult to 
watch, even creepy, but therein lies the power of this rethinking of the body. I argue that 
the posthuman Orlan makes visible—indeterminate, fragile, and patently embodied—
provides a powerful and necessary contrast to the fantasies of technological enhancement 
and disembodiment that the figure can also evoke. 
 I begin with a description of the larger project, The Reincarnation of Saint Orlan 
(begun 1990), that contains the 1993 Omniprésence performance, placing it in the context 
of Orlan’s wider oeuvre and her Carnal Art Manifesto, before proceeding to a detailed 
account of the Omniprésence video. I address the relationship between skin and self in 
the writings of Didier Anzieu and Michel Serres and the ways in which Orlan’s 
performances literalize the themes they imagine, and then investigate the ways in which 
Orlan’s flaying in Omniprésence, and her own rhetoric about it, is a quintessentially 
posthuman gesture. I argue that Omniprésence generates, and presents to view, a 
posthuman skin that draws on, but is essentially different from, former understandings of 
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the skin and the subject it contains: a skin that cyborgically mingles flesh and technology, 
refuses a single given truthfulness, and is perpetually indeterminate and unfixed. I 
employ the skin as a metaphor to consider the liberal humanist subject and the distancing 
through which Kant defines the aesthetic—and in turn, as Terry Eagleton proposes, 
liberal humanist subjecthood itself.  Against that framework, and this subject’s treatment 
of his racial and non-human others, I introduce Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr’s “semi-living 
sculpture” Victimless Leather to explore further the webs of meaning between self and 
skin, human and other, and to highlight  the unique potency of Orlan’s performances. I 
conclude by returning to the themes of empathy that make Orlan’s project so powerful for 
imagining the posthuman, despite, and even because of, the failure that inheres in the 
projects—from Orlan’s “failure” to resemble the plan she initially established for the 
project, to the monstrous growth that forced Victimless Leather’s MoMA exhibitors to 
“kill” it. 
Carnal Art  
 Carnal Art is the label Orlan applies to her surgical performances, which began in 
1990 with the announcement of her upcoming project The Reincarnation of Saint Orlan 
(fig. 3). Her Carnal Art Manifesto (see Appendix I) outlines what this particular style of 
body and performance art involves, and what it stringently refutes. From its first 
sentence, which defines Carnal Art as “self-portraiture in the classical sense, but realized 
through the possibility of technology,” through its concluding statements on style, in 
which Orlan professes a love for the baroque against the formalist and conformist, she 
reveals her indebtedness to, but independence from, Western art historical traditions. In 
succinct sections with the subheadings Definition, Distinction, Atheism, Perception, 
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Freedom, Clarification, and Style, Orlan describes Carnal Art as concerned with the 
process of surgery and the body as medium, and as specifically not interested in pain, 
which she connects not only with Body Art, but a Christian tradition that denies “body-
pleasure,” and prescribes pain, as in childbirth. Carnal Art  is in many ways a 
continuation of Orlan’s more traditional earlier oeuvre, a coherence she deliberately 
highlights in her lectures and presentations, and one which does provide a useful 
framework from which to understand the more esoteric surgical works. 
 Among her earliest works are black and white, nude self-portraits Orlan began 
producing when she was 17. In them, she uses masks and contorted poses to subvert the 
idea of the classical nude, presenting instead a lithe, young body in ways that are far more 
evocative of the monstrous than the seductive. The first of these images,189 the 1964 
Orlan accouche d’elle-m’aime (Orlan Gives Birth to Her Loved Self), seems particularly 
prescient in retrospect (fig. 4). In it, Orlan, seen from above and reclining slightly, 
supports her head with one hand and with the other caresses the armless and androgynous 
mannequin resting between her knees, to whom she seems to give birth. This gesture of 
symbolic autopoesis follows another recreation of self, a few years earlier: her adoption 
of the name Orlan.190 Both prefigure the “reincarnation” that would follow in Carnal Art. 
 Orlan’s work throughout the ’60s and ’70s continued to focus on resistance to power, 
institutions, and expectations, centering particularly on her use of sheets from her 
trousseau. These sheets formed the canvases for embroidery-highlighted semen stains 
obtained from gallery owner “donors”; the discarded drapery of a saint-cum-Venus in a 
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sequentially photographed striptease; and the garment in which she performed her 
MesuRage actions, measuring traditionally male-dominated spaces in “Orlan-corps,” or 
her own body-lengths (fig. 5). In 1977, Orlan was dismissed from her teaching post at the 
Atelier de Trois Soleils after a public performance of Le Baiser de l’artiste, in which 
viewers who dropped a coin into a slot on Orlan’s breastplate—featuring a photograph of 
her nude torso, and with a coin collection receptacle at her crotch—received a kiss from 
the artist herself (fig. 6). 191Beside her on the podium, in striking counterpoint, stood 
another photographic cut-out of herself, this time swathed in voluminous fabric as Sainte 
Orlan (fig. 7). 192 In the late ’70s and ’80s, Orlan’s performance and photography series 
Le Drapé-le Baroque again starred this baroque persona of the Madonna or White Virgin 
(fig. 8), and color photographs from the ’80s and ’90s show variations on the theme, 
including Madonna of the Garage (where her apotheosis is effected via hydraulic lift) 
(fig. 9).  
 The series of color photographs Peau d’âne (Donkey Skin) was produced in 1990, the 
same year Orlan announced and began the Reincarnation series, and addresses similar 
themes. In these vivid, highly-saturated photographs (fig. 10), Orlan, set against vibrant 
backgrounds that seem to surround her with a glowing aura, poses in fanciful headgear, 
from a pair of donkey’s ears to a bishop’s miter. In some images she wears elaborate 
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costumes, mismatched with her equally extravagant headgear, and in others she is 
topless. Her poses and facial expressions range from coquettish to silly, and don’t seem to 
correspond to either her costume or state of (un)dress. As scholar C. Jill O’Bryan points 
out, the title Peau d’âne refers to a French fairytale by Charles Perrault. 193  Orlan’s 
images seem lighthearted and frivolous, doubtlessly influenced by the 1970 musical film 
adaptation of the tale (fig. 11), with its ornate costumes (including a gauzy ruff worn by 
the Lilac Fairy, the princess’s godmother), sparkles, and bright, stylized colors.194 The 
story itself, however, has, as do so many fairytales, rather dark undercurrents. When her 
queen mother dies and her father the king (having promised the queen to re-marry only a 
woman more beautiful than herself) decides that the princess is the only suitable 
replacement as his bride, the princess delays by requesting a sequence of increasingly-
elaborate nuptial gifts: a gown the color of the weather, of the moon, of the sun. Finally 
she requests, and is granted, the skin of her father’s prized donkey, which defecates 
riches and is the source of the court’s wealth. Disguising herself in the beast’s flayed 
skin, and with dirt carefully applied to her skin by the Lilac Fairy, the princess is able to 
escape the castle and her father’s incestuous advances. In a nearby kingdom, she is forced 
to take dirty jobs and is persecuted for her ugliness and smelliness. The prince, however, 
stumbles upon her in her forest hovel, where she is wearing her radiant sun-colored 
gown, and immediately falls in love. Through the usual fairytale avenues, they are united, 
married, and live happily ever after.195 
 As O’Bryan points out, Orlan’s Peau d’âne “mirrors a few motifs articulated in La 
Reincarnation de Sainte-Orlan: beauty and ugliness; and the idea that molding one’s own 
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skin means shaping one’s destiny.”196 Although the skin of the flayed donkey allows the 
princess to escape the palace, the guise renders her monstrous. Villagers speculate that 
her skin hides some foul disease, that she is evil, and that she infests the air. The prince 
insists to a friend that he wants to marry Donkey Skin because she “is a beauty,” though 
the friend warns that others will think him mad. Yet, when the prince and princess meet 
again and it is revealed that she is the one he loves, her outer skin (and presumably with it 
any offensive miasma) falls away and she is resplendent again in her sun-colored gown. 
The donkey’s skin defined her while she wore it, but her ability to shed it and reclaim her 
all-important beauty is what matters in the end. Orlan plays with costumes to upend the 
idea of beauty in Peau d’âne, mismatching the fine textiles, juxtaposing the ornate hats 
with her nude torso, and, despite her carefully applied cosmetics, mussing her hair and 
making foolish faces.  This questioning of beauty norms would also form a key element 
in the Reincarnation series, along with the idea that changing the skin can change the 
self. 
 Orlan’s shift to the medium of surgery with Carnal Art, and the deliberate parallels 
she draws to earlier work, not only in her discussions of her oeuvre, but in the artifacts 
that she displays in the operating room (such as a life-sized cutout of herself as the nude 
Venus from Strip-tease occasionnel or a black and white photograph of herself as Saint 
Orlan), draw connections between her body and the other media she has used in her art. 
Her own skin becomes the costume: the mismatched fabrics that stand in for a semi-
magical donkey skin, or the voluminous wrappings that, as in Le Drapé-le Baroque, are 
stripped away to reveal a different self altogether. To take as an artistic medium one’s 
skin, however, has far higher stakes, physically and culturally, than any other material 
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with which she has worked. By opening the body, she continues, more emphatically than 
ever, her rebellion against institutions that would declare the body as sacred and 
untouchable space, and uses Carnal Art to show what the body can mean with the use of 
current technology. 
 The Reincarnation of Saint Orlan 
 Omniprésence was the seventh, and most ambitious, of the nine surgeries that 
comprise the series The Reincarnation of Saint Orlan. The series began, according 
O’Bryan, “on May 30, 1990, Orlan’s forty-third birthday, when she exhibited Imaginary 
Generic: Successful Operations at the Newcastle Festival in All Saints’ Church, 
Newcastle, England.”197 The ambiguity in the image permeates and is reflective of the 
Reincarnation project as a whole. Although it looks like a movie poster, it is actually a 
painting, done in acrylic on canvas. It was painted not by Orlan, but by the ad agency 
Publidécor, with whom Orlan collaborated on her 1988 series Les Affiches Peintes 
(Painted Posters). The poster is complete with credits: directing by Orlan, screenplay by 
Serge Grümberg, lighting by Jean-Michel Ribettes, and production by “Sept et Demi.” 
An “avec” section suggests appearances by “Marina Abramovic, Jean-Michel Pheline, 
Jean Dupuy, Helene et Ben Patterson, Elisabeth Jappe, Joel Savary, Ramon Tio Bellido, 
et Litz [sic] Taylor.”  Although her project is an extremely collaborative one (surgery 
necessitating a skilled surgeon, among others), the names listed on the poster are not her 
project collaborators but “friends and well-known figures from the world of art and 
movies.”198 Finally, although the image seems to lay out a clear schematic for a program 
of appropriation, Orlan claims that she is not literally appropriating the features of the 
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Western art historical beauties shown. Her own goal, she insists, is not a unified, 
beautiful gestalt, nor has she chosen these characters only for their beauty. 
 At the center of the image, Orlan, her features blended with those of the art historical 
beauties surrounding her, rests her chin in her hands. Her hair frames her face in loose 
waves and she demurely averts her eyes in a classic modeling pose. Portraits of Western 
art historical beauties ring her in a halo of sorts, each marked by a transparent red box 
that highlights a particular facial feature and links it, by a sharp red arrow, to the 
corresponding part of Orlan’s face. Some of these are readily identifiable, perhaps most 
so Botticelli’s Venus (with highlighted chin) and Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa (with 
highlighted forehead). Between those two is Francois Pascal Simon Gérard’s Psyche, 
with highlighted nose, and to the right of them, with highlighted eyes, the somewhat less 
well-known Diana the Huntress by an anonymous School of Fontainebleu artist. At the 
far right is a figure that Orlan identifies as Europa, though the source image is far less 
clear.199 
 Although it is the physical features of the women surrounding her that Orlan 
highlights and merges with her own in the poster (fig. 12), she states that she has chosen 
them not simply for their beauty, but for their underlying symbolism and the “inspiration” 
present in their histories.200 She explains: 
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Diana was chosen because she is insubordinate to gods and men; because 
she is active, even aggressive, because she leads a group. Mona Lisa, a 
beacon character in the history of art, was chosen as a reference point 
because she is not beautiful according to present standards of beauty, 
because there is some “man” under this woman. We now know it to be the 
self-portrait of Leonardo Da Vinci that hides under that of La Gioconda 
(which brings us back to an identity problem). Psyche because she is the 
antipode of Diana, invoking all that is fragile and vulnerable in us. Venus 
for embodying carnal beauty, just as Psyche embodies the beauty of the 
soul. Europa because she is swept away by adventure and looks toward the 
horizon.201 
 
The focus on the inspirational traits of these women, rather than primarily their physical 
ones, again emphasizes that Orlan is not literally appropriating those features. She uses 
cosmetic surgery, not in the pursuit of beauty or even a unified gestalt, but to foreground 
and question the beauty norms and pressures to which women are consistently subjected. 
 The first surgery in the series, Art Charnel (Carnal Art), took place shortly after the 
presentation of Imaginary Generic, in July of 1990 in Paris, and involved liposuction of 
the face and thighs; the fat was sealed into limb-shaped reliquaries.202 In one photograph 
of the performance (fig. 13), Orlan reclines on the operating table, her head and torso 
swathed in green surgical drapes. Electrodes, monitors, wires and tubing cover her bared 
breasts and arms, though her right arm bends at the elbow to raise a copy of Eugénie 
Lemoine-Luccioni’s La Robe to reading height. Behind her, the aseptic tiled wall and 
operating room equipment are set off by a life-sized cut-out of Orlan in the pose of 
Botticelli’s Venus, a photograph from her series Incidental Strip-Tease Using Sheets from 
the Trousseau (1974-1975). The surgeon and his assistant wear costumes of red, gold, 
and black, striped with reflective piping that glows in the camera’s flash. Orlan’s lips 
                                                                                                                                                 
with regard to their histories.” Orlan, “Orlan’s Speech” in Orlan: 1964-2001. (Salamanca: Ediciones 
Universidad de Salamanca, 2002), 220 . 
201
  Orlan, “Intervention” in The Ends of Performance, ed. Peggy Phelan & Jill Lane, (New York: New 
York University Press, 1998), 319-20. 
202
 O’Bryan, Carnal Art, 14. 
  105 
move as she reads aloud from the text, even as the surgeon directs the cannula through 
her skin, the attached tube already filling with a thick pinkish substance.   
 Text consistently forms an important part of Orlan’s surgical performances, and La 
Robe (Dress), subtitled Psychoanalytic Essays on Clothing (1983), has become a crucial 
text for her. The final chapter of the book takes as its subject the artist herself, which is 
how Orlan first came to read it. Lemoine-Luccioni focuses, briefly, on Orlan’s series Les 
Draps du Trousseau and Le Drapé-le Baroque, and briefly mentions her S’habbiler de sa 
proper nudité (Dressed in Her Own Nudity, in which Orlan wore a dress printed with an 
image of her own naked body). In both Orlan’s artwork (her appropriation of Bernini’s 
Saint Teresa, for example, or Ingres’s Grand Odalisque) (fig. 14) and in her personal life, 
Lemoine-Luccioni reads disguises, or travestie (a word that in French also refers to 
transvestism or cross dressing). She traces this desire for self-reinvention to Orlan’s 
relationship with her distant, absent mother, whom Orlan also accuses of “wanting, as all 
mothers do, to sell her off.”203 Lemoine-Luccioni calls Orlan’s a double disguising: as a 
teenager, dressed/disguised as a man to not be like her mother, and, having become a 
woman, dressed/disguised as a woman, with even her excessively feminine attributes 
(bared breasts, exposed sex) a mask (fig. 15).204 
 However, it was a passage in an earlier chapter, “The Second Skin,” with which 
Orlan credits her inspiration to use surgery to physically change her own skin. Lemoine-
Luccioni writes: 
Skin is deceiving. ...in life, one only has one's skin... there is a bad 
exchange in human relations because one never is what one has... I have 
the skin of an angel, but I am a jackal... the skin of a crocodile, but I am a 
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puppy, the skin of a black person, but I am white, the skin of a woman, but 
I am a man; I never have the skin of what I am. There is no exception to 
the rule because I am never what I have.205 
 
As Orlan describes it, “Reading this text, I thought that in our time we have begun to 
have the means of closing this gap; in particular with the help of surgery... that it was thus 
becoming possible to match up the internal image with the external one.”206 Orlan reads 
this seminal text, to which I will return, during all of her surgical performances. 
 The second and third surgical performances were somewhat smaller productions, 
according to O’Bryan, due to the “increasingly problematic” surgeon, Dr. Chérif Kamel 
Zaar, who “protested the excessive décor and documentary equipment” of the first 
surgery, allowed only one photographer for the second, and insisted on general, rather 
than local, anesthesia for the third. The second surgery involved the insertion of a 
prosthesis to evoke Venus’s chin, and the third surgery “liposuction of the legs and 
ankles, and retouches to the face and eyelids.”207 
 The fourth surgical performance, Opération réussie (Successful Operation/ Surgery), 
occurred in December of 1991 and featured a new surgeon, Dr. Bernard Cormette de 
Saint-Cyr. This performance was the glitziest to date, with Orlan, the surgeon, and his 
attendant in gowns with iridescent metallic spangles, designed by Spanish fashion 
designer Paco Rabanne. The Venus cut-out was again present, as was another painted 
movie poster, this one featuring imagery from Art Charnel, and a long banner reading 
“jamais film aussi abject n'avait sonné aussi pur” (film never sounded as abject as pure). 
Other props included a large image from Etude documentaire: le Drapé-le Baroque 
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1979-1980, decorative urns with real and plastic fruit and lobsters, the black and white 
crosses from Orlan’s Skaï and Sky e Vidéo photographs (1983), a loaf of bread, a silver 
microphone, and a pair of flashy sunglasses (fig. 16). 
 In an edited video of the performance, operating room footage is set against an 
insistent electronic soundtrack.208 A white cross divides the screen, and the resulting 
corners are alternately clear and overlaid with another video. Orlan, in her spangled 
gown, tears plastic sheeting from the wall, strikes poses with a cross in each hand, and 
seductively eats grapes off the bunch. In scenes reminiscent of her earlier Le Baiser de 
L’artiste (The Artist’s Kiss, 1977), she enthusiastically kisses Stefan Oriach and the 
bespectacled surgeon, who grins as they part. The camera cuts from Orlan reading La 
Robe to a close-up of her flesh, swabbed with an orangish antiseptic. Moments later we 
see her reclining on her side on the operating table, still reading aloud from the book, as 
the surgeon inserts the liposuction cannula into the flesh of her back. He makes a few 
preliminary strokes, then begins rapidly sawing back and forth as she continues to read.  
 In a typically humorous, if nonetheless somewhat disturbing, image of the 
performance whimsically entitled “Warranted Pure ORLAN no artificial color added,” 
Orlan lies on her side on the operating table, one leg bent under her and the other 
extending into space (fig. 17). One arm props her up, and the other holds a suction 
canister filled with what one can only assume is the fat that has just been removed during 
the procedure. The smooth, pale skin of her face and arms contrasts with the bright red, 
“pure” Orlan in the canister, the clear walls of which suggest a transparent body that her 
own flesh belies. Orlan preserves the fat removed in these procedures into “reliquaries,” 
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echoing—and subverting—the Christian tradition that carefully preserves and venerates 
fragments of saints and holy objects. The “purity” suggested by the title would seem to be 
a requirement for such an object of veneration, yet the canister reveals neither pure fat 
nor pure blood, but a fleshy mixture of the two: an indeterminate inside brought outside, 
and vested with the significance of representing the artist herself.  
 The fifth surgery performance, in July of 1991, was officially dubbed Opera 
Operation and was again carried out by Dr. Zaar. This performance was yet more 
elaborate than the last, with its visual centerpiece the elaborate gown designed by the 
Parisian fashion house Franck Sorbier and a coordinating brightly-colored, harlequin-
patterned cap (fig. 17). The gown featured a black bustier bodice giving way to a full, 
silky skirt elaborately patterned in bright red, yellow, blue, purple, and orange forms: 
abstracted anthropomorphic figures, musical notes, stars and moons. Orlan’s hair (red on 
one side, blue on the other); her cherry-red gloves; and props including a pitchfork and 
red-eyed, red-horned plastic skull, intensified what Cros describes as a “carnivalesque 
atmosphere,” one further emphasized by the presence of dancer Jimmy Blanche, who, she 
writes, performed a strip-tease during the surgery.209 
 The structuring text for the performance was “Secularism,” the introduction to 
philosopher Michel Serres’ 1991 Le Tiers-Instruit (The Troubadour of Knowledge), 
which recounts the fantastical tale of Harlequin, the Emperor of the Moon, who, upon 
returning from visiting the far reaches of his realm, haughtily reports to his subjects that 
“everywhere everything is just as it is here.”210 From the disappointed crowd, one 
individual rises to challenge the emperor, asking whether they are also to believe that his 
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cape is the same in every part—“a road map of your travels?” The discomfited emperor 
struggles out of his harlequin-patterned cloak—a patchwork, indistinct and chimeric—
only to reveal more and more layers of shimmering, iridescent, layers of motley. Peeling 
off layer after layer of clothing, he finally gets to the skin underneath: also tattooed, 
patchworked, incoherent, and revealing the emperor himself as a hermaphrodite, a 
monstrous mixture in a single body. “What can the common monster,” Serres writes, 
“tattooed ambidextrous, hermaphrodite and cross-bred, show to us right now under his 
skin? Yes, Blood and Flesh.”211 This text, in a multitude of different languages, adorns 
the series of Grands reliquaires (Large Reliquaries) that enclose 10 grams each of 
Orlan’s resin-preserved flesh, sealed in metal frames behind bullet-proof glass (fig. 18). 
Yet Serres’ story continues: the emperor is transformed into what the audience identifies 
as another commedia dell’arte character—Pierrot, glowing whitely as his many colors 
integrate. The emperor has been marked by his travels, and his experiences, gained 
knowledge, and adopted customs are engraved upon his clothing as well as his skin. He 
displays, as the learned subjects explain, “the secular miracle of tolerance, of benevolent 
neutrality” that can define a society that recognizes and accepts the monstrous mixture 
that is humanity. 
 During the performance Orlan’s own skin is marked, in a sort of temporary tattoo:  
curved lines and hatching on her legs, thighs, and buttocks, where the liposuction is to 
take place, and war-paint-like lines on her face marking nasolabial folds, cheekbones, 
upper lip, and nose. Her colorful skirt hiked up, anesthetic injections and the liposuction 
cannula trace these lines, even as she continues calmly to read. The dancing harlequin on 
the cover of Serres’s book—held in Orlan’s red-gloved hands with a pen at the ready, as 
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if to take notes—matches her own cap. Even when the needle enters her face, she 
continues reading, the camera’s extreme close-up capturing her carefully rouged lips 
moving even as her cheek is pierced.  
 The sixth surgery was, to judge from the few photographs available, a more subdued  
affair,212 with Orlan in a shiny black jacket and a fur hat (fig. 19). O’Bryan and art 
historian Sarah Wilson write that the performance involved “liposuction from the face 
and belly,” and two images—one showing Orlan’s swollen, taped face, and another 
showing her printing a kiss on a transparent sheet, as she did in 1991’s Opération 
Réussie—support this.213 
Omniprésence  
 The Reincarnation of Saint Orlan reached its peak in November of 1993 with the 
seventh surgery performance, Omniprésence, the largest and most ambitious to date (fig. 
21). Held in New York City, it was intended to insert cheekbone and forehead 
implants,214 and to be broadcast live to museums and galleries around the world. Clocks 
on the wall of the operating theater, labeled Paris, New York, Tokyo, and Toronto, 
indicated the project’s global scope, with live links to various museums and galleries 
across the world, including the Sandra Gering Gallery in New York City, the Centre 
Georges Pompidou in Paris, and the Creative Institute in Riga, Latvia. Viewers could ask 
questions and make comments via phone, fax, and videophone. The performance 
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included two translators, one between French and English, and one for American Sign 
Language.  
 As in earlier performances in the series, the operating room has been turned into a 
colorful (and crowded) theater. Chartreuse fabric covers the walls and floor, matching 
surgeon Marjorie Cramer’s cap, gown, and mask, as well as the hat of the sign language 
interpreter. Others present in the operating room wear black gowns emblazoned with the 
phrase “the body is but a costume.” Unlike earlier performances, there are no colorful 
props, photographic cut-outs, or painted posters. Instead the small space is filled with a 
jumble of communications technology and their associated operators—video cameras, 
videophone, monitors, fax machine, and the old-fashioned corded phone Orlan is handed 
as the video of the performance begins. Orlan looks more polished than theatrical, in a 
dark, conservative dress with short sleeves, a scooped neck, and a waist-defining corset. 
Her hair, parted down the middle, is bleached blond on the left and dyed a vivid indigo 
on the right, and her manicured nails match the red of her lipstick. She smiles as she 
accepts the phone, a call from Sandra Gering, and although she jokes in her heavily-
accented English about wanting champagne, the undercurrent of nervous tension is 
palpable in the speed of her speech and the hubbub of other voices in the room. 
 The two translators join Orlan in the operating room as she prepares to read the 
opening text (fig. 22). The room falls silent as she reads, in French, the aforementioned 
passage from La Robe: “Skin is deceiving…” Orlan’s voice is rich and clear, the 
translator’s movements graceful, and the combined effect highly theatrical. At the 
conclusion of the passage, Orlan closes the book and states, in French, that she uses this 
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text for all her operations because she “believes strongly that it is possible to reduce the 
distance between that which one has and that which one is.” 
 Orlan seats herself on the operating table and begins taking questions by fax as a 
surgical assistant removes her make up. As the questions and comments continue to come 
in, Kramer begins to marks Orlan’s skin, deftly manipulating the underlying bone and 
muscle and tracing contours with her pen: dots under the eyes, lines indicating the 
nasolabial folds and cheekbones, hatches above the eyebrows, brackets alongside the 
nose, a tracing of the jawline (fig. 23). Through Kramer’s probing fingers and pen, 
Orlan’s face is transformed into sculptural material in the hands of an expert, and the skin 
itself into map of its own approaching transformation. Kramer carefully positions blue 
silicone implants over Orlan’s cheekbones and temples and traces around each one. 
Afterward she places the implants on a skull at the foot of the operating table, but the 
adhesive doesn’t hold, so Orlan keeps the inserts in place with manicured fingers, her 
hands cradling the whimsical memento mori like a child’s head (fig. 24). The smooth blue 
implants on the creamy plastic of the skull suggest an easy integration between the 
technology of these prostheses and Orlan’s own body, although the difficulty of attaching 
them foreshadows the messy technical details in modifying the body. Both skull and 
implants belie the flesh that comprises the body, the in-between stuff of skin and fat and 
blood. 
 Tension continues to run high in the operating room as Cramer and her assistants 
prepare for surgery, technicians establish remote connections, and questions continue to 
come in by fax and videophone. Cramer places a bright yellow surgical drape behind 
Orlan on the table and has her recline so that the IV needle can be inserted and taped to 
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the back of her hand. Orlan is helped into a black gown with attached black gloves, for 
which she requests the black belt designed to accompany it. Flat on her back and with 
Cramer leaning over her to swab her neck and face, Orlan appears tense as she strains to 
look to her right, toward the questions to which she responds. Cramer lifts Orlan’s head, 
repositioning it in a more natural position as she pens in more lines, in front of Orlan’s 
ear and through her hair. As Cramer uses tweezers to tuck cotton into the opening of 
Orlan’s ear, they converse briefly in a mélange of French, English, and gestures; Cramer 
seems to explain that she cannot access Orlan’s temple without making a longer cut that 
goes in front of the ear, and Orlan nods in assent. Over the continuing babble of voices in 
the room, we hear Cramer tensely demand local anaesthetic, and for a moment the 
camera pulls back from its tight close-up on Orlan’s face and pans the still-crowded 
operating room, as the assistants bustle about in preparation and the translators attempt to 
remain out of the way. The camera zooms back in on Orlan’s face as Cramer leans over 
her, places a tender hand on the side of her head, and then pulls back her hair to begin the 
injections. 
 The close-up is relentless as the fine needle begins to pierce the skin of Orlan’s 
scalp. Although Orlan’s face remains almost motionless, her eye begins to water slightly 
and her voice is strained and almost robotic in her rapid-fire response to a question from 
the Gering Gallery about pain: these injections, she says, actually hurt quite a lot, 
although after them the pain will go. The camera pulls back to reveal Orlan’s legs, which, 
as she points out with a faint smile, are moving in discomfort. The camera returns to a 
close-up of Orlan’s face as Cramer directs the needle into the skin beneath and behind 
Orlan’s ear. The injections in front of her ear have begun to bleed, and it is almost 
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impossible not to hold one’s breath and wince as the needle threads in and out, visible 
beneath the surface of the skin. “You okay?” Cramer asks, and Orlan tersely responds, 
“No problème,” though she squeezes her eyes shut for a second as the needle moves 
underneath her eyebrow. 
With the injections complete, the definitive gesture, the incision, can begin; Orlan 
nods slightly in assent, and Cramer proceeds. Holding the scalpel with the delicate grip of 
an artist, Cramer draws its point in front of Orlan’s ear, from her lobe upward toward her 
temple, then around the back of the ear (fig. 26). Pausing, she says, “Orlan, if you feel 
anything, tell me, okay?” Bright light bathes Orlan’s face, highlighting the blood that has 
begun to flow in earnest. Cramer slides dissecting scissors into the incision, their 
contours gruesomely visible as she opens and closes them beneath the skin, separating it 
from the underlying tissue. The delicacy with which Cramer palpated Orlan’s skin, 
feeling for the underlying bones and tissues, contrasts with her vigorous, even violent 
movement with the dissecting scissors as she works them under the skin. As Orlan’s flesh 
swells and bleeds, it is increasingly apparent what a difficult artistic medium it presents—
even were its occupant not conscious, speaking, and moving. The marks Cramer traced 
earlier on Orlan’s face become an ever-more necessary map, even as the skin on which 
they are inscribed stretches, moves, and opens. A call comes in from Toronto, drawing a 
comparison between Orlan’s operation and Van Gogh’s cutting off of his own ear, a 
comparison Orlan immediately dismisses. Whereas Van Gogh cut off his ear in a moment 
of madness, she says, such is not the case here: this performance is her art. “My blood is 
my painting,” she declares in English—as the blood runs from the skin that pulls away 
from her ear like a mask. Moments later, she requests that the yellow surgical drape on 
  115 
which she is lying be displayed, raising her head so that it can be removed and held up as 
the camera zooms in on the blood staining it (fig. 27). 
As the scissors move down to her jawline, Orlan gives a start and Cramer pauses to 
inject more anesthetic. Orlan’s eyes water again as the needle moves through the flesh 
around her neck and jaw and the scissors enter the incision again, stretching the skin and 
tugging the corner of her mouth. Cramer continues to move the scissors under the skin, 
opening a space at Orlan’s left temple. As the instrument slides below Orlan’s eyebrow, it 
moves it, generating unexpected expressions on a face that is increasingly puffy and 
discolored.  Cramer requests the implants, which are a light gray rather than the bright 
blue of those on the skull at the foot of the table. The intent had been that the 
transmission to the Sandra Gering Gallery would last through the insertion of the first 
implant, but as Cramer tries to place it, she realizes that there is still not enough space 
beneath the skin. She is working on continuing to loosen the skin from the face when the 
transmission—and thus the available video record—abruptly ends.  
 The Reincarnation of Saint Orlan, too, ended shortly after Omniprésence, with two 
more, less extravagant, performances that same year (fig. 28). Although Orlan had stated 
in multiple venues that she desired to have a surgery that would give her “the largest nose 
physically possible,” at the moment no further surgical performances seem to be in the 
works.215 Kate Ince writes that in fact a concluding surgery would have foreclosed the 
ambiguity and multivalence of the Reincarnation series: “As an end-point to 
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‘Reincarnation,’ the construction of a phallophanic nose would have marked a reneging 
on the open-ended, experimental identity work which has characterised Orlan’s surgical 
project from the outset.”216  As long as future surgery performances are a possibility, 
then, Reincarnation remains unclosed and Orlan’s identity and appearance perpetually 
unfixed and subject to change.  
The photographs of Omniprésence, with their glowing light and saturated colors, are 
documents that record middle ground between the traditional “before” and “after” of 
cosmetic surgery, and are perhaps more equivalent to recordings of states of artists’ 
work-in-progress than finished art objects. Yet Orlan insists that Reincarnation is not 
about a final end product, and is specifically not about shaping her face into a unified 
gestalt of classical beauty. In the days following Omniprésence, Orlan exhibited more in- 
between photographs at the Sandra Gering Gallery, one a day during her recovery, which 
she called “portraits produced by the body-machine.” These images show a bruised and 
swollen Orlan, sometimes voguing coquettishly and other times staring blank-facedly.  In 
the photograph from the fourth day after the surgery, Orlan gazes at the camera through 
bloodshot eyes ringed in deep purple bruises (fig. 29). Her pouting lips sport two dark 
scabs and a blueish bruise, and the skin of her face is swollen and puffy. She pops the 
collar of her jacket with both hands, holding the lapels against her cheeks in a pose that 
may or may not be intended to disguise the trauma to her skin. Her hair, still indigo and 
blond, flares in wild tangles about her face as she stares evenly at the camera, her gaze 
simultaneously a seduction and a challenge. In the face of so much delicate and damaged 
flesh, calling the body a machine seems particularly ironic and even whimsical. 
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The next year, in an installation at the Centre Georges Pompidou called 
Omniprésence Nº 2 (1994), these photographs were displayed as diptychs, each alongside 
a computer-generated composite of Orlan’s face with one of the art historical beauties 
from Imaginary Generic (fig. 30). In the final diptych, Orlan wears full makeup and a 
striking coiffure that accentuates her high forehead and new bumps, a dark pompadour 
backswept over silver hair that reaches just below her ears (fig. 31). Paired with this 
photograph is a composite of all five of the project’s muses: Venus, Psyche, the Mona 
Lisa, Diana, and Europa. The resemblance between the composite image and the post-
surgical Orlan is not striking. Indeed, what she resembles most is the imagined “body-
machine” with whom she credits the production of the portraits: her unexpressive face 
smooth, and, with the protruding bosses at her temples, vaguely robotic.  
These images reinforce the fallacy of interpreting Orlan’s surgically modified visage 
as the result of a quest for either beauty or a single fixed image. Ince records Orlan’s 
exasperated response to these misinterpretations: “I said: ‘Can you see my face? So  
you’ll stop writing that I want to be the most beautiful woman, that I want the Mona 
Lisa’s forehead or that I want to look like Botticelli’s Venus, which is a beauty standard 
I’m fighting against.’”217 Orlan’s face, her skin opened, stretched, refigured and closed, 
hovers between a “before” that she never requested, and an “after” that never existed. The 
photographs record one history of Omniprésence and the unedited video tells a somewhat 
different story, but what remains, in its perpetual state of in-between-ness, is Orlan’s 
face, the canvas of her skin. 
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 Skin and Self 
 In 1974, French psychoanalyst Didier Anzieu introduced his highly influential model 
of the Skin Ego, which he later elaborated upon and published as a book of the same 
title.218 Anzieu builds on Freud’s concept of the Ego, or sense of self, but focuses on its 
relationship to, and development along with, the skin. Anzieu argues that all physical 
senses, as well as the ego itself, arise from the development of, and experiences gained 
through, an individual’s skin. It is through the skin, Anzieu posits, that an infant first 
becomes aware of the world around it and its own place as an individual within the 
world; the skin, as a uniting, common sense, provides context for the other senses. 
Anzieu writes that this intimate relationship between skin and ego is physiologically 
fundamental, a claim he supports with an overview of developmental biology. The skin, 
he shows, is the first organ to develop, and remains the largest. As such, it literally 
provides for the development of all the other physical senses. In Jay Prosser’s gloss, 
“Bordering inside and outside the body, the point of separation and contact between you 
and me, skin is the key interface between self and other, between the biological, the 
psychic, and the social. It holds each of us together, quite literally contains us, protects 
us, keeps us discrete, and yet is our first mode of communication with each other and the 
world.”219 
 Because it covers the entire body, skin provides the sense of coherence and 
positioning in the world that is necessary for understanding the self and the other senses. 
The ego itself has a containing skin of sorts as well, containing and protecting the idea of 
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the self the way the skin of the body contains and protects it. Because of the intimate 
connection between the physical and psychical skins, ailments of the former can be useful 
for recognizing and treating ailments of the mind.  
 Michel Serres, whose Le Tiers-Instruit formed the textual basis for Orlan’s fifth 
surgery performance and reliquaries,  meditates on a similarly intimate, if more poetic, 
relationship between self and skin in “Veils,” the first chapter of his book The Five 
Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies.220 Serres devotes this chapter not only to the 
sense of touch, but to the unique role of the skin in uniting the other senses and forming 
the locus of the body’s consciousness of itself. For Serres, the skin both houses, and is, 
the soul, which is felt and recognized at the points of most sensitive tactility and where 
one is conscious of one’s inhabited and acting body. It can be felt in the fingertip when 
cutting the nails, and in both the lips and the finger when the two touch each other. The 
skin is where the self exists.  
 It is this intimate connection of skin and self and soul that fascinates Serres, along 
with the fact of its constant change. The skin, especially marked with cosmetics or 
tattoos, seems to reflect an individual’s personality, yet in reality bears the marks and 
scars of forces largely beyond his or her control. Serres uses the metaphor of a tapestry to 
highlight the skin’s dual roles as marked surface and external fabric of the self. Drawing 
from a discussion of the Lady and the Unicorn tapestries, commonly interpreted as 
illustrating the five senses, he examines how the threads that comprise the tapestry form 
its image as well as the canvas itself. Likewise, Serres argues, the skin links and mingles 
the senses and itself acts as a sort of an originary, primal eye: “In the beginning, touch; at 
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the origin, the medium.”221 As in Anzieu’s argument, the skin forms the “common sense” 
that precedes and provides for the development of all the senses.  
 Serres takes the materiality of the metaphor further, though, describing how the knots 
and threads visible on the reverse of the tapestry evoke both the “nerve threads” of a 
flayed skin and “[prefigure] a computer circuit board” like the “inside wiring of an 
automaton.” 222 For Serres, the skin is not just a surface containing the body, an external 
integument of a separate internal reality, but instead is the stuff of the self and locus of 
the soul. As such, it is not perfectly tailored, but is rather an assemblage—“a suit, 
cobbled together with its seams visible.”223 This image evokes both the cloaks and the 
skin of his later harlequin Emperor of the Moon, who found himself marked and seamed, 
inside and out, by his travels. This patchworked, indeterminate, chimeric body stands in 
refutation of a fully visible self, neatly divisible between body and soul. As Serres puts it, 
“All dualism does is reveal a ghost facing a skeleton. All real bodies shimmer like 
watered silk. They are hazy surfaces, mixtures of body and soul.”224 It is the skin that 
puts an imagined Cartesian dualism to the lie. 
 In his introduction to the English translation of The Five Senses, literary theorist 
Steven Connor writes that this volume fits into Serres’ larger project of describing the 
sensing, feeling body within the strictures of language. Connecting The Five Senses to 
Serres’ 2007 Hominescence , Connor writes:  
…a quarter of a century after Le cinque sens, Serres will be able to 
represent his earlier work as a presentiment of the new body that he  sees 
in the process of construction through knowledge: [Serres writes] ‘Once, I 
wrote Les cinque sens, and, just now, the Variations, not just to celebrate 
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this birth or advent, but to mark the changes they induced, and above all to 
understand a body that has recently become translucid and visible, 
denuded finally of the cuirass of alienation which imprisoned it in the 
past.’225  
 
This “becoming” body has been made visible in its component parts, examined with 
technologies that see through the skin, dissected and analyzed. Serres makes a case for 
the integrated, feeling body in a similarly full world, and the skin the interface uniting the 
two and containing the self.  
 For both Anzieu and Serres, surface and self are connected via a metaphorical skin: 
the skin of writing. In concluding The Skin Ego, Anzieu writes that in completing the 
book, he has in a sense sealed his own skin ego. His words have become a container that 
unites and protects him. Similarly, Serres writes that with his own text, he is presenting 
his skin: “Painters sell their skin, models hire out their skin, the world gives its skins. I 
have not saved mine, here it is. Flayed, printed, dripping with meaning, often a shroud, 
sometimes happy.”226 His words, presenting like the skin their own history and 
memories, are analogous in their intimacy to that canvas of the body, locus of the self and 
soul, the skin. 
If Anzieu and Serres equate their writing with sealing or presenting their own skins, 
Orlan inverts the equation. As she writes in her Manifesto, “Carnal Art transforms the 
body into language, reversing the biblical idea of the word made flesh; the flesh is made 
word.”227 Text plays an important role in Orlan’s surgical performances, and she credits 
La Robe with her motivation to undertake the Reincarnation series. Yet, instead of 
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writing about or imagining a transformation of her skin, Orlan literally does write and 
donate her skin—“flayed, painted, and dripping with meaning.” Orlan writes her skin, not 
by inscribing or tattooing it, though her surgeries do leave traces (though she rarely 
mentions her scars), but by making it a signifier, an object to be edited, read, and re-
written. By making the flesh word, she participates in the rhetorical shift examined in the 
previous chapter, whereby life itself comes to be seen as code. By making language, or 
code, of her flesh, and using technology to upgrade that software, as she calls it, she 
writes her own self and future.  
 Indeed, Orlan’s language makes it clear that although the relationship between skin 
and self may at times be an uneasy one, the two are intimately linked, and that the skin 
not only reflects the self, but that the self reflects the skin. In the passage she reads from 
La Robe, emphasis is on the skin not matching what one feels oneself to be: “Skin is 
deceiving… I have the skin of an angel, but I am a jackal.”228 Through surgery, she says, 
the external can be brought in line with the internal. Her citation of beautiful art historical 
models, chosen not just for their looks but for their character, suggests that the 
incorporation of their skins might carry  some transformative power. Yet her very 
inclusion of these models in structuring her project reveals a seam, an uneasy suturing, 
between skin and self. Orlan insists that her appropriation of these beauties’ physical 
features is not literal. The “skins” she takes from them may therefore be read as a film of 
entanglements: of filaments that link male artists’ objectification of the female form; of 
an art history that sees only passive female objects of the male gaze; of forceful 
personalities that survive and persist even when their painted skins would erase them. Her 
own skin, as opened by the tool of plastic surgery, is further entangled—with societal 
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demands that females be (or at least appear) young and beautiful, the perception that 
beauty equals goodness, and with the skins of those who don’t have access to a surgeon 
or even to basic healthcare.  
Orlan’s Posthuman Gesture 
 The idea of skin as self echoes in the cry of Marsyas, who, as Ovid relates in his 
Metamorphoses, is sentenced to flaying as punishment for losing a musical competition 
to the god Apollo. Ovid describes the gruesome scene in detail: 
 ‘Help!’ Marsyas clamoured. ‘Why are you stripping me from myself? 
Never again, I promise! Playing a pipe is not worth this!’ But in spite of 
his cries the skin was torn off the whole surface of his body: it was all one 
raw wound. Blood flowed everywhere, his nerves were exposed, 
unprotected, his veins pulsed with no skin to cover them. It was possible 
to count his throbbing organs, and the chambers of the lungs, clearly 
visible within his breast.229 
 
Not only does Marsyas equate his skin with his self, but the skin is clearly more than a 
thin covering; in Ovid’s description, the stripping of the skin lays bare not merely 
subcutaneous tissues and muscles, but even the organs. The skin in this description 
behaves as a protective shell containing the self: its removal reveals the body’s core, 
creating a clear delineation between inside and outside. 
 The flayed body holds a particular position in art history, as numerous paintings 
and sculptures of the flaying of Marsyas attest.230 The scene invites the opportunity for 
the artist to display his prowess in anatomy, not only in the elaborate contortion of the 
musculature, but in the depiction of the body inside as well as out. Paintings of the scene, 
in particular, suggest a series of arresting juxtapositions—mortality and divinity, terror 
and calm, pained struggle and artistic deliberation, and even humanity and beastiality. 
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The scene even has a moral component, whether displaying the fatal hubris of Marsyas or 
suggesting his liberation from the prison of his flesh, both interpretations addressed by 
artist and theoretician Stephane Dumas in his essay “The return of Marsyas: Creative 
Skin.” In his text, Dumas offers another interpretation: that Apollo, from the use of his 
voice in the earlier musical competition through the active flaying gesture, achieves true 
subjecthood in contrast to, but necessarily through, the objectified Marsyas. Drawing 
from an examination of Juseppe de Ribera’s 1637 Apollo Flaying Marsyas (fig. 31), he 
writes, “The Hanging Marsyas is the passive object of the transitive verb “to flay” whose 
subject is Apollo. However it seems to me that this transitivity involves a degree of 
reflexivity. This in fact is why it expresses the action of a true subject. In a way, through 
the duel and then the flaying, Apollo and Marsyas form an indissociable pair.”231 
 For Dumas, Apollo’s gesture is thus one of self-creation and creativity. For an instant, 
Apollo becomes fused, through touch, with Marsyas, the linking visually emphasized, as 
Dumas argues, through the vermillion mantle that billows around Apollo, seeming to 
stem from Marsyas’s like-colored wound. The two are linked, but it is Apollo who 
creates. 
 Orlan, too, is flayed, her skin pulled away from her face at the hands of another. Yet 
she is both artist and object, the creator and the skin that is pulled away. She not only 
remains conscious, but insists on her own control of the situation, directing the surgeon in 
an inversion of the traditional roles. As Orlan puts it, “I do not abandon my body to the 
surgeon’s hands. I remain conscious and active: I read texts, I enter into dialogues, I 
orchestrate the accessories and costumes of the surgeons. I am left to their expertise and I 
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give them mine.”232 She also denies pain through the use of intravenous analgesics; 
though the video certainly reveals her discomfort, there is none of Marsyas’ tortured 
screaming. Instead of clamoring in terror, she smiles. Orlan is “stripped from herself” not 
as punishment meted out by a vengeful god, but at her own will. 
 Dumas’s description of Apollo’s flaying of Marsyas seems to begin to approach 
what Georges Bataille (whom he does mention briefly) calls sovereignty, a concept that 
can be read even more clearly through Orlan in Omniprésence. “…[S]overeignty,” for 
Bataille,  
is always linked to a denial of the sentiments that death controls…. It also 
calls for the risk of death. Sovereignty always demands the liquidation, 
through strength of character, of all the failings that are connected with 
death, and the control of one’s deep tremors. If the sovereign, or sacred, 
world that stands against the world of practice is indeed the domain of 
death, it is not that of faintheartedness. 233 
 
Bataille’s sovereignty, influenced by Hegel’s Master/Slave dialectic,234 is the awareness 
that comes upon recognizing, and not fearing, the face of one’s own death—the fugitive, 
miraculous moment that occurs outside of time and quotidian drudgery. This is the 
moment on display in the Greek sculpture of Laocoön, which German art historian 
Johann Joachim Winckelmann, to whom I will return momentarily, reads as the pinnacle 
of aesthetic achievement: perfect beauty despite—and even because of—the subject’s 
obvious torment.235 Art historian Simon Richter argues that, indeed, “the pain of the body 
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is at the center of the aesthetics of beauty,”236 a necessity, in art historian Jane Blocker’s 
gloss, “to the story of triumph. If we remove pain, beauty becomes invisible or dead.”237  
Art, from its position outside the economy of the useful, is uniquely positioned to capture 
this moment and express the sovereign. “What is the meaning of art, architecture, music, 
painting or poetry,” Bataille asks, “if not the anticipation of a suspended, wonder-struck 
moment, a miraculous moment?”238 He continues, “…[A]rt has no other meaning… art is 
always a response to the supreme hope for the unanticipated, for a miracle.”239 
Omniprésence, with its risk, its danger, and its complete lack of utility, captures the 
essence of this sovereign gesture, the making of the “creative skin” that Dumas reads in 
Apollo.240 
This opening of the skin, this sovereign, creative gesture, opens another sort of fissure, 
one that I argue creates a space of possibility for imagining the posthuman. We can’t 
avoid being drawn into this negative space, this lacuna, and forced to confront what our 
own, ostensibly intact, skin contains and would seal out. To witness this horror-inducing 
act is to admit our own permeability—and potential. In thinking about the creation of this 
space, I am indebted to Parveen Adams, who offers a psychoanalytic reading of Orlan’s 
work. For Adams, the crux of Omniprésence occurs in what she identifies an “unfillable 
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gap [that] opens at the moment that the face is lifted.”241 In that moment, the skin 
becomes a mask, but with a space, rather than a face, behind it—a space that remains 
unseen. For Adams, who concentrates on Orlan’s declaration of being a “woman-to-
woman transsexual,”242 which I will discuss shortly, this gap is the space where castration 
occurs, where Orlan becomes Woman-as-phallus-as -mage and denies the possibility of a 
fixed and definitive gender identity.  She writes: 
The power of her work is here, in the surgical manipulation of her face, 
rather than in the conscious programme of art historical references which 
really are no more than rationalisations. It is here on the operating table 
that castration occurs; not in the act of cutting, not in the drama of the 
knife, not in the barely suppressed frenzy of it all, but in the space which 
is opened up. In the space in which the face is unmade. It is the space 
between the bloodied place which we see all around her ear and the face as 
it lifts from its customary base. Something flies off; this something is the 
security of the relation between the inside and the outside. It ceases to 
exist. There is, suddenly, no inside and no outside….It is the moment, a 
horrifying moment, of the birth of a new space which ruins habitual 
space.243 
 
Orlan’s surgery invites—and requires—a new kind of seeing. The opening of her face, as 
she continues to speak and interact, rouses a kind of horror unique to seeing the face 
become object and, in a way, disappear.  
 I don’t read this space primarily as an effect or cause of a metaphorical castration, 
however, but rather as a space that invites the imagining of the posthuman. What we see 
as Orlan’s skin is pulled back and her face transformed is not the lack of the phallus, or 
the impossibility of embodying Woman, but rather something simultaneously human and 
alien. We see a space emerging to imagine a new figure. By opening her skin and by 
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facing what she has called “the life-risk of dying,” 244 Orlan demonstrates the possibility 
of understanding body as machine, in its its non-naturalness and non-givenness, and with 
the possibility of upgrading it. 
 I want to return briefly to the question of Orlan’s use of the term transsexualism, 
which has been (justifiably, in my opinion) criticized as being simplistic and suggesting 
that gender transition is simply about a superficial, skin-deep transformation. In his book 
Second Skins, transsexual scholar Jay Prosser recounts attending Orlan’s gallery talk at 
the Sandra Gering Gallery in December of 1993, when “Orlan: Omipresence” was 
displayed there. During the question and answer period, he writes, 
[A]fter mentioning the work I was then beginning on transsexuality, I 
asked Orlan about the relation of body and identity in her work. Did she 
feel any sense of identity transformation, of an internal shifting, as her 
face underwent its successive alterations? Was the transformation really 
only skin deep? (I wondered what it was like to wake up to a different face 
each morning; I wondered how she sustained her self in the face—
literally—of such change). Skimming over the substance of my questions 
(there were problems in translation) but picking up my reference to 
transsexuality, Orlan replied simply that she felt like “une transsexuelle 
femme-à-femme.”245 
 
A few pages later, he mentions Adams’ essay, explaining, parenthetically, that the 
exhibition he had attended had been televised—seeming to suggest that the formulation 
“une transsexuelle femme-à-femme” may have had its genesis at that moment. Certainly 
Orlan has used the phrase since, but its record in Adams’ essay seems to be seminal—and 
widely criticized by scholars of transsexual studies. Diane Morgan calls Adams’ 
approach emblematic of “psychoanalytical theory’s more or less consistently dismissive 
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attitude to transsexuality.”246 However, Alluquére Rosanne Stone, herself a trans-
gendered person and one of the founders of transgender studies, had another take on 
Orlan’s use of the phrase, writing:  
…I am particularly fond of her appropriation of the hot-potato word 
Transsexual for an unholy purpose for which it was never intended. In one 
of her interviews she uses the term female-to-female transsexual. I saw 
this remark as playful and ironic, because of the way it stands binary 
opposition on its head. Once the idea of female-to-female transsexuals is 
possible, the lid is off the worm can. 247 
I agree with Stone that the comment was intended to be playful, although I do still find 
Orlan’s usage of such a complex fraught, “hot-potato” word rather simplistic and 
damaging. Nonetheless, her appropriation of this phraseology does again underscore 
Orlan’s larger claims that changing the skin can effect a fundamental change in identity. 
Cyborgian and Christian Imagery 
 When Orlan gives presentations to English-speaking audiences, she likes to joke, 
through her interpreter, that she was unable to find the proper batteries for the automatic 
translation implants in her temple bumps, and apologizes for having to use an interpreter 
instead. The bumps, which she highlights with iridescent or sparkly make-up, contain no 
electronics, but do have a high-tech, alien look (fig. 33). Though covered by Orlan’s skin, 
they are simultaneously a part of her body and foreign to it. As low-tech as her bumps 
are, Orlan is physically a cyborg through the incorporation of silicone into her own flesh. 
 Metaphorically, however, Orlan’s project is even more deeply cyborgian. Her claim, 
“This is my body, this is my software” (fig. 34) evokes the trope of body as machine, a 
comparison that has roots at least as far back as Descartes. Yet whereas the body-
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machine Descartes envisioned was an earthen vessel piloted by a soul inhabiting but 
distinct from it, the more contemporary metaphor of software raises different 
possibilities. In the cyberpunk imaginary, the self is seen as a digital construct, like 
software, running on the hardware of the body but transferable to other “media,” 
including other machine-bodies.248 Orlan’s performances demonstrate not the separability 
of self and body, or hardware and software (they are emphatically in-body experiences, 
for performer as well as spectators), but rather the possibility of each for replacement and 
reprogramming. The body is no longer given, but modifiable. 
 The phrase “This is my body” comes, as do many of the themes in Orlan’s oeuvre, 
from the Christian tradition, in this case the Eucharist celebration. The gospels of 
Matthew, Mark, and Luke record Christ’s words to his disciples at the Passover supper 
before his crucifixion as he breaks the bread and shares the wine: “This is my body… this 
is my blood.”249 Christ is foreshadowing his coming death and explaining that the 
sacrifice of his opened and broken body will provide forgiveness for his followers. Orlan, 
who specifically denies her performances as being either masochistic or sacrificial, 
nonetheless appropriates this Biblical language, making a strong claim for the body freed 
from the strictures and taboos of the Christian tradition. By identifying the body with the 
technology of software, she challenges a view of the body as given by a creator and thus 
hallowed and inviolable. The opening of her skin is not an act of suffering or atonement, 
but of rewiring her circuits or upgrading her firmware.  
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 This denial of an Edenic origin story, as much as her impure mingling of “organic and 
technological flesh”250 most closely aligns Orlan with the cyborg Donna Haraway 
imagines in her famous Manifesto of 1985. For Haraway, the cyborg, an amalgamation of 
organism and machine, is a metaphor for exploring agency in an ever-more wired and 
networked world. This autopoetic origin story and unnatural fusion suggests a figure of 
“transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities.”251 Rather than 
cowering in the face of the “informatics of domination,”252 which represent the webs of 
power present in an increasingly technologically-mediated social reality, the cyborg, 
illegitimate and resistant hybrid, has the power to navigate this new terrain. “Cyborg 
imagery,” Haraway writes, “can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we 
have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves.”253 During surgeries, Orlan’s skin 
likewise complicates easy dualisms of inside and outside, mind and body, organic and 
technological. Orlan is, like Haraway’s imagined cyborg, a figure who interacts 
intimately with technology, combining body and tool into a single, multidimensional  
force. 
 In her later work When Species Meet (2008), Haraway explores the implications of a 
world rendered increasingly cyborgian by expanding scientific knowledge and 
technologies. There she addresses what Sigmund Freud, as early as 1916, identified as 
cracks in the liberal humanist edifice (oft-cited as the origins of a posthuman 
perspective)—what he called three “major blows at the hands of science” to the “naïve 
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self-love of men.” 254 These were the Copernican revelation that the earth was not the 
center of the universe; the Darwinian theory of evolution that revealed humans’ small 
distance from other animals; and his, Freud’s, pronouncement that man is not even the 
master of his own mind. To these three, Haraway adds a fourth, “the informatic or 
cyborgian [wound], which infolds organic and technological flesh and so melds that 
Great Divide as well.”255 Again, Haraway’s language is metaphorical, but Orlan’s 
wounds are literal: an actual infolding of the technological within her organic flesh. As 
she lies on the table, celebrating the lack of pain through the intervention of analgesics, 
conversing with real-time viewers through the communications technologies that 
surround her, and prepared to receive under her flayed skin upgrades to her own 
hardware, she embodies the nature of the cyborg: unfixed, changing, and an 
indeterminate figure between the human subject of the past and the technological realities 
of the present. 
Posthuman Skin 
In her book Skin: On the Cultural Border Between Self and the World, literary scholar 
Claudia Benthien traces the changing perceptions of skin across recent history, positing 
that even though developing medical technology has allowed unprecedented access to the 
interior of the body, the skin is seen as a more rigid boundary than ever before. Benthien 
examines skin metaphors in multiple languages to trace skin as something that houses, 
hides, or reflects the true self, and she identifies a fundamental change in interpreting the 
skin taking place during the 18th century. In the 17th and 18th centuries, she writes, the 
body was seen as “open,” such as in philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin’s description of the 
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“grotesque body.”256 The skin was pervious to water and other dangerous substances, and 
also allowed for the exit of toxins—and in turn the diagnosis of internal maladies—
through wounds. However, by the late 18th century, Benthien writes,  
skin had already become simply a place of passage to the inside. The 
dissection of the body in anatomy created a model of knowledge based on 
dismemberment, extraction, and disembodiment. A mechanizing view of 
the body gradually took hold. Today it finds its logical continuation in 
transplantation medicine, the final conquest of the inner corporeal space, 
what Virilio has called, for now, the ‘final political form of domestication’ 
(1994, 108-109). The implantation of human organs and eventually also of 
technological devices leads to a forceful abolition of the classical 
distinction between internal and external, a distinction traditionally 
marked by the skin. But the many literary and historical documents I 
examine in this study reveal that in terms of the history of mentalities, this 
development has by no means rendered the notion of skin as a boundary 
superfluous in the collective imagination—on the contrary that notion has 
taken on even greater significance.257 
 
The idea of skin as a fixed boundary, therefore, a sort of garment protecting the inner self 
from the outside world, persists, even as medical technologies allow the body to be 
entered and visualized in ways that belie that ostensibly inviolable border. 
 Interestingly, although her focus throughout the book is on literature, in her 
introduction, Benthien briefly mentions a variety of contemporary art projects to illustrate 
the primacy of the skin in contemporary culture and imagination. The first of these 
examples is Orlan, to whom is devoted a single, inaccurate sentence: “The contemporary 
French performance artist Orlan, for example, undergoes continual surgery to shape her 
face to the ideal of beauty found in classic Renaissance painting (e.g., Botticelli’s Venus 
or Leonardo’s Mona Lisa), all the while documenting this bloody metamorphosis of the 
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self transformed into the image.”258 Benthien is correct neither about Orlan’s surgeries 
being “continual,” nor about her quest being directed toward ideals of classical beauty, 
but she is correct in identifying Orlan as an artist whose “works and performances deal 
quite concretely with skin as a place of encounter.”259 She also provides a useful frame 
for thinking about the ways in which Orlan’s performances allow us to imagine a skin 
that is neither a pre-modern, open, osmotic skin, nor a fully sealed, rational, and self-
containing skin, but something that goes beyond either. I identify Orlan’s skin as 
posthuman: cyborgically mingling flesh and technology, refusing a single given 
truthfulness, perpetually indeterminate and unfixed. This visible skin resists both the idea 
of the perfectly self-contained, bordered, liberal humanist subject, and the triumphal, 
technologically-enhanced superhuman. 
 As a border of the self and a feature that visibly differentiates man from animal, the 
skin is of particular significance for the liberal humanist subject. It functions as the 
imagined boundary that allows the distancing from the world necessary for this 
subjecthood. This distance is crucial to philosopher Immanuel Kant’s formulation of the 
aesthetic, which can only be judged from a position of “disinterestedness” and separation 
of self from the sensations or personal goals that would cloud rational recognition.260 This 
potent concept of the aesthetic, critical theorist Terry Eagleton argues in The Ideology of 
the Aesthetic, came to stand for and enable Enlightenment thinking about subjectivity, 
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politics, and power. For Eagleton, the idea of the aesthetic is rooted in the body, where it 
mediates “between the material and the immaterial; between things and thoughts, 
sensations and ideas.” 261  The aesthetic allows for physical sensations and perceptions to 
be brought into the realm of the mind and brought under the control of reason. It is a 
recognition of “our creaturely life,” as he calls it, and formalized in such a way that this 
shared experience of the embodied aesthetic comes to be understood as a universal that 
can link (a certain segment of) humankind. As Eagleton explains, “When, for Kant, we 
find ourselves concurring spontaneously in an aesthetic judgement, able to agree that a 
certain phenomenon is sublime or beautiful, we exercise a precious form of 
intersubjectivity, establishing ourselves as a community of feeling subjects linked by a 
quick sense of our shared capacities.”262 The aesthetic, then, understood as a rationalizing 
of phenomenological experience, allows, Eagleton argues, for a universal subjectivity, 
which creates “an entirely new kind of human subject—one which, like the work of art 
itself, discovers the law in the depths of its own free identity, rather than in some 
oppressive external power.”263 This liberal humanist subjecthood, then, depends 
fundamentally on an awareness of shared embodiment, but a separation effected by 
reason. The subject recognizes himself, through his “disinterested” observation of the 
world, as an entity separate from that surrounding world, and, by extension, from a 
controlling deity: enclosed, rational, and entirely independent. 
 In Eagleton’s formulation, the body is the locus of the aesthetic; I propose that the 
skin can be understood as emblematic of the humanist subjecthood to which it gives rise. 
The skin in this view is what acts as the physical and literal barrier of the self—the object 
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that allows for a perceived separation from the world. It is itself the limen that translates 
between material and immaterial, things and thoughts, sensations and ideas. Anzieu 
describes the skin as the source from which all other perceptive organs arise, and the 
sense of touch as the “common sense” that unites other perceptions. The skin, then, as the 
primary source of input, performs the unique role of delivering sensations to the intellect, 
while simultaneously serving as that marker of difference between the individual and the 
environment. 
Difference as demarcated by the skin, however, clearly has a sinister aspect that 
belies the vaunted language of universality in Kant’s philosophy. At the same time he 
expounds upon an aesthetic based on an “inner, personal interrelation between subjects as 
rational and feeling beings,”264however, and imagines a taste marked by “universal 
communicability,” an “accord, so far as possible, [between] all ages and nations… from 
grounds deep-seated and shared alike by all men,”265 unspeakable violence was occurring 
throughout the Atlantic. This violence, exercised upon the same sensing, feeling bodies 
that should have merited common subjecthood, instead emphatically denied it to millions 
in the Atlantic world, from Africa to North and South America, based largely on the color 
of their skin. 
 Kant’s discussion of physical attractiveness, versus the pure aesthetic, makes it clear 
that although he imagines the aesthetic as universalizing and unifying, an implicit 
hierarchy is still at play when it comes to “all ages and nations.”  Perception of physical 
beauty, he writes, depends on the accepted notions of beauty in a particular location, 
based on that region’s average physiognomy. Because of this, “a negro must necessarily 
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(under these empirical conditions) have a different normal idea of the beauty of forms 
from what a white man has, and the Chinaman one different from the European.”266 The 
“ideal of the beautiful,” however, which can only be reflected in the human figure, 
requires not only “correct” features, but a reflection of “moral ideas,” such as 
“benevolence, purity, strength, or equanimity,” which are expressed visibly.267 Although 
he makes a nod to inclusivity, then, the white, European male, with his attendant cultural 
values, is arguably the true (if invisible) standard against which other ideas of beauty are 
merely imperfect versions.268   
 Within the discipline of art history, Winckelmann is even more explicit about the 
connection between skin color and superiority. According to his “environmental” theory, 
different regions of the world produce distinct types of people, distinguishable by their 
skin tones. The weather and temperatures of various zones, by this theory, result not only 
in differently colored skin, but in fundamental differences in character and ability. The 
idea of the aesthetic, in his writing, becomes not something universally appreciable, but 
instead the indication of the superiority of the tastes of those with lighter skin. For 
Winckelmann, this excellence of taste reaches its aesthetic and intellectual apex with the 
classical Greeks, whose celebration of the human form and spirit embody true artistic 
greatness. It is interesting to note that the sculptures that Winckelmann so admires are, in 
fact, not only Roman copies,269 carved in marble, rather than cast in bronze like the 
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originals—and, by the time Winckelmann encountered them, sparkling pristinely white, 
denuded of the skin of polychromy that would have covered them originally.270  
This imagined, invisible whiteness becomes for Winckelmann the symbol of artistic 
greatness in his beloved ancients, and for Kant suggests an aesthetic that can create a 
universal brotherhood, in spite of the physical differences he nonetheless points out. Yet 
real skin—never white, but an innervated, metamorphosing spectrum of shades—does 
serve the function Kant envisioned for the aesthetic. Skin is something all living humans 
have in common; it is impossible to live without the skin, the only sense organ that also 
serves a vital protective function. Skin may be different colors, but pulled back, it reveals 
the same stuff; to quote Serres again, “What can the common monster… show to us right 
now under his skin? Yes, Blood and Flesh.” 271 If a genuine intersubjectivity can be 
located in a particular awareness, as Kant suggests the aesthetic can, I propose that it 
exists in the skin, and more specifically, in empathy to expressions of others’ pain to the 
skin. It would seem that we are essentially evolutionarily programmed to flinch when we 
see another’s expression of pain:  involuntarily to sense, empathically as if in our own 
skin, the other’s suffering.  
In her classic The Body in Pain, English professor Elaine Scarry writes about the 
inexpressibility of physical pain: the impossibility of using words—even when pain is not 
actively robbing one of them—to make one’s experience of pain visible to another. She 
writes that “To have pain have is to have certainty; to hear about pain is to have 
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doubt.”272 One’s own pain is what can’t be un-grasped, but it is equally impossible to 
grasp the pain of the other (4). The pain of another, even as it is described in language, is 
inaccessible: it may “seem to have the remote character of some subterranean fact, 
belonging to an invisible geography that, however portentous,” Scarry writes, “has no 
reality because it has not yet manifested itself on the visible surface of the earth” (3). 
However, when that pain does become visible on the surface, it will “immediately convey 
to anyone present the sentient distress of the person hurt,” so “suggestively” that even if 
the wounded person “is not actually in pain, [she] may find it difficult to assure the 
companion” of as much (15). That shared sentience is ultimately what does allow for the 
making visible to pain to another person; Scarry writes:  
we will see that the story of physical pain becomes as well as story about 
the expansive nature of human sentience, the felt-fact of aliveness that is 
often sheerly happy, just as the story of expressing physical pain 
eventually opens into the wider frame of invention.(22) 
 
As “visible surface,” the skin, when wounded, is uniquely able, in the absence of any 
words of description, to evoke empathy. 
The skin’s unique ability to evoke empathy is highlighted in the 1982 Ridley Scott 
film Blade Runner, even when the skin in question isn’t human. Blade Runner features 
androids called Replicants, who are visually indistinguishable from humans in behavior 
as well as in appearance.273 The only way of definitively telling the two apart, shown at 
work in the opening scene of the film, is the “Voight-Kampff” test, which uses an 
individual’s physiological responses to hypothetical scenarios to measure empathy—the 
quality that distinguishes humans from Replicants. This sensibility—or lack of it—is also 
revealed in the Replicants’ skin. Midway through the film, escaped Replicants Pris and 
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Roy Batty seek out “genetic designer” J.F. Sebastian in his home, intent on gaining an 
extension to their pre-programmed lifespans (fig. 35). In a scene that opens with a close-
up of eggs bobbing in a beaker of loudly bubbling water, Sebastian is unable to stop 
staring at the physical perfection of the individuals he helped to design, and giddily 
requests, “Show me something!” 
 “We’re not robots, Sebastian,” Batty chides him. “We’re physical.” Pris, rising to 
drape her arms around Sebastian’s shoulders, declares, “I think, Sebastian; therefore I 
am.” 
 “Very good, Pris,” Batty nods. “Now show him why.”  
In a series of moves that simultaneously support and belie Batty’s first assertion of their 
physicality, Pris easily executes a gymnastic back walkover and steps to the steaming 
beaker as the cringe-inducing diegetic bubbling again surges. Prolonging the dramatic 
moment, the camera cuts to Roy’s look of concern, a close-up of the boiling eggs and 
burner, and finally back to Pris, as she plunges her hand into the water and lingers there 
before extracting and flinging an egg to Sebastian—who is forced to drop it almost 
immediately (fig. 36). Though we don’t see Sebastian flinch at Pris’s action, the scene’s 
editing certainly plays on audience empathy to heighten the tension, the sound of the 
burbling flask a vivid aural cue to the pain the boiling water would inflict on the skin. 
Moments later, as the Replicants insist that Sebastian take them to his boss, their ultimate 
creator, the bubbling again rises to underline their sinister purpose, and again we feel the 
threat in our own skin. 
The hairless skin of the human, in any of its multicolored variations, also 
distinguishes it from other animals, a distinction that the liberal humanist subject 
  141 
considers superiority. Scholars working in the increasingly influential field of animal 
studies have problematized this assumption of innate superiority, examining the ethics of 
using non-human animals, as well as what our treatment of them reveals about ourselves. 
For literary scholar Cary Wolfe, the entire idea of the “subject” takes on new meaning 
when we ask whether it can be applied to non-human animals, particularly as humans’ 
historical treatment of other animals has been, and continues to be, so violent and 
exploitative. Indeed, the title of his 2003 book, Animal Rites,274 plays deliberately with 
questions of subjecthood. The “rites” of the title refers to Wolfe’s intention to “take 
seriously the question of the animal,” while the homophone it suggests, “animal rights,” 
raises the question of what it would mean for animals to be granted the status of subjects 
under the law, and thus entitled to its particular assurances and benefits. 
Animals, it is clear, are not only not granted rights under the law, but are considered a 
natural resource rather than individual entities: they produce food, leather, wool, and 
other materials for which humans breed, raise, and eventually kill them. Wolfe uses 
Jonathan Demme’s The Silence of the Lambs275 to ground his discussion of a 
“speciesism” that “marginalizes and objectifies the other solely based on species, but also 
[suggests] a whole network of material practices that reproduce that logic as a 
materialized institution and rely on it for legitimation.”276  The film, with its specific 
focus on skin, and particularly skin as garment,277 allows Wolfe to highlight the 
“speciesism” latent in it and in contemporary society. This occurs, Wolfe argues, through 
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the animalization and humanization of both animals and humans, which Wolfe maps out 
on a sort of grid, with “animalized animals” at one end and “humanized humans” at the 
other. Animalized animals, he writes, through “the ongoing practices of violence against 
nonhuman others  ‘so vital to our modernity,’ as Derrida ironically notes (‘Force of Law,’ 
951),” come to be seen as expendable. “Demme’s film,” Wolfe writes, “like the 
‘humanism’ and ‘modernity’ Derrida critiques, takes for granted the fundamental 
sacrifice of nonhuman animals (in what we eat, what we wear, the testing of the products 
we buy, etc.), which must continue to be legitimized if the ideological work of marking 
human others as animals for the purposes of their objectification and sacrifice is to be 
effective.”278 At the far end of the spectrum from animalized animals is “the wishful 
category of the humanized human, sovereign and untroubled,”279 the subject whose 
unquestioned superiority is the justification for taking and wearing the skins of other 
animals. Between these two poles lie the categories of humanized animals (notably, 
house pets) and animalized humans (paradigmatically those the state incarcerates and 
executes).280 In Silence, the protagonist must seek the help of one of these felons, a 
former psychiatrist imprisoned as a murderer and cannibal, in order to find the as-yet 
unincarcerated Buffalo Bill, wanted for his crimes of killing and skinning humans. As 
Wolfe’s argument makes clear, the law condemns the killing, eating, and skinning of 
humans against a backdrop, rendered invisible by the film and by society, of systematic 
practices of killing, eating, and skinning animals. 
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Another project that highlights the “network of material practices” that Wolfe 
identifies as inhering in speciesism is Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr’s Victimless Leather—A 
Prototype of Stitch-less Jacket Grown in a Technoscientific Body (2004) (fig. 37). The 
rather prolix title lays out the parameters of the project: the artists grow “leather” outside 
a natural body, in a laboratory environment that would seem to render unnecessary a 
“victim”—a living body that must be killed and skinned in order to clothe another. Yet 
the body, outside of which skin cannot exist as such—becoming, when it is put into use, 
leather, through processes that are chemical as well as semiotic—does not exist here.  
These substitutions of bioreactor for body, bloodless cells for leather, and machinery for 
a would-be “victim” unite to form their own skin: a linguistic creation posthuman in its 
own way and an apropos foil for understanding Orlan’s performances. 
Although it was most recently on display at the Museum of Modern Art in New 
Work, Victimless Leather looks more like something out of a mad scientist’s laboratory 
than what one might expect to encounter in an art museum. The thin arms of a metal 
stand support three laboratory vials connected by a series of tubes and illuminated by a 
red indicator light that bathes everything in a pinkish glow. On the left, an indeterminate 
liquid beads on the inside and collects in the bottom of a flask fitted at the top with a 
rubber stopper. On the right, thin filaments coil inside a smaller vial, also stoppered and 
nearly full of a similarly fuchsia-tinged liquid. Curving tubes connect the flasks to a 
peristaltic pump behind the stand, as well as to the piece’s focal point, which rests above 
and between them: a clear globe, beaded inside with moisture, and housing what appears 
to be the tiniest of leather jackets.  
  144 
Victimless Leather is replete with unexpected juxtapositions, contradictions, and 
transfusions. The project depends upon cutting-edge scientific technology, yet its beakers 
and labware seem deliberately to evoke an older—if not science-fiction—aesthetic. The 
miniscule size of the jacket is almost playfully whimsical, yet its fabric of living cells 
alludes to serious ethical questions, especially of medical research and genetic 
engineering. One of the boundaries the project addresses and blurs most productively, 
however, is a physical one: the skin. Physically and metaphorically multilayered and 
indeterminate, Victimless Leather calls attention to skin itself and, beyond the ethical 
implications of wearing the skin of another organism, the skin’s fragile and imperfect 
function as marker and boundary. It is the very in-between-ness and indeterminacy of 
Victimless Leather, as especially revealed through this multilayered “skin,” that makes it 
a provocative and productive model for understanding posthuman subjectivity. 
Victimless Leather was created by Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr of the Tissue Culture 
and Art Project, which they co-founded in 1996. The two are currently artists in residence 
at SymbioticA, of which Catts is the director, a biological laboratory at the school of 
Anatomy and Human Biology at the University of Western Australia that facilitates 
artistic production and resources in so-called wet biology practices.281 At the core of the 
Tissue Culture and Art Project, according to its founders, is the “artistic manipulation of 
living materials using the tools of modern biological research in order to sharpen 
questions arising from the utilization of these new sets of tools.”282 The scientific tool the 
artists use in Victimless Leather is tissue engineering, wherein new tissue is grown, 
usually over some sort of matrix, from living cells. Before Victimless Leather, Catts and 
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Zurr produced several other artworks requiring care, feeding, and protection, and 
straddling, sometimes disturbingly, the line between living and inanimate: “Semi-Living” 
sculptures, as the artists call them. Among these were the 2001 Pig Wings Project, in 
which pig bone tissue was cultured and grown over matrices in the shape of wings, and 
the 2003 project Disembodied Cuisine, in which they grew, and ate, miniature “steaks” 
from frog muscle cells (fig. 38). 
Certainly these pieces aren’t without their sensationalist aspects, and Victimless 
Leather is no exception. It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss these Semi-Living 
sculptures as merely shock art. Through these projects, the artists make visible just a few 
of the increasing ways in which technology is able to intervene in, and even define the 
parameters of, life itself. Victimless Leather, especially, also illustrates vividly the 
increasing awareness of our inseparability from our Others, organic and technological, 
that characterizes the posthuman experience.  
The skin of Victimless Leather, and the heart of the project, manifests this 
intermixture between organisms and between the organic and technological. The titular 
leather is actually tissue formed from immortalized283 cell lines: here, human bone cells 
overlaying mouse connective tissue cells. The artists are concerned with provoking 
conversations on how humans interact with, and most often exploit, their animal 
Others—using them to grow body parts or other medical products, consuming them for 
food, or wearing them as garments—but beyond that, this project raises questions about 
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what it means to be a human subject. It casts a revealing light on the fragility, 
permeability, and tenuousness of what would seem to be the most personal and definitive 
border of the self: the skin. 
The tiny jacket of Victimless Leather, the color of raw flesh and glistening with 
moisture, clearly represents no ordinary skin. It has a distinctly alien quality, lent not 
merely by the scientific apparatus housing it, but by its indeterminacy. We are used to 
receiving from skin, as the outer layer of an organism, visual clues of identity and origin, 
but this skin reveals not even its species, let alone ethnicity or status. Detached from any 
organism it might be expected to identify, it is, of sorts, a free-floating signifier. 
Additionally, this skin seems almost to pulsate with life, which is never a quality 
associated with leather. The conversion from skin (which will decompose and decay if 
left untreated) to leather is a chemical and physical one that at the same time removes 
traces of the former occupant in order to create a durable material suitable for product 
manufacture.  This particular “leather,” however, dripping with nutrient medium and 
glowing rosily, hovers in an indeterminate zone, and is visible alive enough to provoke 
the curator’s guilt at having to “kill” the piece, as will be discussed later. 
An organism’s skin serves many functions, including protecting, bounding, and 
sensing. A leather garment can protect against the elements, but living skin serves an 
even more important defensive function, providing crucial protection for other organs and 
muscles, acting as a waterproof barrier, and defending against the invisible threat of 
invading microbes. Remarkably resilient and quick-healing, skin is nonetheless a fragile 
barrier, prone to damage and scarring as it shields the body as a whole. In the case of 
Victimless Leather, however, the skin is inside the “technoscientific body” described in 
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the title, not offering but receiving protection. The tissue of the jacket must be protected 
from the bacteria that would kill it, precisely because it lacks skin of its own. Thus, it 
remains quarantined not just within its protective flask, but within the sterile bioreactor.  
Skin, as the outer border, as it were, of an individual’s body, also serves as a tangible 
boundary of the self. Yet the skin of this jacket bounds nothing—it is an empty 
garment—and is indeterminate in its own existence: living or inanimate, human or 
animal, natural or artificial. It is an extreme manifestation of Serres’ Harlequin’s coat. It 
is unclear what, if anything, steers this organism—the creators who set these cells in 
motion, the peristaltic pump providing nutrition to the tissue, or some elusive natural 
force. Unlike human skin, or even Orlan’s opened, altered skin, this “skin” seems to have 
a mind of its own. Curators at MoMA ultimately had to stop the flow of nutrients to the 
project because it was growing out of control, as if staging a break from the confines of 
its bioreactor. When a similarly out-of-control growth occurs in the body—not 
uncommonly on the skin itself—those haywire cells, driven to continue reproducing their 
damage, are called cancer. Not only did this skin of Victimless Leather bound nothing, 
but unconnected to a contained organism, its growth was unchecked and unstable. 
Finally, skin not only bounds a subject, acting as border between self and Other, but 
leads to an awareness of self through the presence of the Other. It is not merely border or 
barrier, but an organ of reception; it is impossible to touch without feeling the touch of 
the Other.284 This presentation of skin also reminds us of the interconnectedness made 
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possible by advanced medical science, whether in its positive aspects (such as using the 
same cell-growing techniques as shown here to develop organs to replace ones damaged 
by trauma or disease) or in the more questionable directions in which it could possibly 
go. It also highlights both the inescapable similarities and inequities in humans’ 
relationship with their animal Others: we are intricately interconnected organisms sharing 
the same planet and ecosystems, and far more similar than once thought (a fact that recent 
genome mapping highlights even more than the Darwinian theories cited above by 
Freud), yet humans’ interaction with other animals is almost exclusively exploitative (and 
rarely questioned). 
The project would seem resolutely posthuman, but it is perhaps fitting that, given 
posthumanism’s rejection of fixed and impermeable boundaries, Victimless Leather is not 
without its humanist influences and overtones. The piece was, after all, displayed at 
MoMA as part of their Design and the Elastic Mind show, which celebrated 
technologically-aided design to improve human life. Even more strikingly, Victimless 
Leather achieves the ultimate dream of Renaissance humanist art: the actual reproduction 
of nature, not merely via a convincing simulation, but by displaying the very process of 
created and artistically altered life. This display of life in an art museum ended up 
creating an unusual dilemma for MoMA’s curators when the cells of the project, designed 
as they were to “grow indefinitely,” did just that. When the project’s rapidly multiplying 
cells began to clog its incubator, and one of the jacket’s sleeves began to fall off, senior 
curator Paola Antonelli was forced to flip the switch, as described in a New York Times 
article provocatively headlined “Museum Kills Live Exhibit.” Antonelli reports, “I felt 
                                                                                                                                                 
space of our touch, our subjectivity-in-process. Touch as a reaching toward is a gesture of /espacement/, 
and instance of the inexorable violence of difference, of the unknowable. Touch is a movement toward an 
other through which I re-cognize myself differently, spacing time as I time space.” (60) 
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cruel when I turned it off. It was the only piece in the show that was alive.”285 Catts, on 
the other hand, was quite satisfied with the outcome and emotional reaction. He stated 
that he “particularly liked what happened at the MoMA [sic],” stating that the need for 
the shutdown fit with the group’s desire “to present the end of our projects in ways that 
remind people that these works are/were alive and that we have a responsibility towards 
the living systems that we engage in manipulating.”286 
The small ritual of death at the museum, combined with what the NYT reporter called 
the sculpture’s “unsettlingly alive”287 appearance beforehand, reveals the discomfort 
prompted by the presence of something that straddles the gap between  living and 
inanimate—as well as the appearance of skin itself: real, simulated, or simulacrum.288 
Victimless Leather, with its semi-living cells that are neither skin, leather, nor 
victimless,289 nonetheless reads as strikingly animal, if not quite human. One doubts 
whether Antonelli would have felt as much empathy and subsequent “cruelty” had the 
project been floral rather than faunal, and in particular had it not had that pinkish, flesh-
like glow. 
The rosy hue of flesh comes, however, from the blood that courses through it, blood 
that has never infused this Semi-Living Sculpture.290 In fact, Victimless Leather’s 
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bloodlessness is perhaps the quality that makes it most alien, and most differentiates it 
from Orlan’s skin. In Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, protagonist Antonio 
escapes having the amount of his debt subtracted from his person in the form of his own 
flesh on a technicality: the earlier deal with the vengeful Shylock made no provision for 
the former’s blood, without which extraction of the flesh is impossible. In a prior scene 
that foreshadows this denouement, the tormented moneylender, justifying the extreme 
terms of this contract, relates the persecution he has suffered at Antonio’s hands—simply 
because, Shylock states, “I am a Jew.” He continues passionately, “Hath not a Jew eyes? 
hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with the same 
food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same 
means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is?”291 
Shylock appeals to a sense of shared humanity that is embodied, and particularly related 
to organs of sensation and to the ability to feel. He continues, “If you prick us, do we not 
bleed?” Skin is the unspoken unifier in his diatribe: receptive (touch, in more ways than 
one, the common sense Anzieu describes); vulnerable; and an individual, yet universal, 
boundary with a shared fragility. Two hundred years before Kant theorizes a universal 
subjectivity based on a shared experience of the aesthetic, Shakespeare’s Shylock, from a 
position of low social standing, makes an eloquent plea for subjectivity based on 
something much more immediate and intimate: the skin. 
Pricked, Orlan does bleed. Not entirely dissimilar in color and texture to Victimless 
Leather, her skin also becomes object: no longer self, or face, but medium. Watching her 
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skin open under the surgeon’s scalpel, however, produces an effect that is less alienating 
than entangling. Orlan is not cyborg, but consummately human: bleeding, she is so 
human that we cannot help but feel the pain she claims to avoid. Orlan’s rather cavalier 
attitude about the pain, after the fact, may align with the photographic record, but not 
with the video. Although she continues to speak and answer questions throughout the 
surgical procedure, it is clear—visibly as well as empathically—that she is indeed 
suffering. 
During Omniprésence, art and cinema critic Jean-Paul Fargier, speaking via live 
uplink, makes a connection to another image of suffering designed to provoke a visceral 
reaction, one not entirely uninvited by Orlan’s earlier oeuvre: “You identify with the 
Holy Face. That’s all you had left to do: become a suffering body.” Orlan quickly 
corrects him: “My body is operated on—it’s not suffering.” Fargier, still concentrating 
upon religious imagery, and anxious to assert his point, responds, “We suffer to see the 
needles. What’s interesting is, you’re killing yourself in public, disappearing, 
reappearing, a sort of resurrection. You’re trying to attain immortality while you’re 
alive.”292 Although Fargier insists upon offering his own interpretation of the piece, he is 
certainly correct that the audience “suffers to see the needles”—though not because it 
reminds them of a religious icon of suffering, but because of the humanity they share with 
the artist. This visceral reaction is not merely an intellectual empathy, but a bodily-
experienced sense of the deeply uncanny, not absent a certain revulsion at seeing Orlan’s 
body open and oozing. 
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Orlan is well aware of the effect the images of her surgeries have on viewers, though 
she insists that she doesn’t experience any more pain watching them than she did during 
the procedures. In the text of her “Conference,” she writes:  
A few words more on these images that you will probably watch with 
discomfort. Sorry to have to make you suffer, but know that I do not 
suffer—unlike you—when I watch these images. Few images force us to 
close our eyes: death, suffering, the opening of the body, certain aspects of 
pornography (for certain people), or for others, birth. Here the eyes 
become black holes into which the image is absorbed willingly or by 
force. These images plunge in and strike directly where it hurts, without 
passing through the habitual filters, as if the eyes no longer had any 
connection with the brain. When watching these images. I suggest that you 
do what you probably do when you watch the news on television. It is a 
question of not letting yourself be affected by the images, and of 
continuing to reflect upon what is behind them. 
 
 The images do penetrate, and though they enter the brain through the eyes—whose 
filtering capabilities, Orlan suggests, viewers use—they are felt in the skin. There is no 
Kantian distancing here: the shared reality of skin, and the experience of it as self, 
establishes an emphatic empathic connection. 
Indeed, recent discoveries in neuroscience have suggested fascinating (if not yet 
entirely understood) insights into empathy, based on brain activity. In the mid-1990s, 
research on macaque monkeys revealed the presence of what the researchers called 
“mirror neurons,” which fired when the monkeys performed certain actions, as well as 
when they saw others do so. Although it has not been possible to locate these neurons in 
humans, neuroscientists refer to the “human mirror neuron system,” which seems to 
function in similar ways and may be related to language and social communication.293 
More recently, these innate reactions have also been shown in functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, in which brain centers activated by one’s own pain are 
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also activated by witnessing the pain of others.294 Scientists tend to consider this capacity 
for recognizing another’s emotional or physical distress key for survival, and thus an 
important evolutionary and social development. Our innate orientation toward feeling 
others’ pain is in overdrive when we experience the slicing of Orlan’s skin. 
Conclusion 
 The shared sense of skin that makes it impossible for viewers to avoid the pain Orlan 
claims not to feel is the crux of the piece, and demonstrates the failure that makes it 
successful. Orlan’s rhetoric about the body being obsolete, an ill-fitting costume, and 
modifiable (along, ostensibly, with the self) through contemporary medical technology, 
appears patently false in the light of her actual surgeries (fig. 39). In addition, the “plan” 
for the project bears little resemblance to the final product—and Orlan’s features, little, if 
any, resemblance to their art historical models. The large nose Orlan sought seems to 
have been proven an impossibility and abandoned. 
 Yet Orlan’s project is most valuable for what it imagines: a posthuman figure freed 
from the constraints of the given human body; cyborgically integrated with technology; 
and unfinished, in flux. Her work with textiles and costumes foregrounds the materiality 
of her skin when she turns to it as an artistic medium, yet the self-ness of the skin argued 
by Anzieu and Serres makes it much more than the costume Orlan suggests. In fact, the 
decision to open the skin, the tension of which the video captures so well in spite of 
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Orlan’s brave face and bluster, evokes a Marsyan separation of self from self, making 
hers not only a posthuman, but a sovereign gesture.. This is not, however, a Cartesian 
commanding of the body by the soul—a reinforcement of the idea of the body as merely 
a vehicle at the whim of its steersman. The opening Orlan undertakes is ultimately one of 
a body inseparable from soul, or, to use a more cyborgian metaphor, hardware and 
software together. The space opened as her skin is lifted demands, in the light of her 
rhetoric, the imagination of a posthuman figure whose body can be modified like 
machinery, through a seamless interface with technology. This vision of the skin is one 
far different from Early Modern conceptions of a permeable, expressive skin, or a 
modern one in which skin is the boundary and protection of a single, rational, self-
contained subject. I have argued that as such, this latter understanding of skin is 
emblematic of humanist subjecthood as imagined through the concept of the aesthetic, in 
which shared subjecthood is possible through an experience of embodiment necessarily 
mediated and rationalized by distance. Yet empathy, in Blade Runner a uniquely human 
quality, is also located in the skin, linking subjects more intimately than even an 
embodied understanding of the aesthetic does. Liberal humanist tendencies of distancing 
nonetheless remain, and Catts and Zurr’s Victimless Leather highlights these networks of 
exchange and domination, while envisioning yet another kind of posthuman skin: this one 
a fusion of human and animal cells, eerily alive, and with its sci-fi mise-en-scene, a 
vision of a certain imagined posthuman future. This skin, however, unbinding and 
unbound, is also bloodless—perhaps the greatest reason we feel little sorrow at its 
“death,” while watching Orlan’s skin open causes an almost physical distress. 
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 On her website, Orlan has posted a “Petition Against Death” that she invites visitors 
to sign. The text reads: 
ENOUGH IS ENOUGH ! 
It’s been going on way too long ! 
It must stop ! 
I don’t agree, I don’t want to die ! 
I don’t want my friends to die  
It’s time to react against death. 
Let’s try all together, we must have a chance. 
Yes, it is possible to have chance, if you say : No ! 
If you write here : No ! 
Together, with no exception295 
 
As an action intended to reverse the inevitability of death—by, of all things, an Internet 
petition—this performance is doomed to certain failure. It brings into being a world in 
which death is something to be stopped: something that has been wreaking havoc for too 
long and can be ended by emphatic community action—a world at odds with the 
posthuman perspective Hayles argues for, one that “recognizes and celebrates finitude as 
a condition of human being, and that understands human life is embedded in a material 
world of great complexity, one on which we depend for our continued survival.”296 It 
ensures its own failure. Likewise, Orlan’s surgical performances to reinvent the self or to 
display the obsolescence of the body perform their own failure. Although I have argued 
that Orlan’s project is distinctly posthuman in its imagining and presentation of an 
unfixed, modifiable, technologically-mingled self, hers is also, to borrow from another of 
Cary Wolfe’s beloved matrices, whether intentionally or not, a very humanist 
posthumanism.297 Omniprésence is effective because it allows us to imagine this 
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posthumanist figure, while seeing, and feeling as if in our own skin, an inexorably human 
sense of entanglement, and what that entanglement could mean. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Orlan, Manifesto of Carnal Art 
 
DEFINITION 
Carnal Art is self-portraiture in the classical sense, but realised through the possibility of 
technology. It swings between defiguration and refiguration. Its inscription in the flesh is 
a function of our age. The body has become a “modified ready-made”, no longer seen as 
the ideal it once represented ;the body is not anymore this ideal ready-made it was 
satisfaying to sign.  
 
DISTINCTION 
As distinct from “Body Art”, Carnal Art does not conceive of pain as 
redemptive or as a source of purification. Carnal Art is not interested in the plastic-
surgery result, but in the process of surgery, the spectacle and discourse of the modified 
body which has become the place of a public debate. 
 
ATHEISM 
Carnal Art does not inherit the Christian Tradition, it resists it! Carnal Art illuminates the 
Christian denial of body-pleasure and exposes its weakness in the face of scientific 
discovery. Carnal Art repudiates the tradition of suffering and martyrdom, replacing 
rather than removing, enhancing rather than diminishing – Carnal Art is not self-
mutilation. 
 
Carnal Art transforms the body into language, reversing the biblical idea of the word 
made flesh ; the flesh is made word. Only the voice of Orlan remains unchanged. The 
artist works on representation. 
 
Carnal Art finds the acceptance of the agony of childbirth to be 
anachronistic and ridiculous. Like Artaud, it rejects the mercy of God -Henceforth we 
shall have epidurals, local anaesthetics and multiple analgesics ! (Hurray for the 
morphine !) Vive la morphine ! (down with the pain !) A bas la douleur ! 
 
PERCEPTION 
I can observe my own body cut open without suffering !….I can see myself all the way 
down to my viscera, a new stage of gaze. “I can see to the heart of my lover and it’s 
splendid design has nothing to do with symbolics mannered usually drawn. 
Darling, I love your spleen, I love your liver, I adore your pancreas and the line of your 
femur excites me.  
 
FREEDOM 
Carnal Art asserts the individual independence of the artist. In that sense it resists givens 
and dictats. This is why it has engaged the social, the media, (where it disrupts received 
ideas and cause scandal), and will even reached as far as the judiciary (to change the 
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CLARIFICATION 
Carnal Art is not against aesthetic surgery, but against the standards that pervade it, 
particularly, in relation to the female body, but also to the male body. Carnal Art must be 
feminist, it is necessary. Carnal Art is not only engages in aesthetic surgery, but also in 
developments in medicine and biology questioning the status of the body and posing 
ethical problems. 
 
STYLE 
Carnal Art loves parody and the baroque, the grotesque and the extreme. 
Carnal Art opposes the conventions that exercise constraint on the human body and the 
work of art. 
Carnal Art is anti-formalist and anti-conformist. 
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Figure 2.1 Orlan, Omniprésence, 1993.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Orlan, Omniprésence, 1993. 
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Figure 2.3 Imaginary Generic No. 31: Successful Operation(s): det.: Orlan posing. 1990. 
Figure 2.4 Orlan, Orlan accouche d'elle-m'aime (Orlan Gives Birth to her Loved Self), 1964. 
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Figure 2.5 Orlan, MesuRage of Rue Châteaubriant, Nice, 1976. 
Figure 2.6 Orlan, La Baiser de l’artiste, 1977. 
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Figure 2.7 Orlan, La Baiser de L’artiste. Sculpture and pedestal. 1977.1977 
Figure 2.8 Orlan, Strip-tease occasionnel à l’aide des draps du trousseau), 1974-1975. 
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Figure 2.9 Orlan, Madone en demonte-pneu, en assomption sur verin pneumatique, 1990. 
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Figure 2.10 Orlan, Peau d’âne (Donkey Skin), 1990 
Figure 2.11 Charles Perrault, director, Donkey Skin (film still). 1970. 
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Figure 2.12 From left to right: François Boucher, The Rape of Europa, 1747 (detail); Workshop of 
André-Charlemagne Charron, tapestry after Boucher's design, 1754-1770 (photograph; detail); 
"Europa" detail from Orlan's Imaginary Generic. 
Figure 2.13 Orlan, Art Charnel (Carnal Art), July 1990. 
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Figure 2.14 Orlan, Tableaux Vivant, 1978. 
Figure 2.15 Orlan, S’habbiler de sa proper nudité (Dressed in Her Own Nudity), 1976-7. 
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Figure 2.16 Orlan, Operation Reussie (video capture), 1991 
Figure 2.17 Orlan, Warranted Pure Orlan. 
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Figure 2.18 Orlan, Operation Opera, 1991. 
Figure 2.19 Grand reliquaire, "My Flesh, the Text, and Languages," No. 10. English. 
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Figure 2.20 Orlan, Sixth Surgery-Performance. "Posing with skulls and trident" and "Printing lips 
on paper." 1992. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.21 Orlan, "Portrait of Orlan in the Operating Theater Prior to the Operation." 
Omniprésence, 1993. 
Figure 2.22 Orlan, Omniprésence, 1993. 
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Figure 2.23 Orlan, Omniprésence, 1993. 
Figure 2.24 Orlan, Omniprésence, 1993. Video still. 
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Figure 2.25 Orlan, Omniprésence, 1993. Video still. 
Figure 2.26 Orlan, Omniprésence, 1993. 
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Figure 2.28 Orlan, 9th Surgery-Performance, 1993. 
Figure 2.27 Orlan, Photograph Produced by the Body-
Machine Four Days After the Performance. 1993. 
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Figure 2.29 Orlan, Omniprésence Nº 2, 1994. Installation view, Centre-Georges Pompidou. 
Figure 2.30 Orlan, Official Portrait after Leaving Quarantine. Final 
image from Omnipresence: No. 1 (1993). 
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Figure 2.31 Juseppe de Ribera, Apollo Flaying Marsyas, 1637. 
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Figure 2.32 Laocoön Group (Roman copy), 1st c. CE after early 2nd c. BCE Pergamene original. 
Vatican Museum. ArtStor. 
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Figure 2.33 Orlan, from www.orlan.net, 2005. 
Figure 2.34 Small Reliquary, "This is my body... this is my software," 1992. 
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Figure 2.35 Sebastian (left), with Replicants Pris (center) and Roy Batty. Blade Runner (1982). 
Figure 2.36 Pris reaches into a boiling beaker. Blade Runner (1982). 
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Figure 2.37 Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr, Victimless Leather—A 
Prototype of Stitch-less Jacket Grown in a Technoscientific 
Body. 2004. 
Figure 2.38 Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr, Study for 
Disembodied Cuisine, 2003. 
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Figure 2.39 Orlan, Piece a conviction (Courtroom Exhibit): 
Costume for the Seventh Surgery-Performance. Translator 
Sophy Thompson's costme. 1993. 
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“Yet still I'm a cyborg just like you/I am one big myoma that thinks 
My planet supports only me/I've got this one big problem 
Will I live forever? I've got just a short time you see 
Modern man, evolutionary betrayer/modern man, ecosystem destroyer”—Bad Religion298 
Chapter 3 : Immersion 
 
Introduction 
 In the bleak dystopia of William Gibson’s 1984 Neuromancer, mind and body are 
data and meat: the former uploaded, downloaded, or translated across media, and the 
latter upgraded with fragments of “microsoft” inserted into skull sockets or customized 
with physical modifications for aesthetics or performance. The novel’s protagonist, Case, 
is a “console cowboy,” a skilled hacker most at home in Cyberspace, the name Gibson 
invents to describe the vast networked realm where the world’s digital data is navigable 
in graphical form.299 Case enters this space by “jack[ing] into a custom cyberspace deck 
that project[s] his disembodied consciousness into the consensual hallucination that [is] 
the matrix.”300 Connected to the matrix via “dermatrodes” at his temples, he maintains a 
link to the physical world as he runs codes and viruses through the deck at his fingertips. 
Yet with full neural integration into the matrix, he experiences both “the bodiless 
exultation of cyberspace”301 and well as the real threat of physical braindeath inside it.  
 Gibson’s descriptions of Cyberspace itself are sparse, impressionistic sketches of a 
space “with its roots in primitive arcade games,…in early graphics programs and military 
experimentation with cranial jacks…. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, 
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clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding…”302 The most evocative 
passage describes Case’s first reentry into the matrix after having surgery to repair neural 
damage inflicted by a former employer he had robbed: 
He closed his eyes. 
Found the ridged face of the power stud. 
And in the bloodlit dark behind his eyes, silver phosphenes boiling in from 
the edge of space, hypnagogic images jerking past like film compiled from 
random frames. Symbols, figures, faces, a blurred, fragmented mandala of 
visual information. 
Please, he prayed, now— 
A gray disk, the color of the Chiba sky. 
Now— 
Disk beginning to rotate, faster, becoming a sphere of paler gray. 
Expanding— 
And flowed, flowered for him, fluid neon origami trick, the unfolding of 
his distanceless home, his country, transparent 3D chessboard extending to 
infinity. Inner eye opening to the stepped scarlet pyramid of the Eastern 
Seaboard Fission Authority burning beyond the green cubes of Mitsubishi 
Bank of America, and high and very far away he saw the spiral arms of 
military systems, forever beyond his reach.303 
 
The language describes a nearly orgasmic physical sensation, but cyberspace itself is 
depicted in strictly geometric terms, here and elsewhere: cubes and pyramids, protected 
with security “ice,” all set against the matrix’s Cartesian grid. Case’s body is only the 
vaguest of shadows: “And somewhere he was laughing, in a white-painted loft, distant 
fingers caressing the deck, tears of release streaking is face.”304 The body fades into a 
barely perceptible background, the mind blissfully absorbed in the virtual world. 
 This digital realm, which can absorb the mind as well as impact the body, is vividly 
depicted in the 1999 film The Matrix,305 which takes its title, as well as much of its 
imagery, from Neuromancer. The opening scenes bring to life the “symbols, figures… 
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[and] fragmented mandala of visual information” that Case sees as he enters Cyberspace, 
here in the form of acid green characters rolling and shimmering down a black screen. 
The film describes the Matrix as “a neural interactive simulation”—a construct that 
represents the “reality” experienced by those who haven’t been “unplugged”—but it is 
also visible from the outside in this encoded form. When the protagonist Neo asks one of 
the operators, watching the glowing gibberish (fig. 1), if he always looks at it encoded, 
the operator replies, “Well, you have to. The image translators work for the construct 
program. But there’s way too much information to decode the Matrix. You get used to it. 
I…I don’t even see the code. All I see is blonde, brunette, redhead...” Although the 
entirety of the data required to run a convincing reality construct is vast, the scrolling 
screens of code make it clear that “reality” is simply an elaborate piece of software. 
 The interface of The Matrix further emphasizes the idea of a seamless transmissibility 
between body and machine, the real and the virtual. In contrast to the dermatrodes that 
Case straps on, Neo’s connection to virtuality is effected via a long metal probe that fits a 
socket at the base of his cranium. Experiences in the Matrix also have repercussions in 
the physical world; when Neo returns to reality after plummeting to the virtual ground in 
a failed jump, he’s sore and has real blood in his mouth. “I thought it wasn’t real,” he 
winces. “Your mind makes it real,” his mentor, Morpheus, explains. Neo clarifies, “If 
you’re killed in the Matrix, you die here?” Morpheus responds enigmatically, “The body 
cannot live without the mind.” As the film later reveals, a body unplugged while the mind 
is in the Matrix also dies in both worlds; the metaphor here might be a catastrophic crash 
of both software and hardware. 
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 Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash, published in 1992, is a third imagining of the body in 
virtual reality, and, as its title suggests, depicts just that sort of catastrophic crash.306 
Unlike Neuromancer and The Matrix, Stephenson’s virtual sphere, which he dubs the 
Metaverse, is accessed not neurally, but through external stimulation: earphone-equipped 
goggles, onto which one’s computer projects a high-resolution laser image for an 
immersive 3D effect. A fisheye lens tracks the user’s gaze to facilitate navigation of the 
virtual world and translates facial expressions to his or her avatar,307 which might be a 
generic off-the-rack model, or, in the case of skilled programmers such as the eponymous 
Hiro Protagonist, highly personalized and lifelike. Less an abstract data repository or 
nefarious illusion than an entertaining parallel of the physical world, the Metaverse is 
also less invasive and more egalitarian than cyberspace or the Matrix: access requires no 
more than a sufficiently powerful computer, including ones publically available. 
 “Dying” in the Metaverse poses no particular risk, as users aren’t neurally linked to 
the matrix; the user is simply booted offline while programs dispose of the avatar in 
question, and after a few moments the user can “goggle in” again. However, the titular 
Snow Crash is a drug, or perhaps virus, that moves, unexpectedly, between computer and 
mind. In the Metaverse, a shifty character offers Hiro the drug in the form of a 
“hypercard,” a visual representation of transferable data: 
If Hiro reaches out and takes the hypercard, then the data it represents will 
be transferred from this guy’s system into Hiro’s computer. Hiro, 
naturally, wouldn’t touch it under any circumstances, any more than you 
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would take a free syringe from a stranger in Times Square and jab it into 
your neck. 
 And it doesn’t make sense anyway. “That’s a hypercard. I thought you 
said Snow Crash was a drug,” Hiro says, now totally nonplussed. 
 “It is,” the guy says. “Try it.” 
 “Does it fuck up your brain?” Hiro says. “Or your computer?” 
 “Both. Neither. What’s the difference?” 
 Hiro finally realizes that he has just wasted sixty seconds of his life 
having a meaningless conversation with a paranoid schizophrenic. He 
turns around and goes into The Black Sun.308 
 
As it happens, the pusher’s description was neither paranoid nor schizophrenic, which 
becomes obvious inside the Black Sun, when Da5id, Hiro’s fellow hacker and the bar’s 
proprietor, samples the Snow Crash. “I’ve got so much antiviral medicine in my system 
that nothing could get through,” Da5id boasts, yet moments later, exposed to the data 
from the card, he dissolves into a spectacular cloud of digital noise. More troublingly, he 
ends up convulsing and babbling in a Reality hospital, his heart and mind both apparently 
scrambled by the digital virus. In Snow Crash, this rogue program is not transmitted 
directly into Da5id’s neurons, but enters his eyes as code that his programming 
background allows him to internalize: his body’s “hardware” processes software that 
crashes not just his computer but his body. 
 Cyberspace, the Matrix, and the Metaverse, despite their differences, share the vision 
of virtual worlds that completely immerse the participant, allowing interaction between 
multiple entities on a global scale and near-complete dissociation from the physical 
world. They also frame the human mind as extensible into the digital realm: thoughts 
merely data, personalities transferable constructs, and the body just another form of 
hardware. Given this extensibility, the body is essentially abandoned in the physical 
world, an old-fashioned token with arcane and inconvenient demands—the “prison of his 
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own flesh” that Case feels when he is neurally prevented from accessing Cyberspace. 309 
In Neuromancer, the body outside of Cyberspace is “meat,” with the attendant “meat 
needs” that Case disdains.  
 In the 1980s and ’90s, technological development began to bring the idea of  
computer-generated worlds, dubbed Virtual Reality (VR), from fantasy to reality. These 
projects tended to have the Neuromancerian aesthetic of hard-edged polygons emerging 
from an inky background310 and to be navigated using a “goggles and glove” interface 
underscoring a Cartesian notion of control. Yet the projects that represent the pinnacle of 
this technology were spearheaded by a Canadian painter and digital artist, Char Davies: 
the highly sophisticated Omsose (produced by the Softimage corporation in 1995) and 
Ephémère (coproduced by Softimage and Davies’ Immersence, Inc. in 1998). These 
projects replace rigid geometric forms with layers of transparent color to evoke a full and 
almost pulsating space, and feature an interface that emphasizes embodiment. The virtual 
world is entered via a head-mounted display (HMD) with stereophonic audio, while a 
vest measures the “immersant’s” breathing and location in space to facilitate navigation 
of the digital environment.311 There is neither glove nor other manual motion control, 
thwarting the traditional video game desires for speed, action, and accomplishment of 
tasks. With these projects, Davies insists that she is using the technology subversively, 
working from within the system to challenge it. 
 Yet this is just one of many contradictions in these fascinating pieces. Although 
Osmose and Ephémère were created with what at the time was cutting-edge technology, 
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Davies’ rhetoric about them echoes much older philosophies of the body and femininity. 
Intended to immerse the user in an entirely computer-generated space, they shape a very 
specific experience of technology (as the non-Real) and the body (as entirely natural and 
discrete from technology). Whereas the digital spaces Gibson and Stephenson imagine 
are arenas of agency, connection, and possibility, Osmose and Ephémère are solitary 
ones, private personal immersions disconnected from a larger web of digital information 
and movement. Viewing the two pieces today is not the overwhelming experience of 
transcendence described by so many early immersants. Instead, the HMD, grainy liquid 
crystal display (LCD) screen, and low-resolution graphics provide a stark contrast to the 
seamless digital imagery so ubiquitous in the contemporary visual milieu. Although 
Davies’ groundbreaking interface remains unique, it is clear why: it is cumbersome, 
exhausting, prone to breakdown, and expensive—even more so than more traditional VR 
interfaces, which, like the technology they facilitated, were largely abandoned in the mid-
1990s. 
 In How We Became Posthuman, Katherine Hayles argues that contemporary 
(posthuman) understandings of our relationship to technology, shaped by science and 
science fiction, imagine the body as merely a vehicle for the mind—which, like computer 
software, is simply data, transmissible across multiple platforms. This is the vision of 
Neuromancer, The Matrix, and Snow Crash. Davies’ projects seem to solve this divide by 
bringing the body, as fully and literally as possible, into the computer. Yet unlike the 
productive blurring of boundaries suggested by posthumanism, as explored in the 
previous two chapters, I argue that Davies’ projects, for all their ambiguous imagery, 
instead tend to reinforce binaries. Davies’ rhetoric draws sharp divisions between the 
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“masculine” spaces of most VR and her own “feminine sensibility,” and between an 
untainted, Edenic Nature/ “real” Real  and the poor simulation of the machine. Although 
the “embodied interface” these pieces offer would bring the body into technology, it ends 
up reinforcing and insisting upon the distance between them. Perhaps most strikingly, 
when viewed against today’s entertainment and communications technology, the pieces 
offer an experience of the virtual that is extraordinarily limited, not just by their low-fi 
graphics and cumbersome interface, but by their insularity. Today’s posthuman 
experience of technology is, perhaps ironically, closer to science fiction than to the safe, 
limited, tethered experience of virtuality offered by Osmose and Ephémère.  
 My goal in this chapter is to place Davies’ two projects—as exemplars of a certain 
kind of VR technology—in conversation with more contemporary experiences of the 
digital world, and thus to recognize better and understand that posthuman experience. I 
argue that this experience is one characterized by an immersion in the virtual that isn’t 
dependent on cumbersome interfaces, but that is more subtle and more pervasive than the 
“safe,” bounded experience offered by Davies’ pieces. Comparing the version of living in 
the future represented by these projects with today’s experience of future-living allows us 
to see the contours and potentials of our posthuman milieu. Although they are, by modern 
standards, fairly old, Davies’ projects feel outdated not, primarily, because of their 
technology, but again, because of the binarism on which they insist. Even the involved 
process of “suiting up” reinforces perceived between body and machine, the real and the 
virtual—the necessary requirements of a journey to a different space. Today, one is far 
more likely to slip into absorption—momentarily or for prolonged periods—in one of the 
ubiquitous two-dimensional screens that surround us, whether televisions, computers, or 
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phones (the distinctions between which continue to narrow relentlessly). The 
contemporary experience of the virtual is of its pervasiveness: its ability to augment, 
rather than reproduce, reality. Precisely because this experience of the “virtual” is porous 
to the broader “real” world, there tend to be fewer disorienting slippages between the two 
than in the earlier equipment that mandated full encapsulation as a requirement for 
suspension of disbelief (and was thus doomed to fail). There is also less need to theorize 
the events experienced in virtuality as being either entirely divorced from “reality” (i.e., 
“what happens in virtuality, stays in virtuality”) or needing to be actively transported 
back into “real” life. 
 In this chapter, I explore this changing experience by first considering VR, both in 
popular imagination and in technological actuality, during the year that likely represented 
the medium’s peak: 1994. I provide a short history of the developments that led to that 
point in order to contextualize Osmose and Ephémère and to situate the accomplishments 
that set them apart in the genre, in particular their unique user interface. I dwell on 
another artistic VR project, 1993’s Placeholder, that not only featured individuals Davies 
would later employ, but foreshadowed similar concerns she addresses in her projects—
about embodiment, nature, and different possibilities for VR’s future. I look at the 
conditions of the creation of Osmose and Ephémère (which differed significantly and 
notably from Placeholder’s), the quasi-mythical reputation they have achieved, and the 
way that this status works to shape perceptions and imaginings of the “immersion” 
experience. I draw on my own experience of traveling to view Osmose and Ephémère in 
the artist’s studio to explore the effect of “immersion” in the pieces a decade and a half 
after their creation. Finally, I examine what these pieces tell us about our posthuman 
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present in light of the technology—notably that by now-ubiquitous 
Cyberspace/Metaverse/Matrix/Internet—that has succeeded them. 
Nineteen ninety-four 
 On February 3, 1994, the situational comedy Mad About You aired the episode 
“Virtual Reality,” in which the main characters Paul and Jamie consider investing in a 
cutting edge VR system that offers an extensive menu of shockingly realistic immersive 
experiences.312 The episode captures the myth of VR—fully interactive, customizable, 
hyperrealistic digital experiences—while also exploring the implications of what might 
happen, or be perceived to happen, within that virtual world. This “Cybercinetic” VR 
system, developed by a precocious 14-year old who also teaches at Columbia, is 
described as the wave of the future. Its young developer extols its interactive capabilities: 
“With this you create your own cyberspace. The picture and the sound are fully digital. 
And plus, it offers a menu of over a thousand pre-programmed images that you’re able to 
interact with.”  
Paul, preparing to experience the system for the first time, sits in a dentist-style 
chair in an austere white room as the kid loads a digital image of him into the attached 
computer (fig. 2). Paul’s friend Ira, who has persuaded him to check out the investment 
opportunity (“You remember Janet Leigh in Psycho?… You remember the first time you 
saw the ‘co-ops’ on her?…Well, with Virtual Reality, I’m telling you, it’s like you could 
actually touch them!”), helps Paul into the HMD as he pulls on the glove. Ira directs 
Paul’s ungloved left hand toward the keyboard to select his scenario and the audience 
sees the garishly-colored screen of options, which Paul ponders only briefly before 
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clicking on “Brinkley, Christie” (fig. 3). As he clicks, the scene fades and pixelates, 
resolving into a shot of Paul sitting at a bus stop against a cartoonlike backdrop. A tall 
blonde enters, clad in black lingerie and, theatrically propping her foot on the bench, 
sultrily declares that her garter belt has given her an itch that Paul should scratch. As he 
acquiesces (his real-world speech seamlessly intelligible in the virtual one), the scene 
cuts to the humorously gadgetry-bedecked Paul, grinning sloppily as he mimes the 
motions—touching nothing, but clearly experiencing the sensations in virtuality. 
Throughout the subsequent scenarios, which involve Paul rubbing tanning oil on 
Christie’s back at the beach, and her rubbing his shoulders on a rug in front of the fire, he 
makes asides to the others, who are apparently also able to see and hear what is 
transpiring in the virtual world.313  
 When he describes the VR system to Jamie, Paul extols the virtues of its realism and 
interactivity, emphasizing its difference from a mere video game, as Jamie has dismissed 
it. “Everything you do, it’s like you’re doing it!” he says. “You’re right there, you’re 
doing it!” When Paul is forced to admit just what he experienced with such simulated 
proximity, his claim that “I didn’t do anything! I virtually did it!” falls on deaf ears, as 
does his now-ironic defense, “It’s a video game!”  
 When Paul prevails upon Jamie to experience VR for herself, she is, unlike Paul, 
allowed privacy in the room—despite the latter’s futile attempts to peer inside her HMD 
before reluctantly leaving, with final suggestions that she try the hang-gliding 
simulation—or the convent. Although Jamie finds herself at the same bus stop, where, at 
his request, she fishes a bus token from the tight jeans pocket of a long-maned Andre 
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Agassi, when the scene pixelates and again resolves, it is Paul who joins her on the bus 
stop bench. Whereas Paul’s wish-fulfillment fantasy involved Christie Brinkley telling 
him he was doing everything perfectly and asking him about his work as he rubbed her 
back (fig. 4), Jamie’s involves a contrite Paul, emphatically stating how very wrong he 
was—to have invested their money without telling her, and for his virtual peccadilloes. 
For the remainder of her allotted 10 minutes, as he massages her shoulders alternately at 
the beach or on a rug in front of the fire, Jamie basks in the virtual Paul repeating, “I was 
wrong. I was so wrong.” As the scene ends, Jamie delivers the punch line, calling, 
“Honey, give ’em a check!” 
  A final scene as the credits roll reemphasizes the fantasy of such virtual reality, 
highlighting the boundary between fact and fiction through a metacommentary on 
television itself. As Paul enters their apartment, Christie Brinkley, wearing Jamie’s 
pajamas, greets him with domestic details and a welcoming kiss. Stepping out of the 
kitchen, Jamie chides, “Christie? That’s my part; we talked about this.”  
“Helen!” Paul protests, using actress Hunt’s first name. “Let her play.”  
As the audience, we are let in on the open secret that Paul and Jamie are imaginary 
characters, as invented as a VR system that not only offers interaction based on spoken 
word and physical touch, but with one’s own real-world companions. The presence of 
actress/model Christie Brinkley, heretofore seen only within the virtual world and ready 
to fulfill any fantasy, doesn’t dissolve the boundary between fact and fiction, it reinforces 
it. Paul and Jamie’s apartment, where she stands, becomes a stage set where actors Hunt 
and Reiser play their parts in the “virtual reality” of the TV world. The episode raises 
anxieties about what counts as “real” in a highly believable (if not entirely immersive) 
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virtuality, but the final scene allays those fears: it is easy to discern fact from fiction, just 
as the audience recognizes the constructed nature of television itself. 
 Mad About You captures a sense of the public’s fascination with VR, but presents a 
highly imaginative system far removed from the technological reality—then, or now. In 
March of 1994, just one month after this episode aired, the Pacific Science Center in 
Seattle opened a new permanent exhibit called the Tech Zone, which featured brand-new 
VR activities. Reporter Larry Brown described this “high-tech, far-out world” in a feature 
article run the day the exhibit opened: 
• You're invited to play Virtual Hoops. You stand against a blue 
wall, put on a special glove, wait to see yourself projected onto a 
basketball court on a screen, then move your arm, and the on-
screen ball moves with it. You bounce and shoot a video ball to 
play one-on-one against your video opponent. […] 
• You put on a virtual-reality helmet and find your way around a 
three-dimensional city. Hang-glide off the top of one of the 
buildings and feel the sensation of flying. Your body feels the 
action because your entire range of vision is enveloped.314 
 
Reading this article on the heels of the Mad About You episode, I could hardly wait to 
experience this new technology, and eagerly persuaded my parents to take my siblings 
and me to the museum to check it out. Needless to say, the Pacific Science Center’s 
Virtual Reality was, rather disappointingly, far heavier on the reality than was the 
virtuality imagined by the sitcom. 
 A long line of kids waited to check out Virtual Hoops, manned by a museum staff 
member who positioned participants in front of the blue backdrop, fitted them with the 
glove, and pointed them toward the screen where they would see an image of themselves 
inserted into a computer-generated environment (fig. 5). The technology of combining 
two images by filming one against a solid background, or chroma keying, has been used 
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in Hollywood since its very early days and is a common technique in contemporary films 
and television. To this older technology, however, Virtual Hoops added the element of 
interaction through the glove, whose sensors are recognized by the computer. Wearing 
this glove, participants could “pick up” a virtual basketball resting in a rack that appeared 
beside them in the composited video, and then shoot it, over a simulated opponent, into 
the hoop. While seeing oneself present and moving in an environment that existed only in 
computer imagery was novel and fascinating, however, interacting with that environment 
proved more difficult. Picking up the ball involved holding one’s gloved hand above the 
rack and hoping a ball would rise to meet it. The ball, once “attached,” would cling 
tenaciously to that hand, in spite of attempts to dribble and shoot, and the shots 
themselves—which had to be aimed based on one’s view of oneself and the hoop on the 
screen, as well as in full view of the camera—were difficult to sink. This is the type of 
“open” VR, combining real and virtual elements, that continues to be popular, largely for 
the creation of videos. 
 The hang-gliding simulator next to Virtual Hoops had a more traditional VR 
interface, but even lower-tech imagery. Wearing an HMD, the participant navigated the 
virtual environment by moving his or her head and using a joystick-like handheld 
controller. A short railing kept the participant from wandering away in the real world. 
Once inside the virtual world, comprised of brightly-colored vector shapes imitating a 
cityscape, the participant found him- or herself atop a tall building, strapped into a hang-
glider. From there, one could theoretically glide out over the tops of the buildings, 
experiencing the full-body thrill Brown described—but I seemed to spend most of my 
time earthbound and turned around, trying simply to decipher and navigate the hard-
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edged and rather elusive graphical terrain surrounding me. Not only was this “enclosed” 
system, it was cumbersome and disorienting.  
1994, as it happened, was more or less the apex of VR development and imaginings. 
With the fast rise of computer power in the 1980s, the possibility of immersive digital 
environments entered the public imagination as well as the goal lists of developers. In 
Disney’s 1982 Tron, the protagonist, video game whiz  Kevin Flynn (played by Jeff 
Bridges), is attacked by an AI that uses a laser to upload him directly into the computer 
mainframe. This cyberspace is dark and spacious, delineated by glowing grids and 
inhabited by anthropomorphic programs with whom Flynn must battle to survive and 
defeat the AI (fig. 6). Although Tron was clearly a fantastical imagining, highlighted by 
the heavy usage of computer graphics (which cost the film an Academy Award 
nomination for best special effects315), it highlights both increasing computer graphics 
technology and the fantasy of imagining humans inside the digital realm. By 1995, when 
Davies created Osmose, this technology had been implemented in multiple ways, been 
found wanting, and was already largely in decline.  
A Brief History of Virtual Reality 
In his Virtual Art, art historian Oliver Grau points out that there is a long history of  
artists attempting to create illusionistic immersive environments, from the first century 
BCE frescos at the Villa dei Misteri in Pompeii to the painted panoramas that became 
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popular in Europe in the early nineteenth century.316 Although these works aimed for and 
to some degree did achieve a sort of immersion, however, VR has its most direct artistic 
and historic roots in the development of stereography. In 1838, writes film and 3D 
historian Ray Zone, Sir Charles Wheaton presented his stereoscope and accompanying 
academic paper to the Royal Society of Great Britain, positing that since the brain 
perceives a separate image from each retina as a single object in space, presenting the 
eyes with pictures from slightly different planes would mimic that effect.317 Combined  
with the rapidly-developing photographic technology, stereographs were soon impressing 
viewers with their uniquely immersive effect (fig. 7). The inimitable Oliver Wendell 
Holmes writes, in an essay describing processes of photography as well as the optical 
basis for stereography, that “The effect of looking at a good photograph through a 
stereoscope is a surprise such as no painting ever produced. The mind feels its way into 
the very depths of the picture.”318 Indeed, these “low-tech,” proto-headsets displayed 
analogue imagery, even if fixed rather than animated, far superior to any of the ’80s VR 
 This tactile metaphor of the mind “feeling its way” into the depths follows Holmes’ 
earlier description of binocular vision, wherein he writes that “We clasp an object with 
our eyes, as with our arms” (though he feels compelled to clarify that this is “an 
illustration of the fact, rather than an explanation of its mechanism”).319 The sense of 
immersion that stereography creates, then, is that of a deep, haptic space—like the full, 
palpable space Davies strives for with Osmose. With his observation that “I leave my 
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outward frame in the arm-chair at my table, while in spirit I am looking down upon 
Jerusalem from the Mount of Olives,” 320 Holmes also prefigures the rhetoric of 
disembodiment that remains prevalent in discussions of VR. 
At the same time that stereography was gaining popularity, so were moving images, 
in the form of a variety of small toys or machines that relied on the optical phenomenon 
of persistence of vision to simulate movement. The best-known of these is probably 
William Horner’s 1834 Zoetrope (fig. 8), in which a series of successive images on a 
strip of paper, when viewed through slits in a spinning drum, appeared to be in motion: 
the forerunner of animation. The Zoetrope improved upon the earlier Phenakistoscope by 
Joseph Plateau (1831), eliminating the mirrors necessary for viewing the latter and 
making it viewable by more than one person at once. It wasn’t long before 
photography—as well as stereography—combined with motion picture devices to create 
early cinematography. The first patent for this type of a device was issued, according to 
Zone, to Parisian optician Jules Duboscq, whose “stereoscope-fantascope or Bioscope” of 
1852 claimed to combine “the essential properties of the stereoscope with the most 
wonderful properties of M. Plateau’s Phenakistoscope,” animating a series of 
stereographs on a spinning disk. Though the device was not commercially viable, 
requiring the production of so many stereographs, it may be seen as the first attempt at 
3D cinema.321 
The immersive power of cinema, even in its earliest, two-dimensional, days, was soon 
evident; the well-known story of audiences at the Lumiere brothers’ screening of 
L’Arrivee du Train reacting with terror to the locomotive that appeared to invade their 
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space testifies to the power of the cinematography to engage and immerse. It also speaks 
to the ability of such technology to do without having to seal the viewer away from clues 
of the “real.” Artists and inventors continued to push the medium further: Fred Waller 
invented the Cinerama, a cinematographic system that captured, and subsequently 
projected, material from multiple cameras to produce a motion picture greater than 
viewers’ visual field for a uniquely surrounding and engrossing experience. Morton 
Heilig, a young filmmaker and visionary, experienced Cinerama and immediately 
understood it, as he told Howard Rheingold—then-editor of the Whole Earth Review and 
author of the seminal Virtual Reality (1991)—as “a revolution[,] because it was a real 
enlargement of the film experience—something that was badly needed when television 
started to catch on.”322 With the television set becoming increasingly ubiquitous in the 
early 1950s and Hollywood feeling threatened,323 Heilig envisioned, and believed he 
could sell, an immersive experience that expanded on Waller’s efforts, stimulating not 
just the senses of sight and hearing, but touch and smell as well. The result was his 
Sensorama (fig. 9), a pre-digital VR system that went far beyond today’s solely audio-
visual systems, but failed to achieve the funding to make it commercially viable. As 
Heilig bemoaned to Rheingold in the early 1990s, “If I had written a proposal for a 
theater that would kill people, I guess I might have done better with finding funding.”324 
Waller’s Cinerama did arise from his earlier work providing large-screen views for Air 
Force flight simulators, and although Heilig obtained a patent for a head-mounted display 
in 1960, “the Telesphere mask,” 325 it is computer scientist Ivan E. Sutherland’s HMD, 
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developed in the late ’60s with Department of Defense (DoD) support, that usually gets 
credit as the first of its kind. Again, we see the continuation of the trend so firmly 
established in the history of the first chapter of this work: the military gets the money. 
Indeed, Grau traces the birth of “interactively experienced virtual reality” to 
Sutherland, whose revolutionary Sketchpad, developed in 1963 at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), allowed direct graphical interface between user and 
computer. A few years later, Sutherland developed an even more direct user interface 
with the HMD (fig. 10), which, equipped with head-tracking sensors, enabled a user to 
navigate a virtual, polygon-comprised world. Sutherland described this hardware as 
“Special spectacles containing two miniature cathode ray tubes… attached to the user's 
head.”326 He affectionately dubbed the system, first researched and developed at Harvard 
with funding provided by the DoD’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), and 
then produced at the University of Utah in 1970, “The Sword of Damocles,” due to the 
somewhat frightening bulk of hardware suspended above the user’s head327 (fig. 11).  
Developments like these led programmers to begin experimenting with 
human/computer interfaces to transport the former—if not physically, as in Tron, at least 
mentally—into the latter. The theories of early computer pioneers such as Norbert 
Wiener had already conceived of the mind and body as fundamentally machinelike, 
operating on a system of feedback that would allow for transmission of information (or 
data) between humans and technology.328 But it was only in the 1970s and ’80s that the 
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computer became a tool for the kind of immersive imagery sought by earlier analog 
techniques, creating illusionistic spaces that could be navigated in a way that began to 
literalize Wiener’s cybernetic feedback loop.  
Between his invention of Sketchpad and the “Sword of Damocles” HMD, Sutherland 
published a paper in the 1965 Proceedings of the IFIP329 Congress, entitled “The Ultimate 
Display.” This paper is far different from the one he would publish in the same journal in 
1968, discussing the HMD and listing, at length, the mathematical and programming 
processes and challenges of drawing the virtual world to which it offers entry. Rather, 
“The Ultimate Display” is a very brief, but pithy, meditation on the possibilities for 
interfaces between human and computer. Before either monitors or keyboards were 
widespread (Sutherland points out that “tomorrow’s computer user will interact with a 
computer through a typewriter”), he imagines the digital display as “a looking glass into a 
mathematical wonderland.”330 He imagines human-computer interfaces utilizing not just 
a “light pen” or stylus, or “knobs and joysticks of various kinds,” but voice and gesture 
recognition and even gaze tracking. He concludes with the grandest vision yet: “The 
ultimate display would, of course, be a room within which the computer can control the 
existence of matter. A chair displayed in such a room would be good enough to sit in. 
Handcuffs displayed in such a room would be confining, and a bullet displayed in such a 
room would be fatal. With appropriate programming such a display could literally be the 
Wonderland into which Alice walked.”331 
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 Sutherland’s description of the eponymous ultimate display bears similarity to the 
eerie nursery, or playroom, imagined by science fiction author Ray Bradbury in his 1950 
short story “The Veldt.” The centerpiece of the fictional Hadley family’s Happylife 
Home, the extravagant nursery is a virtual reality marvel, its walls dissolving into crystal 
displays complemented by surrounding sounds, smells, and even simulated atmospheric 
conditions—all reflecting the users’ “telepathic emanations… [in order] to fill their every 
desire.”332 In Bradbury’s story, the Hadley parents, alarmed that the children’s playroom 
seems to be “stuck” on Africa—visit it, only to find themselves charged by alarmingly 
realistic lions that leave George and Lydia laughing and crying, respectively, outside the 
slammed door. Noticing his wife’s reaction, George comforts her, “Walls, Lydia, 
remember; crystal walls, that's all they are. Oh, they look real, I must admit - Africa in 
your parlor - but it's all dimensional, superreactionary, supersensitive color film and 
mental tape film behind glass screens. It's all odorophonics and sonics, Lydia.”333 
Nonetheless, the Hadleys decide that the Africa simulation, with its echoing screams and 
unnerving lions dining on fresh kills, is too sinister and must be shut down. The children, 
however, react hysterically to George’s decision, pleading for just one more minute in the 
simulation—their own Wonderland. The parents acquiesce, only to be lured, in the 
story’s chilling conclusion, back into the playroom, where the children lock them in. It 
was bullets Sutherland imagined as being fatal in his “ultimate display”; 15 years earlier, 
in Bradbury’s story, it is the lions. 
In 1991, collaborators at the University of Illinois at Chicago’s Electronic 
Visualization Laboratory produced a virtual reality system that falls somewhere between 
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Sutherland’s Damoclean HMD and Bradbury’s sci-fi nursery. Artist Daniel Sandin, 
engineer Thomas DeFanti, and then-graduate student Carolina Cruz-Neira created the 
CAVE (Cave Automatic Virtual Environment) (fig. 12), a VR installation that combines 
computer-generated imagery with the physical space itself, and which they describe in 
their essay “A ‘Room’ with a ‘View,’” published in 1993. The room, or cave, is a partial 
cube with sides three meters square. High-powered rear projectors beam stereo images 
onto the screens that comprise the cave architecture—three side surfaces and a floor. The 
user wears stereoscopic glasses, their liquid crystal displays synchronized with the 
projector controller, that transform these doubled projections into seemingly three-
dimensional objects—in the real space of the physical world, which the user can still 
see.334 The developers call the Cave a “less intrusive interface” because it doesn’t 
necessitate an HMD, which “can be uncomfortable and disorienting, because the viewer  
is cut off from the real visual world.” Because the viewer can move about the space 
physically untethered from cables and without having to worry about tripping over them, 
the authors write, “the Cave frees the viewer to collaborate more fully.”335 In the Cave, 
reality is augmented rather than replaced, allowing for a shared space and experience. 
Placeholder 
In 1992, writer, scholar, and software designer Brenda Laurel and media artist, 
architect, and filmmaker Rachel Strickland co-directed the VR project Placeholder (fig. 
13), which uses HMD technology rather than the Cave environment, but also utilizes 
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physical space to contain, and enrich, the immersants’ experience. Placeholder was one 
of nine VR projects produced as part of the Art and Virtual Environments Project within 
the Computer Applications and Research Program of the Banff Centre for the Arts, and 
made use of the Centre’s extensive resources, including senior research analyst John 
Harrison and sound designer Dorota Blaszczak.336  
Two immersants at a time enter Placeholder: physically, each stepping into a “magic 
circle”—a ring defined by low stone walls (and corresponding to the 10-foot diameter of 
the HMDs’ tracking devices) (fig. 14)—and virtually, into an interactive space 
comprising three distinct natural realms, based on, and using images and sound from, 
actual locations in Banff National Park. Immersants initially find themselves in the Cave, 
but can move through special portals to and from the Waterfall and River Valley, each of 
them designed to evoke a specific “sense of place.”337 This sense of place is further 
modified by the ability to “embody” one of four archetypal “critters” represented by 
icons on the walls of the cave, each of whom attempts to lure the immersant through 
descriptions of its unique characteristics: when the immersant’s own head intersects with 
a particular icon, he or she becomes embodied as that creature: Crow, Spider, Snake, or 
Fish. These bodies function as what Laurel calls “smart costumes,” shaping not just how 
the immersant moves through the space (for example, a Crow immersant would flap to 
fly), but “how a person looked, sounded, moved, and perceived the world.”338 As 
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immersants move through the space, they can grasp339 and move objects as well as 
interact with one another. An immersant can also, through the “voiceholders” present 
throughout the environment, leave his or her own trace in the form of a vocal recording, 
or listen to the recordings of others who have traversed the space before. A Goddess, 
often voiced by Laurel, helps guide the immersants, who hear her as if in their own 
heads. Although Placeholder was on view for a relatively short time in the summer of 
1993, the team produced a video by the same name that introduces the project and 
provides footage of the original locations, the actors’ improvisation, individuals being 
immersed, and their point of view (POV) 340 journeys.341  
In 1994, Laurel, Strickland, and collaborator Rob Tow published an article in 
SIGGRAPH’s Computer Graphics Quarterly,342 in which they are candid about the 
creation of Placeholder, which they call “a research project which explored a new 
paradigm for narrative action in virtual environments,”343 rather than a necessarily 
complete and self-contained work of art. The authors’ descriptions of their vision for 
Placeholder are lofty, from the “magic circle”—which doesn’t simply contain the 
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immersant, but, in Strickland’s words, evokes “the primordial stage—that zone 
differentiated from darkness by the illumination of the campfire”344—to the possibilities 
of a different embodiment, through, as Tow puts it, shedding the “primate body” for a 
non-mammalian one and in turn gaining a sense of “what it is to be an embodied 
human.”345 Nonetheless, the authors are forthright about the difficulties Placeholder 
faced, including their financial, technical, and time constraints. The team’s goal, for 
example, to create entirely different embodied visual experiences for each of the four 
critters—Crow’s intensified awareness of reflective objects, Fish’s clear vision 
underwater and blurred vision in air, etc.—had to be abandoned due to lack of resources. 
As Tow concludes in the last sentence of the article, “This effort was incomplete, and 
highly tentative; many questions remain.”346 The “effort,” however, which involved a 
wide variety of collaborators, credited by name—from media artist and photographer 
Michael Naimark to professional storyteller Lucinda deLorimier—not only explored VR 
as “the art of creating spaces with qualities that call forth active imagination,” as Laurel 
writes, but implemented the “motto [of] ‘no interface,’ expressing [the] desire to 
maximize naturalness, to enable to the body to act directly in the world and to minimize 
distraction and cognitive load.”347 Similar ideas can clearly be seen reflected in Davies’ 
projects of the next two years. 
 In 1991, Laurel published Computers as Theatre, which concludes with what she later 
calls “a rhapsodic coda about virtual reality,”348 and which presciently outlines many of 
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the primary aspects of what would become Placeholder, from magic circles to the 
petroglyphs that would become Placeholder’s critters and voiceholders. By the time of 
the book’s reprint in softcover format, however, Laurel had added a seventh 
chapter/afterword, “Post-Virtual Reality: After the Hype is Over.” Beginning with the 
observation, “A lot has happened in the last three years,”349 Laurel reflects on the changes 
that had occurred in the technology and rhetoric of VR just since she had finished her book in 
1990. Even as popular culture was embracing what she called the “fad phenomenon” of 
VR—a trajectory she likens to video games and the ill-fated Atari, where she worked before 
its crash—those involved with VR “began scrambling… to get some distance from the all too 
vivid spectacle of the hype-fueled, VR road-and-media show that rocketed VR pundits to the 
pinnacle of pop culture and then sent us burning back into the atmosphere, noticing too late 
that we were in the decaying orbit of a fad.”350 Already, in 1993, Laurel identified the 
imminent decline of VR, as it failed to live up to the hype of its being the next big thing in 
entertainment—and, subsequently, moneymaking. Laurel’s position within the industry 
allowed her unique insight into the demise of technology that was still peaking in the popular 
imagination—as well as into the lessons VR, with its synesthetic capabilities, offered. “[VR] 
was hailed as the techno-wave of the future,” Laurel writes, “with potential to transform 
everything from movies to medical imaging. It was also demonized as the latest in mind-
control drugs and the world’s baddest war machine.”351 Of more interest to Laurel than these 
hyperbolic claims, however, is what the medium of VR can tell us about the wider culture: 
“Media represent us to ourselves in a multidimensional way; beyond the content of any 
particular representation, the characteristics of the medium itself give us insight into the 
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invisible cultural context.”352 It is this invisible cultural context I wish to probe in Char 
Davies’ VR projects Osmose and Ephémère. 
Osmose and Ephémère  
 Unlike Placeholder, which was on view for a limited time exclusively at the Banff Centre 
for the Performing Arts as part of its Art and Virtual Environments Project, Char Davies’ 
Osmose and Ephémère have been exhibited around the world: Davies’ Web site, 
www.immersence.com, states, in an article reportedly updated in early 2008, that to date 
35,000 people had been immersed in the two projects. As much as her artistic vision, it 
was Davies’ unique access to significant corporate resources—monetary as well as 
technical—that allowed Osmose to come together at an unprecedented speed, 
subsequently to travel internationally, and to engage such widespread interest. 353 As 
Oliver Grau writes, Osmose “has received more attention in the international discussion 
of media art than perhaps any other contemporary work,” and, though relatively few have 
personally experienced it, “many times that number of art aficionados have avidly 
followed the debate on aesthetics, phenomenology, and reception of virtual art that has 
homed in on this particular work.”354 Although only one viewer can be immersed at a 
time, many more are able to participate vicariously in the experience via the small 
“theaters” that generally accompany the pieces’ museum installations (fig. 15). Viewers 
wear polarized glasses and headphone to simulate the view of the immersant, who is 
visible in silhouette in the adjacent immersion chamber.355 Lack of personal immersion—
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or even installation viewing—hasn’t stopped many authors from describing the projects 
in glowing terms. 
Indeed, Laurel’s own self-described “rhapsodic” rhetoric on VR has nothing on the 
extensive verbiage praising Davies’ projects. Grau’s own description of Osmose is 
paradigmatic of the tone of much of this writing. He begins, “Like a diver, solitary and 
weightless, the interactor first glides out of a grid of Cartesian coordinates into the virtual 
scenarios: a boundless oceanic abyss, shimmering swathes of opaque clouds, passing 
softly glowing dewdrops and translucent swarms of computer-generated insects, into the 
dense undergrowth of a dark forest.”356 By far the majority of the reviews of Davies’ 
pieces are similarly effusive, with language frequently bordering on the elegiac. A 
statement alternately ascribed to one of the construction workers who installed the piece 
in Montreal, a head curator at one of the museums, or an anonymous signer of the 
guestbook is that after experiencing Osmose, the individual was “no longer afraid of 
death.”357 Other immersants have emerged, Davies reports, weeping, nostalgic, euphoric, 
or reporting having experienced the body in an entirely unique way.358 Davies herself 
repeatedly uses the phrase “altered states” to describe immersants’ experiences, 
                                                                                                                                                 
headphones. Laurel et al, 118. Laurie McRobert points out that “the stereoscopic glasses were only used in 
the first two public exhibitions of Osmose in Montreal and New York City in 1995. Subsequently, because 
of lack of corporate support—Silicon Graphics would no longer loan Davies the necessary hardware—she 
had no option but to offer a single-view projection for the audience based on what the immersant was 
seeing but only through one eye.” Char Davies’ Immersive Virtual Art and the Essence of Spatiality. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 166 n.40. 
356
 Grau, p. 193 
357
 See Brenda Laurel, “When Computers Become Human” in Talking back to the Machine: Computers 
and Human Aspiration. Peter J. Denning, ed. (New York: Copernicus/Springer-Verlag, 1999), 106-107;  
“Reverie, Osmose and Ephémère: Dr. Carol Gigliotti Interviews Char Davies” in n.paradoxa (vol. 9, 2002), 
66; Mark Pesce, “3-D Epiphany,” Salon Magazine (June 13, 1998), 
http://www.salon.com/1998/06/13/feature947640934/singleton/  
358
 See, especially, Gigliotti; and Char Davies, “Changing Space: Virtual Reality as an Arena of Embodied 
Being” in The Virtual Dimension: Architecture, Representation, and Crash Culture. John Beckman, ed. 
(New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998), 144-155. 
  208 
comparing the effects to the results of deep meditation (though her study does not extend, 
she points out, to drug usage).359 
Although relatively few individuals are able to be personally immersed in Osmose 
and Ephémère, the artist has produced videos that are available at her website, 
immersence.com, and on DVD. These videos address some technical specifications of the 
pieces, but primarily emphasize the experience and aesthetics of the computer-generated 
space, highlighting the artist’s vision of the projects as space-creating and facilitating the 
viewer’s self-exploration and -discovery. The Ephémère video is 16 minutes long and far 
simpler than its predecessor, the 33-minute Osmose video to which I’ll turn in a moment, 
which includes a brief documentary and participant interviews in addition to a flythrough 
of the virtual world. The Ephémère video begins with five textual slides that briefly 
introduce the navigational interface and the project’s concept. After explaining that 
Ephémère is divided vertically into three realms (landscape, earth, and body) and is 
seasonally chronological (with the immersion beginning in winter), and that objects in the 
environment react to the immersant’s presence and gaze, the text fades and the flythrough 
begins. Fuzzy particles float against a dark background, gradually lightening to reveal 
spiny forms that slowly articulate to form the branches of a tree. A hollow wind seems to 
blow through the monochromatic environment as the mist fades to reveal a clearing in a 
forest of transparent, stylized trees. This landscape, as it turns out, is one of the more 
readily identifiable in the project, as the immersant’s POV travels through an increasingly 
abstract realm of glowing polygons. These suggest, at times, sunlit streams or a glowing 
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chartreuse seed exploding into the transparent shards of an origami flower, or simply 
devolve into intersecting planes of indistinguishable texture (fig. 16). All of this is set 
against an insistent, yet morphing, aural tapestry of strings and other sounds, closely 
linked to the visual components of the virtual space.360 The earlier Osmose video, 
alternatively, provides not just more literal imagery, but sets up the flythrough with a 
mini documentary (as the disc calls it) and post-immersion participant feedback. 
 The Osmose video opens onto the scene of a lone man, silhouetted against a gradient 
golden background evocative of a sunset, donning the equipment to enter Osmose (fig. 
17). Against this imagery, the narrator solemnly introduces the project in the soaring 
language echoed in so many of the flowing reviews: “As a space for exploring the 
interaction between self and world, Osmose allows one to let go of habitual perceptions 
and explore the subjective experience of consciousness as being in the world.” The 
poetic, philosophical nature of this virtual space is then further highlighted with a quote 
from philosopher Gaston Bachelard, whose The Poetics of Space Davies frequently cites 
in her writing, and whose words appear, along with others, in the “text” realm of Osmose: 
“…by changing space, by leaving the space of one’s usual sensibilities, one enters into 
communication with a space that is psychically innovating… For we do not change place, 
we change our Nature.” Still against the backdrop of the single immersant adjusting the 
vest that will measure the expansion of his chest and allow him to navigate the space via 
his breath, the narrator continues that, unlike other virtual environments that aim to create 
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shared space, Osmose is about solitude. Quoting Bachelard again, he continues, “It is  
only when human solitude deepens that the intimate space of self and world-space 
blend.”  
The spaces blend visually on the screen as the immersant dons the HMD and our 
view of him fades, replaced by a grid of white lines extending into space against a dark 
background. This is the “first world encountered,” as the narrator puts it, a space that 
orients the viewer while nodding to the typical Cartesian conception of computer space 
and virtual reality (and paralleling the earlier-discussed aesthetics of Tron and Snow 
Crash). The grid quickly gives way to the nebulous imagery and indistinct aural tapestry 
of Osmose, while the narrator describes how “it is possible to travel anywhere within 
these worlds by simply breathing: in to rise, out to fall, while leaning gently to change 
direction.” After a few moments’ drift through translucent, ambiguous imagery, during 
which the narration points out how Omsose’s soundscape is woven entirely from sampled 
male and female voices, and is localized and responsive to facilitate a sense of space, the 
scene again returns to the physical world and the equipment that enables the  
experience of the virtual one. 
“To experience immersion in Osmose,” the narrator tells us, “one has to dress, like a 
diver entering the sea.” He goes on to describe the vest the immersant wears, with sensors 
to measure breath (the expansion of the chest) and location in space, as well as the HMD 
designed to provide 360º visual imagery and wraparound sound (fig.18) . An odd 
animation follows, created using the chroma key technique discussed earlier, and 
distinctly similar to Mad About You’s imaginative representation of VR. Here the 
technology-bedecked immersant appears against the computer-generated virtual space as 
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he would see it through his HMD. As he turns, leans, and breathes, in the gridded 
orientation space for maximum clarity, the image in front of him reflects his changing 
view (fig. 19). The scene shifts briefly to video of Davies, in SCUBA gear, “practicing 
buoyancy control” underwater, before returning to the image of the immersant apparently 
within the virtual space, walking around the tree in the clearing despite the narrator’s 
specific description of the immersant as floating. The video continues with brief technical 
details about the programming and hardware required, the set-up of the installation view, 
and a diagram indicating the spatial structure of Osmose (fig. 20), followed by brief 
snippets of each of the twelve realms identified.  
“Based on participant response, immersion in Osmose has a profound effect,” the 
narrator intones as the exit sequence is replaced by slow-motion video, dramatically lit, 
of the attendant removing the immersant’s HMD as the latter blinks in wonder. The 
immersant, identified as interactive media artist Henry See, provides the first of two 
testimonials, struggling for words and closing his eyes in recall—or rapture—as he tries 
to explain the piece’s effect. He is followed by another interactive media artist, Jon 
McCormack, giving his reactions as he is helped out of the sensor vest. “It was sort of 
like dying and going to heaven or something,” he smiles, “…it’s like a mythological kind 
of nature.” The video returns to the image of the silhouetted individual preparing for 
immersion, overlaid first by a brief text summarizing the piece, and then the earlier 
Bachelard quotation about changing Nature through changing place. An interlude of 
bubbles rising through blue water and a solitary diver backgrounds the statement, “The 
following images and sounds were recorded in real-time during a fly-through 
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performance of the work,” and the video returns to the silhouetted immersant, shortly 
transitioning exclusively to the view from the HMD. 
 Prepared as one has been by the preceding material—the glowing reviews, the poetic 
possibilities of transcending one’s nature—one can easily be mesmerized by the 
subsequent images. The fly-through glides through all twelve realms, dwelling 
provocatively in the liminal spaces between them and highlighting the uniquely 
translucent imagery that gives the space its dreamlike, phantasmagoric quality. As the 
gridlines dissolve, the center point and anchor of the project, the Clearing, appears: dark 
and calm, yet far from empty, as night sounds—birds, insects, perhaps bats and even a 
wolf or two—fill air that already seems to have a fullness or thickness of its own (fig. 
21). Luminous particles float on the dark currents of a stream winding through the space, 
while shimmering worms wriggle by more quickly. Instrumental sounds join the ambient 
chirping and chattering, their alien harmonies haunting and indefinable, but evocative of 
stringed instruments or even far-away train whistles. Although these sounds border on the 
ominous, it quickly becomes apparent that there is nothing to fear (and, indeed, little to 
interact with at all) in this digital space. Transparent forms drift past, resolving into the 
spiny branches of an abstracted tree. The stream, with its glowing cargo, is visible in the 
background, through its trunk. Below the trunk, the tree extends roots that mirror its 
branches into earth that seems to undulate in transparent waves, its contours ambiguous 
and sketchily defined. 
 As the tree recedes into the distance, dim shapes drift into view, obscuring it in a 
whitish haze as an insistent rustling replaces the instrumental sounds and joins the 
chattering, indicating entry into the Forest. Green leaves and the fronds of pale ferns 
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overlap to fill the space, some sprouting organically from realistic branches, and others 
floating on geometric edges as thin and flat as blades. A swarm of iridescent worms drifts 
by, accompanied by a vaguely electronic burbling, as the leaves part to reveal darker and 
hazier depths. Back in the clearing, the Tree, a monochromatic sketch done in geometric 
shards, has its own percussive soundscape, as if an invisible woodpecker were working 
away somewhere in the distance. Drifting nearer the branches one first sees the shapes of 
Leaves, and then is drawn inside them, where glowing particles now dance frenetically 
against the fuzzy latticework of its abstracted cellulosic structure. After a brief return to 
the Clearing, we begin to sink below ground level, into the depths of the Pond, where the 
water seems to consist of transparent, tissue-like strata that begin to obscure the tree as it 
is glimpsed from below, but reveal again the roots, alive with the radiant particles it 
seems to imbibe (fig 21). Beneath the roots, vaguely spherical objects hover in the 
Subterranean realm (fig. 22),361 at once evocative of boulders or cells, with seemingly 
woven, faceted surfaces: neither hollow nor solid, and posing no obstacle to the 
immersant’s movement. Deeper still, in Earth, trails of mist evoke a planetary 
atmosphere, just resolving into a reticulated surface before fading, in turn, into the acid 
green characters of Code world (fig. 23). Accompanied by a distinctive electronic 
burping and whirring, the passages of code form glowing, rigid planes, not unlike the 
distinctive imagery the Wachowski brothers used to represent the Matrix. This too 
dissolves, replaced by organic chirping and rustling, as the immersant completes the full 
circle and descends into the Clearing. We again drop below the surface of the Pond, but 
this time sink deeper into the Abyss, where the darkness is barely broken by slow-moving 
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luminous particles, which now seem to drift through the thickest of mists. Gradually, a 
form materializes from the darkness, a greenish-gray, stony surface which, as the 
immersant gazes down, seems to hang suspended over a deep and impenetrable void. 
Another object spins into view, a rather crinkled gray bubble, the Lifeworld, which 
houses, under spangled layers, the clearing and its spiny tree. Instead of dropping into the 
clearing, however, we hover in the turbid Cloud above it, gradually ascending through 
whitening mists into the Text realm, where black characters form planes similar to those 
of Code world, this time presenting poetry and prose in English and French against a 
meditative soundtrack suggestive of strings. As the session comes to a close, the 
whiteness of the Text realm begins to dissolve, revealing a transparently-wrapped 
package against the blackness of space. The parcel, gray and crinkly like the Lifeworld, 
seems to drift backward in space, releasing glowing particles like tiny bubbles from a 
sinking stone, until it shrinks completely and disappears from view. The particles swirl 
for a moment after its disappearance, before they, too, fade from sight. 
This tour, skillfully guided by a professional and even under his volition rather than 
one’s own, is quite possibly, if not strictly the fullest, the most enjoyable way to 
experience Osmose and arguably the closest to the artist’s vision, as I discovered when I 
made my own pilgrimage to the artist’s Montreal studio in 2010 to experience the 
projects in person. In Neuromancer, console cowboy Case experiences “the bodily 
exultation of cyberspace” as he straps on his dermatrodes and completes missions in the 
virtual realm. In The Matrix, ports on the backs of their heads allow Neo and others to 
jack back in to the Matrix they now know is a computer construct, but which looks and 
behaves like the Reality they once knew it to be. In Snow Crash, the interface between 
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human and machine is so seamless that a computer virus contracted in VR produces a 
mental breakdown in the physical world. Even in Mad About You, events experienced in 
virtual space are “real” enough to foment real-world drama. Osmose and Ephémère are 
nothing like that. 
First of all, the equipment necessary to experience these two virtual realms is 
determinedly cumbersome. In the studio loft that now houses the project, John Harrison 
helped me into a vest that slid over my head and tightened snugly around my ribcage, 
with a bellows tube connecting the two sides of the vest across the front of my chest. This 
sensor is designed to measure the chest expansion that indicates breathing, so the vest 
was necessarily quite tight. The vest, however, was nothing compared to the HMD, 
Division Ltd.’s DVisor. At nearly nine pounds, with most of that weight unevenly 
distributed toward the front, the HMD is distinctly burdensome and uncomfortable. 
Though it was tightened close to my head with a mechanism similar to a bike helmet, I 
still felt the need to support the projecting visor with my hands to balance the load on my 
head and neck. The HMD seals out most external sights and sounds (though small 
glimpses of the floor may still be caught where the helmet meet the bridge of the nose), 
rendering one rather vulnerable in addition to off-balance, and glad for the assistance of 
the immersion attendant. 
Secondly, although the audio in the HMD is excellent, the visuals are significantly 
lacking. The DVisor has a display of just 294 by 141 pixels, though since the two screens 
sit so close to the eyes, the result is a field of vision that is 105º vertically and 41º 
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horizontally.362 Davies preferred this helmet, Harrison said, manufactured from twin 
Sony Watchman TVs (which account for much of the helmet’s weight), because its 
display did extend to the user’s peripheral vision, contributing to a more immersive 
experience.363 Because the LCD screen is in such close proximity to the viewer’s eyes, 
some viewers also experience, as I did, a chromatic separation or “rainbow effect,” 
wherein the horizontal registers of the image tended to produce a color ghosting effect in 
red, green, or blue. The HMDs, which are no longer manufactured (Davies’ team bought 
the last five when the company liquidated its stock, according to Harrison), have also 
suffered from age and wear; although Harrison fitted me with “the best” one, the screens 
had visible dirt or scratches and a blurry spot in the upper right-hand quadrant of the left 
screen. Combined, these factors draw continual attention to the visual aspect of the 
experience, making a sense of full immersion much more difficult. 
Finally, between the heavy HMD and the breathing, leaning, and deep-knee bending 
required to navigate the virtual spaces, immersion in Osmose and Ephémère is also an 
extraordinarily physical experience. I visited the studio, which was cooled by just an 
overhead fan, on a rather warm morning, and despite being in excellent physical 
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condition, I quickly found myself sweating, with beads of perspiration rolling down my 
arms as they supported the HMD. The video flythrough makes traveling through the 
virtual environments look easy, but actually arriving at any given location while 
immersed requires significant effort. Indeed, most likely because Davies emphasizes that 
these environments are about being, rather than doing, the “controls” of the embodied 
interface feel imprecise and even unresponsive, thwarting, to some degree, the desire, as 
well as the ability, to travel to a particular location.364 
Osmose and Ephémère’s difference from the VR setups imagined by Neuromancer, 
The Matrix, Snow Crash, and Mad About You are largely intentional. The rather 
cumbersome gear, which Davies has likened to diving gear, is necessary, she points out, 
for entering a new spatial realm: “There are many, many correlations between diving and 
VR. One of them, the most simple, is that when you’re diving you have to put on all this 
heavy stuff. In VR, people complain [that] you have to put on this and you have to put on 
that, you have wear these goggles. Why can't you have unencumbered VR?”365 Although 
the technology required to create a certain kind of immersion does require that 
encumbrance, Davies also frequently emphasizes that these virtual environments are not-
nature, suggesting a possible interest in keeping the gear relatively burdensome lest the 
immersant grow too comfortable in the artificial realm. Again, these virtual environments 
are kept clearly distinct from the Real. 
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The low resolution imagery also appears to be a deliberate choice, particularly 
compared to the resolution of the “tantalizingly good,” as art historian Virginia Rutledge 
puts it, screen projection for viewers.366 Laurie McRobert, whose book is the first full-
length one to be written on Davies’ work, writes that Davies has “come to value the ‘low-
resolution’ quality of the images” produced by these HMD helmets, and “believes that 
the resulting softness or lack of detail causes the immersants to let go of their habitual 
reliance on sharply focused vision and begin to ‘feel’ space instead.” McRobert continues 
that Davies has told her that if the latter “were to use HMDs with a much higher image 
resolution, she would no doubt add a ‘compensatory’ softening filter.”367 As far as the 
control—or lack thereof—in navigating the virtual space, Davies has made clear that 
unlike video games and more traditional uses of VR, she intends her projects to be less 
about doing than about being; the lack of any sort of simulated hand or tool with which to 
grasp or interact with the environment underscores this. In fact, the body is not 
represented at all within the computer-generated space; Davies emphasizes embodiment 
solely through the uniquely physical interface. One’s physical body may be sweating and 
struggling in Real space, but Davies insists that the environment itself, coupled with 
one’s physical interaction, leads to a meditative experience: 
After a certain period of immersion (usually about ten minutes), various 
conditions related to the imagery, luminosity, semitransparency, spatial 
ambiguity, slow subtle transitions between the worlds, evocative resonant 
sounds along with solitude, deep breathing and maintaining one’s center 
of balance within the space all combine to create a distinct shift of 
awareness as he or she lets go of the rational urge to control, and 
boundaries between inner, outer, mind, body, space and time being to 
dissolve.368 
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One might wonder how much this “letting go” is due to aesthetics—and how much it 
may also be the deliberate or unintentional effect of an interface that is becalming and 
even antagonistic toward easy, direct navigation. Although Davies hasn’t said as much, 
the uncertainties of the navigation seem, if not necessarily deliberate, at the very least 
conducive to that letting go she aims to facilitate. She has made it clear that she is aiming 
to subvert the conventions of the medium,369 and less responsive “controls” would 
certainly contribute to such a subversion. 
Subverting the medium 
In 1991, years before she began work on Osmose, Davies submitted a paper to the 
“Virtual Seminar on the Bioapparatus,” held at the Banff Centre for the Arts. At the time, 
Davies was the vice-president of SoftImage, a 3D graphics software company, and had 
begun using that software to produce her own digital imagery in the Interior Body Series 
(1990-1993) (fig. 24). Even at such a relatively early point, however, Davies was already 
thinking about the implications of using VR technology to create art. As she writes in her 
submission to the Natural Artifices panel: 
The technology associated with virtual reality is not value-free. Inherent in 
three-dimensional computer graphic tools are a host of conventions such 
as objective realism, linear perspective and Cartesian space, all of which 
tend to reinforce the Western scientific/mechanistic/dualistic 
worldview….For me, the challenge of working with this technology 
involves subverting its conventions and the ideology behind them in order 
to make images that can act as antidotes, reaffirming our organic 
participation in, rather than our separation from, the world.370 
 
Later, Davies writes even more heroically of her use of this medium, claiming that she 
created Osmose and the later Ephémère “to serve as ‘lighted lamps in a dark corner,’ so 
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to speak, in terms of going beyond my own personal artistic agenda to demonstrate to 
others in the field that the medium of virtual reality could indeed be used for purposes 
other than reinforcing the dominant and conventional worldview.”371 It is instructive to 
look a bit more closely at the “dark corner” to understand Davies’ metaphorical “lighted 
lamps.” 
 Gibson’s Cyberspace, though fictional, epitomizes the objective, Cartesian grid-
oriented look of VR, where geometric blocks of data emerge from inky darkness. It’s an 
aesthetic common to the actual VR that followed, which Mark Pesce, co-inventor of 
VRML (Virtual Reality Modeling Language), writes, “normally featured sharp-edged 
objects floating in a black void, looking like an amusement park of the mind's eye.”372 
The amusement park simile is apt not just for the carnivalesque glow of the graphics and 
their bright colors, but for their orientation toward the viewer as objects with which to 
interact. The Pacific Science Center’s hang-gliding VR presented its strongly geometric 
objects against a flat blue sky and green ground, and all buildings and fields strictly 
adhered to a grid that produced a precise linear perspective. Even this alignment of 
objects toward the viewer suggests, Davies argues, a particularly Western, dominating 
viewpoint, one which she attempts to modify through the spatial and atmospheric 
ambiguity of Osmose. 
 More than the hard edges of the graphics in traditional VR, Davies claims to 
subvert a medium that is, to return to her earlier statement, “not value-free.” As Heilig 
alluded to earlier, VR technology was largely funded and developed not by Hollywood—
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as might well have been the case, Rheingold suggests, had the vision and funding been in 
place—but by the military. This association goes clear back, Rheingold writes, to the 
“Link,” a World War II-era flight simulator originally patented by Ed Link in 1929. 
Powered by pneumatics and providing visuals that evolved from a simple horizon line to 
later film and then video, the Link Trainer inaugurated generations of flight simulators 
that first prefigured VR and later benefitted from its technology.373 Sutherland’s HMD 
was produced with funding by ARPA and the Office of Naval Research,374 and shifted 
simulation technology from the earlier camera model to use of computer-generated 
graphics.375 Ed Link impressed his eventual army patrons by meeting them, on a day with 
terrible flight conditions, by flying in on instruments376—itself a sort of abstraction and 
virtualization of flying by looking at the ground. As aircraft instruments grew 
increasingly complex, Air Force engineer Thomas Furness III realized, as Rheingold puts 
it, that as pilots struggled to monitor their avionic information displays, they “were 
already operating in an artificial reality.”377 He and his colleagues designed an HMD, the 
Visually Coupled Airborne Systems Simulator (VCASS) that became the Super Cockpit 
program, an augmented reality system that combined graphical representation of 
information with the pilots’ trained physical reflexes and abilities.378 NASA, another 
governmental organization driven by similar martial (including Cold War) forces, was 
also prominent in the development of early VR, though, as “an impoverished 
bureaucracy,” in Rheingold’s words, its contribution was demonstrating “the feasibility 
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of near-garage-scale virtual reality [that] set off a wave of commercial and academic 
interest in the late 1980s.”379 Grau writes that the panorama, “ancestor medium” to 
immersive digital art, was originally designed as a tool for military reconnaissance, and, 
despite prompting concerns that “the illusion might permanently impair the capacity for 
perceiving reality,” was quickly recognized as a tool for shaping public opinion.380  
Likewise, military backing was essential to the development of digital VR. 
 Military applications remain the largest use of VR today. A NATO report 
published in 2003 and summarizing extensive VR research and development in the 
United States and Europe affirms that “[Virtual Reality’s] most important application 
domain is training. VR for training can reduce cost and risk of casualties and improve 
flexibility and performance monitoring. Furthermore, great opportunities are identified in 
the domains of planning and mission rehearsal, simulation supported operation, remotely 
operated systems and product design.”381 It is perhaps not surprising that these militaristic 
origins remain visible in many commercial virtual reality environments, as well as in the 
preponderance of popular “first-person shooter” (FPS) video games. The United States 
Army has even capitalized upon the popularity of such games, introducing their own 
American Army in 2002 as a recruitment and public relations tool. The game has enjoyed 
wide popularity, with its most recent version released in December of 2011.382 
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 These FPS and other first-person POV games, are not, with few exceptions, 
played in VR format. Instead, players utilize computer monitors or televisions for the 
visual, speakers or headsets for the audio, and game controllers or keyboards for avatar 
control. The graphics, when displayed through an adequately equipped game system or 
computer on a high-resolution screen, are spectacularly clear; the control immediate; and 
the experience certainly immersive, often occupying users for many hours on end.383 
Games like L.A. Noire,384 with its cinematic narrative, characters animated using 
MotionScan technology that captures every nuance of an actor’s expression, and 
elaborate reconstructions of period architecture, blur the distinctions between movies and 
games (fig.25). Games played on Microsoft’s Xbox 360, which allows users to view 
scenes not just from a single, fixed POV, but, as the title suggests, a range of vantages, 
allow the player to be actor, viewer, and director at once, in a strikingly visually realistic 
virtual world. 
 The increasing realism of video games, as well as of special effects in film, is, 
perhaps somewhat ironically, indebted to the work advanced by Davies and Softimage. 
Softimage produced software that, as Pesce puts it, “allowed artists to create 3-D 
computer graphics without a deep knowledge of mathematics and computer 
programming.”385 Founder Daniel Langlois, himself an artist and designer, began 
developing the software in 1986 after experiencing firsthand the “torturous process” that 
at the time characterized 3-D animation, and wanting a tool that was more intuitive for 
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artists. Davies helped him finance the endeavor by introducing him to investors in 
Toronto, and joined the tiny start-up as a founding director in 1987. 386 She served as 
Softimage’s first vice president from 1988-1994 and director of visual research from 
1994-1997.387 The company soon vaulted to success, acquired by Microsoft in 1994 after 
the former’s Creative Environment software fueled the effects in films Terminator2: 
Judgment Day (1991), The Mask (1993), and Jurassic Park (1994). The effects George 
Lucas’ Industrial Light & Magic (ILM) created for the latter were heralded as “a quantum 
leap forward in computer-generated graphics, one that will forever change the way 
movies are made.”388 As Langlois put it mildly in a press conference, “It’s an exciting 
time for computer graphics. [In Jurassic Park] the quality of the graphics is perfectly 
integrated into the ‘real’ film footage; you can’t tell what's real and what’s not.”389 Credit 
for this realism is shared by Davies, who says of her role:  
I feel it’s really important that along with pure technological development, 
there’s another development that goes alongside in terms of aesthetics and 
content. My role in visual research is to “push” the tools in terms of their 
expressive capacity. If this technology is to convey a full range of human 
emotion, then its aesthetics should be evolving along with the actual 
code.390 
 
Pesce, a passionate Davies devotee, is even more expansive about her contribution, 
writing, “One reason everything on screen looks so real is that — in the earliest days — 
an artist judged each effort against a private standard of visual fidelity.”391 Pesce credits 
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Davies not just with using computer technology to create a rich and expressive aesthetic 
project, but with infusing the technology with those characteristics from its inception. 
 What, then, is the nature of Davies’ subversion of the medium, of her bringing the 
proverbial lit lamp to these dark corners? Certainly the interface is one that strives for a 
more fully embodied experience than the simple goggles and glove or game controller, 
and control itself is thwarted in favor of a more contemplative “being.” The ambiguous, 
transparent imagery explodes Cartesian space, revealing perspective to be merely a fickle 
illusion. The space itself has a different “feel”; as opposed to polygons or wireframes 
against empty darkness, Davies’ diaphanous, ambiguous imagery strives for, as she puts 
it, “a sense of lived, felt space that encircles one with an enveloping horizon and presses 
closely upon the skin”—one very different, needless to say, from the necessarily precise 
flight simulators or war games that preceded it. Her focus is on solitude, rather than 
virtual collaboration. Her subject matter is Nature (albeit transformed), rather than 
futuristic technology. It does, indeed, diverge significantly from the VR projects that 
have preceded it.  
 The subversiveness of the project as a whole, however, remains somewhat 
questionable, particularly given its corporate sponsorship. Davies shares production 
credit and copyright for Osmose with Softimage, which provided not just the software, 
but other tangible support. As science writer Margaret Wertheim points out, Davies had 
access to “a full-time programmer and computer animator, plus a Silicon Graphics Onyx2 
Infinite Reality supercomputer, the Porsche of graphics computers”392—or, as the 
Baltimore Sun put it in 2000, “one of the most powerful supercomputers ever engaged for 
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nongovernmental work.”393 Although Osmose and Ephémère were ported to PC interface 
in 2002, at the time of their creation, running such a complex program required massive 
computing power: the Infinite Reality, as well as a separate Macintosh computer just to 
run the sound synthesizers and processers.394 This also made exhibiting the projects, in 
which only one person can be immersed at once, an expensive endeavor. In Wertheim’s 
words, this makes Osmose and Ephémère “an essentially elite experience, one made 
possible by the largess of a rich patron—in this case, the artist herself.”395  
 As for the patron herself, she describes her use of the computer as an artistic medium 
as a natural outgrowth of the painterly practice and aesthetic that she had been cultivating 
for years, and her joining with the Softimage team as a prescient move that would 
ultimately allow her to realize her full vision. As she puts it:  
The limitations of painting's two-dimensional picture plane… became 
increasingly apparent to me, as did the medium's limited capacity for 
suggesting envelopment within that space. I began looking for a more 
effective means of visualization…. The desire to work in [a 3D graphics] 
space led me on a bit of a detour in terms of my work as an artist, namely 
that of building the 3D software company, Softimage. I became a 
founding director in early 1988.396 
 
This rather heroic biography, propagated perhaps most admiringly by Pesce, describes 
Davies as sacrificially “set[ting] aside her successful career as a painter to become a 
founding director of a tiny start-up computer graphics company,” where she “worked 
nonstop, [until she] finally took a few weeks off”—and had the experience, while diving, 
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that inspired Osmose.397 Unlike Laurel and Strickland’s project, which involved, and 
listed, dozens of collaborators, Osmose and Ephémère tend to focus almost exclusively 
on the Artist. Even when Davies writes, as she did in her unpublished dissertation, about 
her collaboration with the team that actually produced the projects—3D graphic artist and 
animator Georges Mauro, computer programmer John Harrison, “sonic architect” Dorota 
Blaszczak, and sound composer Rick Bidlack—she emphasizes their “empath[y] with my 
thematic intentions and also my visual sensibility.” As she puts it, “The commitment by 
these individuals to my overall vision was crucial to the fruitfulness of our work on 
Osmose and subsequently Ephémère. Equally important was their understanding and 
respect for my creative process….”398 For Davies, these projects are clearly less 
collaborations than the creations of a master artisan, assisted by her workshop—an image 
that evokes, despite the cutting-edge technology that produced Osmose and Ephémère, a 
far older model of artistic production.  
This anachronism extends, finally, to Davies’ descriptions of the pieces’ 
particularly feminine aesthetic, in clear contrast to what she sees as an overtly masculinist 
technology with its “testosterone dreams” of achieving disembodiment in virtual space. 
Although Osmose and Ephémère represent state-of-the-art technology, Davies’ own 
descriptions tend toward the simplistic and essentializing. Osmose eschews a joystick, 
which Davies calls, in a 2002 interview with her dissertation advisor, Carol Gigliotti, “so 
obviously phallic it makes me laugh.”399 Instead, in the same interview she describes the 
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space of Osmose—navigated through the more intimate interface of breath and body—as 
a close, “sensuous space, subjectively, bodily perceived.” She continues, “Some might 
interpret this as a uterine or womb-like space. Perhaps the desire to recreate, to 
communicate this sensibility, my sensibility, of such space is because I am female: I 
would leave that up to interpreters of my work.”400  When asked in a 1999 interview 
whether she thought that Osmose had a “feminine subjectivity,” Davies agreed that she 
did, continuing, “How I experience space and time is very much shaped by my being 
embodied as female in this life—and this sensibility has no doubt shaped my approach to 
the technology.”401 This privileging of a “feminine sensibility” and a focus on the female 
body as a subject of art made by women hearkens to an earlier period in art history, and 
particularly to the body-centric art of the 1970s. This art sought a unifying feminine 
aesthetic resulting from an essential core common to all women, and thus discernible in 
women’s art. Osmose does not feature explicitly vaginal imagery to express and celebrate 
a perceived inherent femaleness, as did such 1970s pieces as Judy Chicago’s The Dinner 
Party (fig. 26). However, the reference to an unproblematic “feminine subjectivity” does 
seem somewhat anachronistically essentializing, particularly given the lively theorization 
of gender in the 1990s, when Osmose was developed. 
Posthuman Imaginings—and Failures 
As discussed in Chapter 1, in How We Became Posthuman, Katherine Hayles 
identifies as a key characteristic of the posthuman mindset the science-fictitious 
imagining of the human as seamlessly interfaceable with the computer. The mind, in this 
imagining, is analogous to a computer, thought to data, and the body simply to the 
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hardware (or “wetware”) that houses and transports it. It is this rhetorical software, to 
return to Richard Doyle’s useful phrase, that undergirds cyberpunk imagery, from an 
individual abandoning his body for the “bodiless exultation of cyberspace,” to sharing the 
physical sensations and POV of another’s body,402 or even to being uploaded entirely into 
a purely virtual realm. Hayles has no interest in glorifying the liberal humanist subject, 
against whom she poses the disparate figure of the posthuman, but she does argue against 
what she calls “the erasure of embodiment.”403 Minds require bodies, and human thought, 
as philosopher Jean-François Lyotard argues, is a product of, and thus fundamentally 
dependent upon, human bodies.404 An experience in even a virtual world is still only 
possible through embodiment. 
In some ways, a virtual space that requires physical embodiment for immersion and 
navigation would seem to present an ideal model of posthumanism, one that repairs a 
false Cartesian dualism that would cleave mind from body, while blurring boundaries 
between the biological and the technological, the natural and the artificial, the virtual and 
the real. Instead, however, Osmose and Ephémère are interesting precisely for their 
refusal to do so, and for the boundaries they instead reinforce. This failure becomes even 
more salient with the benefit of nearly two decades’ hindsight and in light of the direction 
communications and imaging technology have since taken. Today’s focus is not on 
virtual environments that seal out the so-called Real, but that mesh seamlessly with it.. 
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Osmose and Ephémère fail to immerse—particularly now, but also perhaps nearer the 
time of their own creation. Artist and new media theorist Frances Dyson describes her 
own experience of the projects as a frustrating one, with the interface, rather than 
disappearing, “all too present”—at the same time it rendered her essentially unable to 
navigate within the virtual space.405 Margaret Morse, a professor of film and digital 
media, recounts a similar difficulty in navigating Osmose, describing her experience as 
not so much “profound” as “an occasion for panic.” As an individual with asthma and a 
phobia of math, the seemingly underwater environment made her “deeply and instantly 
afraid,” and her inability to escape the scrolling Code world prompted even more 
anxiety.406 (It’s interesting to note that in Morse’s case, although Osmose doesn’t produce 
the desired effect, it certainly prompts an affective response—in this case, her physically 
manifested anxiety.407) Dyson suggests that more individuals may have had similarly 
less-than-transcendent experiences, writing, “It is unfortunate that anecdotal testimonies 
like my own and Morse's were probably not recorded in the comments book placed on 
the podium at the exit of Osmose's premiere, since the abject failure of virtual 
embodiment of which they speak may have muted some of the more wildly mystical 
comments that came to represent Davies's work.”408  
Although the works are undoubtedly very highly acclaimed, certainly not everyone 
was transported, particularly in later shows, by which point the equipment was becoming 
rather worn, such as SFMOMA’s “010101.” Jason Spingarn-Koff begins his 2001 Wired 
review of Davies’ pieces in that show with the observation that her projects “transport 
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users into a magical world—and elicit some very strange responses,” following which he 
recounts Davies’ story of a woman who burst into tears and, when asked why, responded, 
“Because I am so happy. I feel really happy to be alive.” He describes other claims 
Davies makes about the pieces: that the “peaceful, disembodied experience often 
produces a sense of astonishment,” that “for the first minute or two after taking off the 
helmet, some people can't even speak,” and that “on several occasions, people have told 
her they cried.” Spingarn-Koff describes his own experience rather more dimly, writing 
that being immersed—especially compared to watching the higher-resolution images on 
the public display—“can feel like you're sticking your eyes against a television set.” He 
quotes fellow critic David Littlejohn of the Wall Street Journal, who said he preferred to 
watch the former display than to “get strapped into all the gear and look at it through 
fuzzy goggles, even if you were led to believe you had something to do with creating 
what you saw. Most ‘interactive’ stuff I've fiddled with so far seems pretty transparent in 
its maker-designed manipulation.”409 Littlejohn’s own review of “010101” dedicates a 
single, tepid sentence to Davies’ pieces: “In a dark chamber, I donned the wired helmet 
and vest required to ‘immerse’ myself into Char Davies's 15-minute virtual environment, 
in which movements of the head and body influence the floating, surreal world one 
perceives.”410 He suggests that not only the inadequate visual quality, but the inability to 
explore freely, prevent these pieces from truly immersing. 
The clumsiness of the interface and low quality of the graphics stand in striking 
contrast to today’s entertainment media. Video games for the Xbox 360, discussed above, 
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immerse through engaging cinematic narratives (as in L.A. Noire) and vivid, high-
resolution imagery. Nintendo’s Wii video game system (fig. 27), released in 2006, allows 
users to interface with the game through a wireless wand that can be freely moved in 
space. The wand not only allows users freedom of motion, but provides haptic feedback 
that further enhances the sensation of being fully, physically in the game world. Finally, 
Microsoft’s 2010 Kinect console for the Xbox 360 does away with the controller 
altogether, using a camera and microphone to capture and respond directly to users’ 
physical gestures and voice. Unlike Virtual Hoops, Kinect games (of which basketball is 
one—along with tennis, bowling, yoga, dance and more) do not require a blue screen, and 
can be played by more than one player at once (fig 28). The Kinect has experienced wide 
success, capturing the Guinness World Record as the “fastest-selling consumer 
electronics device” after it sold eight million devices in 60 days,411 and introducing a 
newly physical dimension to the traditionally sedentary video game medium.412 
Osmose and Ephémère, with their low-resolution graphics and cumbersome interface, 
not only fail to immerse, but fail to challenge the dualistic binaries they would overcome. 
Davies emphasizes that with these pieces she’s challenging VR as “the epitome of 
Cartesian desire[;] a place of the mind, where the body is denied, a place where humans 
have total control.” As we’ve seen, the pieces certainly challenge total control, whether 
via the interface that thwarts the ability and desire to reach certain locations in the virtual 
world, or through the transparent, ambiguous imagery that challenges the viewer’s sense 
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of space as (in traditional VR’s depiction) rational, logical, and oriented toward the 
viewer’s commanding gaze. The idea of traditional VR as particularly Cartesian, as far as 
seemingly splitting mind from body, is supported by language such as Gibson’s 
description of the “bodiless exultation of cyberspace,” or even by Paul’s insistence to 
Jamie that he “didn’t do anything”: that the virtual didn’t count, because the experience 
was in the mind rather than the body.  
Davies’ solution to this mind-body split is to make navigation dependent, not on a 
manipulable “hand,” but on the movements of the body’s core—to make the immersant 
aware of one of the most fundamental aspects of being alive and embodied: breathing. 
She describes Osmose and Ephémère as providing “full body immersion,” and her work 
as trying to create “a sense of lived, felt space that encircles one with an enveloping 
horizon and presses closely upon the skin.”413  However, an HMD, no matter the degree 
to which the display wraps around the head, added to a torso-based navigational 
interface, does little, it seems, to challenge the Cartesian mind-body dualism that appears 
to inhere in VR. The entirety of the projects’ sensory input—imagery and sound—is 
delivered via the HMD. Although the requirement that one lean and inflate one’s chest 
may make one more aware of one’s body outside of the virtual space, there is no less a 
disconnect between mind and body than in any simulation that primarily engages the 
senses of sight and hearing. Since one’s primary experience of the virtual worlds is, as in 
more traditional VR, visual (regardless of the tactility Davies describes), and since the 
body isn’t visible at all within the virtual worlds, it is difficult to see Osmose and 
Ephémère as doing much to challenge, in practice, a Cartesian dualism.  
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This dualism of mind and body in the virtual world also suggests a sort of originary 
oneness in Nature, against which Davies poses the Technological of Osmose and 
Ephémère: the natural, whole body exists in the former, even if necessarily split in the 
latter. Although both projects draw from natural imagery, in emphatic contrast to a hard, 
geometric, Tron-like aesthetic, Davies insists that they are not an attempt to replicate, and 
definitely not to replace, Nature itself, and is clear about the distinction between it and 
technology: 
I don’t believe, as some in the field do, that nature is an outmoded 
metaphor and that the sooner we can recreate ourselves through silicon 
and genetic engineering, the better off we’ll be—and when we have fused 
our brains with our machines we can leave this spoiled planet for virgin 
territory elsewhere. This is a testosterone dream… I want no part of it, and 
I guess that’s where my female sensibility comes in. In my work, I’m 
attempting to reaffirm the role of the subjectively-lived body. Rather than 
deny our embodied mortality and our material embeddedness in nature, I 
seek, somewhat paradoxically, through a highly technologicalized art 
form, to return people to their bodies and to the earth by using VR to 
refresh their own perceptions of an embodied being-in-the-world, to return 
them to a perceptual wonder at being here.414 
 
Not only is Nature here clearly delineated from Technology, but the former is rather 
simplistically associated with a “female sensibility,” and the latter with a “testosterone 
dream.” In describing Ephémère as “a lament, not only for the ephemerality of our own 
lives, but for the passing of Nature as we have known it,” she links human life and death 
to the cycles of nature, while also seeming to suggest an Edenic Nature somehow 
separate from humanity. Although Davies clearly aims to dissociate her own projects 
from the idea of VR as disparaging the body as merely meat in a brave new virtual 
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world—the time and sentiment Arthur Kroker has dubbed “the flesh-eating 90s”415—her 
depictions of both technology and gender seem anachronistically non-nuanced.  
Indeed, what Osmose and Ephémère offer is not the blurring of boundaries suggested 
by posthumanism, but instead very safe, clear-cut, versions of gender, immersion, 
technology, body/ machine interface, and the virtual. Even as they experience the virtual 
worlds, immersants are literally and metaphorically tethered to a particular “real.” This 
real enjoys a cameo in the form of digitally imported texture in Osmose’s leaf, which, 
Davies is quick to point out, represents “the only use of the ‘real’ in the entire work, 
[while] all else is digitally constructed.”416 It is important to her to emphasize that the 
virtual worlds of Osmose and Ephémère are not real, just poor reflections of the Real of 
Nature she would urge immersants to explore instead.417 No one, certainly, would 
confuse the two; as Grau points out, “Even six-year-old children are able to distinguish 
between realty and ‘as-if worlds,’418 and the HMD and gear one must wear to explore the 
virtual worlds are not exactly easy to forget. Unlike those immersed in Cyberspace, the 
Metaverse, the Matrix, or even the Cybercinetic, Davies’ immersants experience a very 
small, tightly controlled space (computing power an unavoidable necessity and limiting 
factor in 1994’s physical reality), with few options for interaction with the 
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environment—and none with other individuals. And although the memory of the 
experience may linger, her immersants undertake little to no physical or mental risk.419  
Nonetheless, Davies’ insistence, spoken and unspoken, that her projects stand in 
contrast to the Real world, enacts less a comingling of body and machine than a 
reinforcement of their absolute separateness. The body is not visible in the virtual world 
because there, it doesn’t exist. The body, for Davies, must remain outside the virtual, 
firmly anchored to the Real. Navigation of Osmose and Ephémère isn’t even possible 
without the split awareness that the physical body exists somewhere separate from the 
world one sees and hears through the HMD—in an outside emphatically demarcated from 
the virtual inside. In contrast to science-fiction imaginings, this making real of virtual 
worlds, dependent on the real physical body, demonstrates the limits of VR, even as, with 
maximum computing power and unprecedented visuals, it represents the medium’s 
greatest achievement. 
The Internet and non-VR immersion 
Even as Davies pushed VR to its limits, however, perhaps taking satisfaction in 
demonstrating those shortcomings, most others were abandoning the medium—and had 
been, as Laurel suggested in 1993’s “Post-Virtual Reality,” for a while. A new 
communications technology was beginning to take center stage: the Internet. Arising 
from a network originally developed by the military—notably the network of the DoD’s 
ARPA, which had also funded Sutherland’s HMD research and development—the 
Internet began to gain widespread popularity in the early- to mid-1990s as households 
used modems to connect through their telephone lines. One of the first of these online 
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services was Prodigy®, which connected users to its own content before becoming a true 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) in 1994 and allowing access to the World Wide Web. 
Although Prodigy did offer some games—including the popular “Mad Maze” (fig. 29), 
which a player navigated through a first-person view—the real allure of the Internet, and 
its true immersive power, came not through its ability to provide striking visuals (which 
were nonexistent in the early days), but through its ability to connect individuals with a 
wide web of human contacts and information, through features such as bulletin boards 
and chat.   
What the Internet offered was a different kind of virtual reality: a sort of parallel 
universe, in which, as Sherry Turkle wrote in Life on the Screen, individuals can 
construct alternate identities formed for, and through, interactions with other individuals 
linked by the Web.420 This reality proved thoroughly immersive even in the absence of 
the computer graphics that did continue to grow ever-more realistic. The Internet was the 
manifestation of decades of science-fiction imagining; it is appropriate that this parallel 
universe came to be known by the moniker Gibson gave his imagined data world: 
cyberspace. If Gibson’s impressionistic descriptions of Cyberspace, focusing on data and 
code, evoke the early days of the Internet; and the interactive, online MUDs (multi-user 
dungeons) with the text-based role-playing Turkle describes fall somewhere in the 
middle; Stephenson’s Metaverse is perhaps closest to today’s reality.  
In fact, the Metaverse was of direct inspiration to Philip Rosedale, the creator of the 
online community Second Life (SL), which today hosts a massive number of registered 
                                                 
420
 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995). 
  238 
“Residents” and has an economy worth millions of real-world dollars.421 As Rosedale 
told National Public Radio reporter Laura Sydell in a 2010 interview, regarding 
Stephenson’s novel, “You looked at that and you said, well, we could actually do that. 
There's not really a whole lot of reasons why we couldn't actually do what's in that 
book”—that is, once technology caught up in the late ’90s.422 Rosedale founded Linden 
Labs in 1999 and launched SL in 2003, a virtual world that he describes as beginning 
with just a small island with trees, but which soon filled with entirely user-created 
content, including avatars of all shapes and forms.423 This content is created, Resident 
Asri Falcone explains in the 2012 documentary Life 2.0, by using “primitives,” basic 
building blocks that can be cut, twisted, hollowed out, and joined together. “Anything 
you can think of,” she says, “you can actually build” (fig. 30). 
The documentary follows Asri, who designs clothing and houses in SL (and 
successfully pursues a lawsuit when another resident steals and resells copies of her 
items); Aaya Aabye, an 11-year old girl avatar and the adult man behind her; and the 
couple Bluntly Bertinger and Amie Goode, who meet in SL and attempt to translate their 
online relationship into “first life”—at the expense of their extant marriages in the latter 
(fig. 31). Asri reports spending 15-20 hours per day in SL, and the anonymous man 
behind Aaya says that the night he discovered SL, he didn’t sleep all night—a pattern that 
would continue, to the eventual detriment of his physical health and relationships. “[SL] 
feels real, it feels like real life,” he says, “…and life takes time.” This intense immersion 
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stems not, it seems, from the visual realism of the world (where the graphics suffer from 
jagged anti-aliasing; time lag; and physical oddities, especially at the articulation of 
joints), but from the real-time interactions it facilitates.  
And this is the direction, as hindsight clearly reveals, in which technology has moved 
in the decade and a half since Davies’s last VR project. Today, VR is still used in highly 
specific applications, such as simulators for flight and medical training, but has not swept 
the entertainment industry as was predicted at its inception. Today’s video games 
immerse through their graphics, and, in the case of the Kinect, an interface that has 
literally disappeared. Yet the absence of ubiquitous personal VR gadgetry or even the fact 
that the majority of the population still isn’t Second Life Residents doesn’t mean that we 
aren’t still intimately connected with, and immersed in, the virtual world. Indeed, the 
virtuality has become even more tightly enmeshed with reality. In his 2010 book Reality 
Hunger, author David Shields identifies a trend in contemporary arts and entertainment 
that doesn’t distinguish between so-called fact and fiction, but instead revels in their 
intertwining and indiscernibility. He bemoans what he considers outmoded strictures of 
“truth” telling in memoirs, and argues that the most compelling art, in all formats, is 
simultaneously reality and non-reality. I would argue that this indeterminate mingling of 
fact and fiction parallels today’s experience of virtuality and reality, and characterizes the 
posthuman environment. 
Conclusion 
The increasing imbrication of the virtual and real worlds is due, in large part, to 
increasing access to cyberspace. In 1999, when she wrote How We Became Posthuman, 
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Hayles claimed that 70% of the world's population had never made a telephone call.424 As 
of the end of 2011, the International Telecommunication Union reported that not only did 
“70% of the total households in developed countries [have] Internet,” but that “mobile‐
cellular subscriptions reached almost 6 billion…, corresponding to a global penetration 
of 86%” (emphasis added).425 In the United States, smartphones (those mobile phones 
that have Internet accessibility and are equipped with additional software functions) 
recently overtook, as I mention in the first chapter, so-called dumbphones as the majority 
among mobile phone subscribers.426 One needn’t spend long with one of these 
smartphone users to realize the immersive power of these tiniest of personal computers. 
In addition to communication via voice and text, these handheld devices offer access to 
social networks, Web searches, games, and videos—a nearly insurmountable source of 
distraction for many of their owners, from in-person interactions and activities such as 
walking and driving. For some, the use of these devices even becomes an addiction.427 
In the opening scene of Osmose, a grid stretches into infinity around the user, a web 
of semitransparent filaments extending into the blackness of space (fig. 31). In Osmose, 
this grid, ideally having achieved its goals of orienting the immersant in the virtual space 
and evoking impressions of traditional VR’s Cartesian aesthetic, fades into the softer, 
filmier layers of “womb-like space.” The immersant remains in a stable, if ambiguous, 
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space, safely tethered to the imagery-generating computer by an umbilical cable. This 
virtual realm is solitary, eventless, and distinctly non-Real, offering what some claim is a 
halcyon, even transcendent experience, but which my own experience suggests is an 
engaging idea that functions more effectively as concept than reality. 
It’s not just the heavy equipment, awkward interface, or lo-fi graphics that make 
Osmose and Ephémère feel particularly dated: it’s the insistence on the virtuality of the 
projects (and the clear-cut distinction from the Real) and the limitedness of this particular 
virtual. The contrast with today’s wired milieu is striking. The virtual, in the form of 
digital projections and communications, is ubiquitous, and accessed not in highly-
specialized, tightly-encapsulating get-ups, but through devices that allow it to be layered 
over and augment the “real” (the latter an increasingly moot distinction). In today’s wired 
milieu, the grid remains, not always visible, but tightly linking individuals with their 
machines, each other, and even political forces and corporations in an interconnected 
web. In the next chapter, I examine what comprises this web, and how performances by 
Australian artist Stelarc work to make it visible. 
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Figure 3.2 Mad About You screenshot, 1994. 
Figure 3.1The Matrix screenshot, showing one of the operators (with cranial port visible) watching 
the encoded Matrix. 
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Figure 3.3 Mad About You screenshot, 1994. 
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Figure 3.4 Mad About You screenshot, 1994. 
  245 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Tron screenshot. 1982. 
Figure 3.5 Seattle Times caption: "Erroll Knight, 11, a fifth-grader at Beacon Hill Elementary, plays 
'virtual hoops' on a television screen, part of the new Tech Zone interactive exhibit his class 
previewed at the Pacific Science Center." March 5, 1994. 
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Figure 3.8 William Horner, Zoetrope, 1834. Picture from  North Carolina School of Science and 
Mathematics. http://www.dlt.ncssm.edu/collections/toys/html/exhibit10.htm  
Figure 3.7 Chicago: World's Columbian Exposition, 1893: Ref.: stereoscope viewer & cards (UCSD, 
via ArtStor) 
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Figure 3.9 Poster advertising Morton Heilig’s Sensorama. (From 
http://www.telepresenceoptions.com/2008/09/theory_and_research_in_hci_mor/, courtesy of Scott 
Fisher Telepresence.) 
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Figure 3.10 Morton Heilig, "Stereoscopic-Television Apparatus for Individual Use," U.S. Patent 
#2,955,156, October 4, 1960 
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Figure 3.11 Ivan E. Sutherland's "Sword of Damocles" HMD. In Understanding Virtual Reality, 27. 
Figure 3.12 CAVE installation at the Ars Electronica Center, 1996 
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Figure 3.13 Placeholder image montage; back cover of Computer Graphics Quarterly. 
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Figure 3.15 Osmose installation illustration. immersence.com. 
Figure 3.14 Placeholder video still. 
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Figure 3.16 Char Davies, Autumn Flux, Ephemere (1998). Digital still image captured during 
immersive performance. 
Figure 3.17 Osmose video still showing immersant and initial orienting grid 
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Figure 3.18 Immersant. www.immersence.com. 
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Figure 3.19 Osmose video still; animation showing immersant and tree 
Figure 3.20 Osmose spatial structure. 
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Figure 3.21 Osmose Clearing. www.immersence.com. 
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Figure 3.22 Osmose. Subterranean Earth. www.immersence.com. 
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Figure 3.23 Osmose Code World. Video still. 
Figure 3.24 Char Davies, Stream (Wellspring), 1991 from the Interior Body Series. Lightbox.  
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Figure 3.25 MotionScan technology for L.A. Noire video game. PC Mag, June 23, 2011. 
Figure 3.26 Judy Chicago, Installation View of The Dinner Party. 
Daniel Wooman, photograph. www.throughtheflower.com 
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Figure 3.27 Image of the Wii system in use, from the Wii homepage. http://www.nintendo.com/wii/  
Figure 3.28 Kinect, screenshot from "Games are  More Amazing When You are the Controller" 
promotional video at http://www.xbox.com/en-US/kinect. Dramatic simulation of the Kinect camera 
capturing a user’s image. 
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Figure 3.29 Prodigy's "Mad Maze," c. 1994. Image from PC Magazine, 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2370006,00.asp  
Figure 3.30 Life 2.0 screenshot. Asri designs one of her high-end virtual houses. 
  261 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3.31 Life 2.0 screenshot. The avatar of "cameraman" Jay Spire records avatars Bluntly 
Berblinger and Amie Goode. 
Figure 3.32 Grid screenshot from Osmose. 
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“When I make a word do a lot of work like that,” said Humpty Dumpty, “I always pay it 
extra.” –Lewis Carrol, Through the Looking Glass. 
Chapter 4 : Interaction  
 
Introduction 
Cary Wolfe’s first objective in the introduction to his 2010 What is Posthumanism? is 
to distance himself from what he calls a “strand of posthumanism,” born from a 
cybernetic genealogy he does claim, that he identifies as transhumanism. 428 He defines 
this movement, through the work of Oxford philosopher and transhumanism activist Nick 
Bostrom, as one with “a belief in the engineered evolution of ‘post-humans,’” beings 
“whose basic capacities so radically exceed those of present humans as to no longer be 
unambiguously human by our current standards.” 429 Wolfe argues that the idea of 
“perfectibility” through technology, particularly in the form of “transcending the bonds of 
materiality and embodiment altogether,” (xv) is in fact a particularly humanist viewpoint, 
and one he rejects altogether. He calls this “extension of humanism… transhumanism (or 
‘bad’ posthumanism).”(xvii) In particular, he dismisses the perspective of N. Katherine 
Hayles in How We Became Posthuman, calling her “fantasy of the posthuman… a 
triumphant transcendence of embodiment.”(120) Wolfe insists that  
“Hayles’ use of the term [posthuman]… tends to oppose embodiment and 
the posthuman, whereas the sense in which I am using the term here insists 
on exactly the opposite: posthumanism in my sense isn’t posthuman at 
all—in the sense of being “after” our embodiment has been transcended—
but is only posthumanist, in the sense that it opposes the fantasies of 
disembodiment and autonomy, inherited from humanism itself, that 
Hayles rightly criticizes. (xv) 
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Though I accept Wolfe’s disinterestedness in Bostrom and the transhumanism he 
represents—certainly not everyone is interested in the idea of “enhancing the human,” 
particularly if there is the possibility of even a whiff of the eugenic—I find his dismissal 
of Hayles rather too facile. After all, Wolfe concludes the above-quoted passage with the 
assertion that the two of them are even united in their opposition to “fantasies of 
disembodiment and autonomy.” Wolfe’s cavil seems to be that Hayles is using the term 
posthuman to refer to a population characterized by its desire for disembodiment (and 
thus to be regarded negatively), while he is using it to represent something positive: his 
opposition to those very fantasies. For Wolfe, posthumanism has to do with moving 
beyond the chief fantasy, 
perhaps the fundamental anthropological dogma associated with 
humanism… namely, that ‘the human’ is achieved by escaping or 
repressing not just its animal origins in nature, the biological, and the 
evolutionary, but more generally by transcending the bonds of materiality 
and embodiment altogether. (xv) 
 
Instead of attempting to overcome these material aspects of being human, posthumanism 
embraces them, at the same time that it 
names a historical moment in which the decentering of the human by its 
imbrication in technical, medical, informatic, and economic networks is 
increasingly impossible to ignore, a historical development that points 
toward the necessity of new theoretical paradigms (but also thrusts them 
on us), a new mode of thought that comes after the cultural repressions 
and fantasies, the philosophical protocols and evasions, of humanism as a 
historically specific phenomenon. (xv-xvi) 
 
One can’t help but notice that Wolfe’s description of his good (as opposed to 
transhumanism’s “bad”) posthumanism tends to be overwhelmingly negative in its 
phrasing. Even so, it is clear that Wolfe’s understanding of posthumanism largely 
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resonates with my own—despite my use, throughout this project, of Hayles’, and his 
summary dismissal of her. 
 My speculations on Wolfe’s decision to undertake as his first task the distancing of 
himself from what might be called “bad” cyborg posthumanism (while still praising 
“Haraway’s playful, ironic, and ambivalent sensibility in ‘A Cyborg Manifesto,’ which is 
suspicious—to put it mildly—of the capacity of reason to steer, much less optimize, what 
it hath wrought” [xiii]) range from his desire to limit the scope of his book to the aversion 
of any too-literal interpretation of a delightfully abstract theory. Indeed, Wolfe makes 
clear that what interests him is the posthumanism (his emphasis)—the point of view—and 
we may consider Hayles’ project as imagining the posthuman—a figure—something 
which ostensibly doesn’t interest Wolfe at all.  
The Australian performance and conceptual artist Stelarc appears to be just the sort of 
figure that doesn’t interest Wolfe: not just a posthuman, but a transhumanist posthuman 
at that. However, as I will explain in more detail below, I read Stelarc’s performances as 
fitting into, and enhancing, Wolfe’s posthuman paradigm. Stelarc’s work has long 
centered on his claim that “the body is obsolete.” Indeed, his manifesto of sorts, “From 
Psycho-Body to Cyber-Systems: Images as Post-human Entities,” lays out his vision of a 
posthuman body that can challenge what he argues is a body no longer adequately 
competitive with the superior technology that increasingly surrounds it. Structurally 
deficient and lacking the computing and memory capacities of more powerful machines, 
Stelarc claims, this soft, wet, and vulnerable “psycho-body,”  with its many needs and 
inherent fragility, must merge with the machine (becoming “cyber-body”) if it is to 
survive, particularly in environments outside the complex sustaining system of the earth 
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(fig. 1). The body he imagines is “HOLLOW, HARDEN[ed], and DEHYDRATE[d],” 
enhanced and immortal, abandoning an evolution of the species for a purely individual 
development that obscures and renders useless distinctions between “human” and 
other.430 Unsurprisingly, Stelarc’s work has been received, and praised, in overtly 
transhumanist venues, including Transvision, the conference of the World Transhumanist 
Association, where he was a featured presenter in 2004.431 
In this chapter, however, I will attempt to argue that Stelarc performs both 
posthumanism and the posthuman—occupying both the theoretical networks that Wolfe 
reads as defining the posthuman perspective, and embodying the cyborgian figure 
suggested by the history Hayles identifies. Stelarc embodies the man/machine/animal 
melding of the science fiction Hayles analyzes, as well as highlights the systems and 
structures that Wolfe reads as constituting the posthuman perspective. Following the lead 
of Amelia Jones and others, I read Stelarc’s rhetoric as supplementary to, but not 
constitutive of, his performances, paying special attention to the edges where rhetoric 
(often of the transhumanist ilk that Wolfe eschews) and performance (in tune with the 
posthumanism he does advance) rub and spark. We might call him the posttranshuman: a 
figure who claims to aim for correctibility and perfectibility but whose awareness of, as 
yet, an embodied, entangled human, means that such reaches necessarily fall short—
though they reveal the contours of their framing networks as they do.  Although Stelarc’s 
rhetoric insists on the obsolescence of the body, his actual performances depend entirely 
on his own, distinctive body, thus marking their own ostensible failure. The result of 
these competing  productive tensions, especially in Stelarc’s articulate hands, is a 
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complex and compelling figure that allows us to begin to imagine the posthuman Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri tantalizingly hint at in Empire. This figure embodies the agency 
necessary to navigate, like Haraway’s cyborg, the webs of power that characterize the 
future in which we live. 
 I begin with a discussion of Stelarc’s “excessive” body, focusing on his recent Ear 
on Arm project (fig. 2) and the connections it represents—between art and science, 
particular artists and scientists, and human and non-human others. Ear on Arm and the 
Ear Mouse to which it is indebted reveal a few of the sticky filaments that characterize 
the posthuman network. From there, I move to the artist as “Naked Robot,” as one 
headline dubbed him, first examining the origins of the robot and using that to situate 
Stelarc’s technologically-enhanced, sci-fi aestheticized, Third Hand and Exoskeleton. 
These projects segue into the long-running series The Involuntary Body, in which the 
artist relinquishes the control of his own body first to other individuals, and then to the 
bodiless whims of cyberspace itself. Finally, I conclude with Stelarc as the embodiment 
of Hardt and Negri’s rather “monstrous” network-navigating (and doomed to a certain 
failure) figure. 
Stelarc’s Excessive Body 
The ear is small and delicately formed, with gracefully sweeping curves. Yet it is 
clearly incomplete, still enshrouded as if struggling to emerge from the flesh around it. 
Smooth skin covers the expanse where the auditory canal would be, and the helix and 
earlobe fail to break the surface and become fully differentiated. Although it clearly 
resembles one, this is not the external architecture of the organ of hearing: not a natural 
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ear. If there were any doubt, its location would be the final clue: this “ear” resides on 
Australian performance artist Stelarc’s inner forearm. 
 After a decade of imagining, planning, and locating surgeons willing to perform such 
an operation, Stelarc gained this “soft prosthesis,” as he calls it, in 2006. The forearm was 
deemed a more suitable location than Stelarc’s original proposal of alongside his own 
right ear, where facial nerves and delicate skin made the project too risky a proposition. 
A model of the artist’s ear was produced in MEDPOR®, which its makers call a 
“biocompatible, porous polyethylene” material with an “interconnecting, omni-
directional pore structure [that] allows for fibrovascular in-growth and integration of the 
patient’s tissue.”432That is, instead of remaining foreign to the body, this scaffolding 
actually becomes a vascularized, permanent addition to the body’s tissues. Several 
months before insertion of the ear scaffold, Stelarc was fitted with a subcutaneous 
expander implant, which he would top off with saline every two weeks in order to stretch 
the skin and grow enough excess to cover the ear. During the surgery, which was 
performed under general anesthesia (fig. 3), surgeons Malcolm Lesavoy, Sean Bidic, and 
William Futrell removed the expander implant, placed the scaffold in the resulting 
pocket, stitched up the incision, and created negative pressure so that the skin conformed 
to the contours of the scaffold.433 
Stelarc’s ambitious plan for this project included a microphone inside the ear, which 
would be Internet connected and would serve, via the Web, as a remote listening device. 
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As a potential part of what the artist describes as “a distributed Bluetooth system,” it 
could also receive phone calls, for which the ear would be the mouthpiece and Stelarc’s 
own mouth the ostensible earpiece: closed, only he would hear the caller “in my head” 
through a receiver and speaker implanted in a gap between his teeth; and open, those 
around him could hear as well.434 The microphone had to be removed just weeks after the 
surgery, however, due to a serious infection that the artist likes to say almost cost him an 
arm for an ear. The scaffold, was, through “heroic efforts,” saved, and Stelarc’s Web site 
indicates that a microphone will again be inserted in the final surgery, which is intended 
also to lift the helix, form the conch, and attach a stem cell-grown “bag” of tissue for the 
earlobe.435 
Visually, the ear is reminiscent of the Vacanti Mouse, or so-called “ear mouse” (fig. 
4), which captured the public’s imagination when images of it were released in 1997.436  
In one iconic image, the tiny mouse perches at the edge of a glass lab vessel, an ear-
shaped structure protruding from its back like a lumpy satellite dish. Pink and hairless, 
with a pair of its own oversized ears, the mouse looks particularly vulnerable as it pushes 
itself up against the walls of its container. The creature was the result of research in the 
challenging field of tissue engineering, and offered the possibility for ultimately growing 
a soft prosthesis like this that could ultimately be used to replace cartilage lost to illness 
or trauma. Misconceptions about the modified creature quickly spread, notably via a full-
page ad run in the New York Times (fig. 5) featuring a photograph of the ear mouse with 
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the caption, “This is an actual photo of a genetically engineered mouse with a human ear 
on its back.” It wasn’t, of course; the subcutaneous “ear” comprised calf cartilage that 
had been “seeded” onto a biodegradable polymer auriform scaffolding, grown in vitro, 
implanted into the mouse, and then supported as it continued to develop by an external 
stent that helped it maintain its shape.437 The massive headline under which the 
photograph was published, however—“Who Plays God in the 21st Century?”—highlights 
the anxieties aroused by such an image, let alone the project’s details. This creature, 
clearly alive as it seems to peer curiously into the space beyond its lab dish, is physically 
recognizable as both mouse and human, though each only in part. A lab mouse, unlike a 
field mouse, is bred as an object of scientific study; its physical characteristics are 
modified to facilitate research, and it exists largely hidden from the view of the public 
that benefits from that research. The “human” ear on this one’s back further emphasizes 
not just its liminal status as an inhabitant of a shadowy alter-world, but as something 
already between life and death, animal and object, the natural and the constructed. 
The ear on both the mouse and Stelarc’s forearm are similarly indeterminate objects. 
Formed of material foreign to the living bodies into which they were implanted, they 
nevertheless become, over time, part of those very bodies. An electron micrograph of this 
process accompanies the 1997 ear mouse paper, revealing chondrocytes, or cartilage 
cells, clinging to the “spaghetti-like” strands of polymer scaffolding (fig. 6). The caption 
points out that the cells themselves are the tiny lenticular objects, while the “extracellular 
matrix” they have secreted forms the sticky-looking web stretching between the polymer 
strands—an indication “of their ability to perform differentiated function.” This in-
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between stuff—perhaps reminiscent of the “junk DNA” of Chapter One438—will come to 
form the substance of the “ear” on the mouse’s back. In the case of Stelarc’s third ear, his 
own tissue, rather than that of a non-human animal, fills in and replaces the MEDPOR 
scaffold, adding an additional layer of meaning to his claim to “rewire” a bodily structure 
“for alternate functions.”439 (The mouse, notably, has been “rewired” to a far greater 
extent; an “athymic” genetic mutant, it lacks not only hair, but a functioning immune 
system that would reject the implanted ear—unlike Stelarc’s own immune system, which 
responded to the implant with a serious infection.) 
Ear on Arm concentrates and materializes a web of intertwined concerns, much like 
the sticky web connecting cells and scaffolding.  Connections stretch between the ear and 
researcher Vacanti, who not only pioneered the field, but shared his laboratory and 
expertise with artists Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr. Another filament connects the ear to 
Orlan’s surgical modification of her body; she borrowed Stelarc’s motto that “the body is 
obsolete” in grounding her own surgical performances, and with this project, Stelarc 
adopts her chosen medium to initiate his first foray into the permanent extension of the 
“soft body.”440 It is the very fabric of the ear itself, however, which forms the most 
striking connections, knitting together art and science, human and non-human animal, the 
body and technology, and the natural and artificial, rendering them indistinguishable. 
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Stelarc 
Stelios Arcadiou was born in Cyprus in 1946, and moved to Australia as a child.441 In 
1972, he legally changed his name to Stelarc, the name under which he has performed 
and written ever since. Voluble and articulate, he has a distinctive and infectious laugh 
that he employs often, and which one journalist, to the amusement of them both, 
described as “the laugh of an evil villain.”442 These characteristics seem to stand in some 
contrast to Stelarc’s rather bombastic rhetoric (including his most famous declaration that 
“the body is obsolete”) and his performances, which frequently range from the cringe-
inducing to the horrifying. Likewise, what performance theorist Amelia Jones calls his 
“small, compact masculine body,”443 almost always unclothed, contrasts strikingly with 
the amplifying or extending technology with which he pairs it, whether suspension hooks, 
wired muscle activators, or massive machine exoskeletons. 
Stelarc’s first performances were suspensions, of which his online biography states 
that he completed 25 between 1976 and 1988.444 In these performances, the artist is 
suspended—whether from a fixed framework, a moving crane, or in one case, 
counterbalanced stones (fig. 7)—by cables attached to hooks inserted through his skin. 
Most of these performances occurred within gallery spaces, but other venues included 
natural settings, a warehouse elevator shaft, and even busy city streets (high above the 
bustle below). Stelarc recently revisited the medium for the first time in decades, 
performing at the Scott Livesey Galleries in Victoria, Australia on March 8, 2012 (fig 8).. 
A video of the performance, by filmmaker John Doggett-Williams, is posted at Stelarc’s 
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Web site.445 The Ear on Arm Suspension video opens with Stelarc lying prone on a large 
white sculpture of his own left arm, complete with third ear.446 Gloved assistants pinch 
his skin away from the muscle and ease in large stainless steel hooks.447 A passage of 
close-ups shows the faces of the two assistants grimacing and straining as they struggle to 
push the hooks through the resistant flesh, and then Stelarc, his cheek resting on the 
sculptural arm, wincing and squeezing his eyes shut as they work. A total of 16 hooks are 
inserted: three on either side of the spine, two each in the thighs and calves, and one per 
arm. The space around his sculptural pedestal clears as an assistant begins turning a crank 
in the corner of the gallery, its ratchet clicking loudly in silence interrupted only by 
Stelarc barking, “Go, go!” as the cables grow taut and he begins to levitate off the arm. 
Free of the sculpture, he spins slowly with his arms stretched in front of him, turning first 
in one direction and then in the other. The hooks strain at the skin, pulling it into an alien 
architecture of pink dorsal ridges. As the artist is lowered (after 15 minutes of suspension, 
only six or seven of which are included in the film), a trickle of blood escapes from his 
calf, two red drops marking the pristine white surface of the sculpture. The video 
concludes, after the credits have rolled, with audio of one of Stelarc’s trademark laughs 
and the applause of the gallery audience. 
Stelarc makes a point of referring, not to his body, but to “the body,” or occasionally 
“the artist’s body,” linguistically highlighting a split he has emphasized and explored 
throughout his oeuvre. “The suspension performances,” he says, “exposed the body as an 
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obsolete body. It was largely empty, absent to its own agency, and performing largely 
involuntarily.”448 This description seems to have little to do with the performance just 
described, wherein “the body” is not only not empty (full, among other things, of the 
blood that leaked out to stain the sculpture), but performing consummately voluntarily, 
and decidedly present to its own agency (as Stelarc’s directions to the assistant at the 
crank are just one indication). It is impossible to watch the artist, floating on thin silver 
cables against the stark whiteness of the gallery space—his skin blushing as it suspends 
him at concentrated points, his brow furrowed as he feels his way through pain and into 
balance—and see some sort of mechanical automaton, or anything other than a very 
alive, feeling, body.  
Indeed, as Amelia Jones points out, Stelarc’s performances and his rhetoric are really 
two separate objects of consideration, and to take his claims about the empty, obsolete 
body at face value is to miss the more nuanced explorations of body and technology that 
his performances allow. She writes: 
while [Stelarc’s] verbal rhetoric is problematically rationalizing and 
Cartesian, and by extension phallocentric (in his words, as we will see, 
explicitly hard and dry), his practice allows for a fluid, even wet, circuit of 
identificatory exchange with his spectators that opens to a deeper 
understanding of the inexorable, coextensively emotional-psychic-material 
effects of technology on contemporary subjectivity.449 
 
I argue that these contradictions, visible in the suspension performances as well as in 
those that merge man and machine, are intentional—that the body displays its failure vis-
à-vis the rhetorical bluster precisely to reveal the potential ends of such thought 
experiments.  
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The Naked Robot 
Although he was already declaring the body obsolete with his suspension 
performances, Stelarc’s intimate interface with technology began in 1980, when he 
worked with a team in Japan to develop his Third Hand (fig. 9). The Third Hand is a 
prosthesis that he defines “not as a sign of lack, but rather [as] a symptom of excess.”450 
Developed between 1 976 and 1980, the hand was produced in Nagoya, Japan based on a 
prototype by Waseda University professor Ichiro Kato and with advice from Tokyo 
Institute of Technology professor Shigeo Hirose.451  
Although built to the scale of Stelarc’s own hand, it is nonetheless strikingly alien, 
with complicated electronics, clearly visible through its acrylic housing, looking like 
brightly colored and stylized viscera. The hand attaches, via a fin-shaped extension 
containing more electronics, to Stelarc’s right forearm, where an acrylic sleeve, jointed at 
the elbow, secures the apparatus. The effect, highlighted in the studio photographs taken 
soon after Stelarc acquired the arm, is of the organic, natural body connected intimately 
to, yet contrasting sharply with, the sleek, hard robotic addition. Positioned as it is, 
perhaps eight inches from the artist’s own hand, it is also unapologetic in its excess.  
Stelarc writes that although the Third Hand was “originally designed as a semi- 
permanent attachment to the body,” the weight of the apparatus (around three pounds) 
and skin irritation from the electrode gel meant that its use has to be restricted to 
performances.452 The hand has “an EMG (muscle signal) controlled mechanism with 
pinch release, grasp-release and 290-degree wrist clockwise and counterclockwise 
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rotation,” all controlled via the muscles of the torso and legs. A “tactile sensor system on 
the fingers provides a rudimentary sense of touch,”453 through stimulation of the skin 
elsewhere on the body. In an early performance with the Third Hand, Stelarc wrote the 
word EVOLUTION on a glass panel at the Maki Gallery, each of his three hands taking a 
three-letter segment of the word.454 He says that he only learned to write two words, 
EVOLUTION and DECADENCE, because each had nine letters.455 The choice, however, is 
certainly not random, and represents equally valid (even possibly simultaneous) 
interpretations of the Third Hand itself: a step toward extending the possibilities of the 
body, or an unnecessary and self-indulgent appropriation of the sort of prosthesis actually 
used to replace a missing body part.456  
Robotics as a field often finds itself between these two, occasionally overlapping, 
poles. Ichiro Kato, the scientist on whose prototype The Third Hand was built, was 
dubbed “the Father of robotics in Japan” for his two ground-breaking WABOT 
projects.457 The first of these—and “the world’s first life-sized humanoid robot” 458—is 
the Biped Walking Robot, WHL-11 (the Waseda Hitachi Leg No. 11) (fig. 10), 
completed by Kato and his Waseda University mechanical engineering students in 
1973.459 Kato’s laboratory also produced the music-playing WASUBOT (WAseda 
SUmitomo roBOT) (fig. 11), which was exhibited alongside the Biped Walking Robot in 
                                                 
453
 Stelarc, “Excess,” 114. 
454
 Jane Goodall, “The Will to Evolve,” Stelarc: the Monograph, 11. 
455
 Stelarc, “Cadavers.” 
456
 In her essay “A Leg to Stand on: Prosthesis, Metaphor, and Materiality,” in The Prosthetic Impulse 
(edited by Marquard Smith and Joanne Morra, 2005), Vivian Sobchack reminds readers that although it is 
an alluring metaphor, a prosthesis is a much more complex and fraught subject for those who, like her, 
actually depend on such devices in daily life. 
457
 Atsuo Takanishi, “In Memoriam: Professor Ichiro Kato,” in Autonomous Robots Volume 2, Issue 1 
(March 1995), 10. 
458
 Peter Menzel and Faith D’Aluisio, Robo Sapiens: Evolution of a New Species (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2001), 37. 
459
 Takanishi, 8. 
  276 
the Japanese pavilion of the International Science and Technology Exposition of 1985.460 
The former, featuring a cyclopean camera in an oversized head and insect-like limbs 
draped in bundles of cords, read from sheet music to play complex pieces on a 
synthesizer organ. Though its legs managed the pedals, they wouldn’t have supported 
WASUBOT, which was in fact bolted to the bench on which it sat.461 Indeed, 
WASUBOT was, in the words of robotics expert Mark E. Rosheim, “Spectacular in its 
dedicated function.”462 Computerworld Columnist Charles P. Lecht waxes rather poetic 
on his experience of viewing that dedicated function at Expo ’85. He concludes that 
WASUBOT’s charm lies in its very difference from the more typical laboring machine: 
Emulating motions of man when he is engaged in purely artistic pursuits 
(like playing the organ) is, relatively speaking, new. Wasubot provides us 
with hope that more such robot uses may be in the making. We cannot 
underestimate the value of robotics to help us off-load the often 
dehumanizing but necessary processes we must execute to survive. But 
survival isn’t everything. The use of robotics in artistic expression 
provides us with powerful new means to further obtain its humanizing 
benefits.463 
 
Lecht admits that “we’ve heard better performances” from humans, but praises the 
“hope” Wasubot offers for robots’ “humanizing benefits.” The humanoid, one-trick 
WASUBOT, like Stelarc’s excessive Third Arm, hovers near what I’ve called the 
“decadence” pole of robotics, yet expresses explicitly humanist ideals. This robot, that is, 
not only serves humans, it addresses their aesthetic desires. If laboring robots are seen as 
doing dehumanizing work, WASUBOT offers the possibility that other robots could, 
perhaps even through increasingly human forms, bring aesthetic pleasure to human life. 
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 Perhaps Waseda University’s best-known WABOT, the Bipedal Walking Robot 
WHL-11 represents the “evolution” pole. Indeed, the laboratory’s brochure Development 
of Waseda Robot writes that the robots at Expo ’85 “were exhibited to implicitly tell of 
the man’s evolvement.”464 The “11” in WHL-11’s name suggests its own evolution; it is 
the 11th in a series of walking robots begun in 1966 with WL-1.465 Perhaps more 
importantly, WHL-11, which “walked more than 85 km in total,”466 sparked a revolution, 
leading to Honda Motor Company’s “secret multimillion-dollar program to build a 
walking robot with a human form.” The latter, upon its unveiling in 1996, “attracted so 
much attention that it pushed the Japanese government into launching a five-year, 
multimillion-dollar humanoid robot project.”467 Kato (who died in 1994) believed the 21st 
century would be the age of the personal robot; Honda’s humanoid ASIMO is bringing 
that vision closer (fig. 12). Honda emphasizes that ASIMO’s purpose is to “genuinely 
help people,” and its design and  function—from its accessible four-foot height to its 
ability to avoid moving obstacles—are tailored to ultimately make it useful “as another 
set of eyes, ears, hands and legs for all kinds of people in need.”468 With its crisp white 
plastic shell, slightly oversized head, and childlike voice, ASIMO looks friendly, 
approachable, and very willing to serve.  
 Service, of course, is robots’ raison d'être, with the term itself, introduced in 
Karel Čapek’s R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots), coming from the Czech for 
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“drudgery.”469 In his short 1920 play, Čapek imagines robots visually indistinguishable 
from humans; in the first act, protagonist Helena Glory, meeting one of them for the first 
time, refuses to believe that the polite, conversational secretary Sulla could be anything 
other than human, and recoils at the idea that the latter wouldn’t mind being cut open to 
demonstrate as much. Indeed, the Robots don’t “mind” anything, at least initially; these 
“artificial workers,” as R.U.R. General Manager Harry Domin calls them, “have no 
soul.”470 Produced with vat-grown organs, manufactured bones, and mill-spun nerves, 
Robots replace the “terribly imperfect” “human machine” with one unencumbered with 
the likes of passions and desires, leaving man with nothing to do but “perfect himself.”471 
Naturally, (unnatural) things go terribly wrong: outnumbering the humans 1,000 to one, 
the Robots, led by a few secretly manufactured (at Helena’s wish) according to a new, 
more human, formula, revolt and kill all the humans. All but one, that is; the elderly Mr. 
Alquist is spared “because he works with his hands, like the Robots.”472 It is he who 
witnesses, as the curtain falls, Robots he calls “Adam” and “Eve,” whose appreciation of 
beauty, sensation of vivacity, and demonstrated altruism suggest that there will yet be a 
future—if not for humankind, at least for a rather melodramatically humanistic 
Robotkind, who will not merely serve, but labor for themselves and each other. 
Čapek, as the translators point out in their Note that precedes the text, was a deeply 
socially engaged thinker who addressed societal ills through satire—at the risk, in later 
years, of his own safety. In R.U.R. Čapek addresses the plight of the worker, the greed of 
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the corporation, and the meaninglessness of war. American literary critic Alexander 
Woolcott, who reviewed the play’s first performance in the U.S., called it “murderous 
social satire”; its Marxist themes of labor, value, production and revolution would not 
have gone unnoticed by audiences at the time. 
 The theme of manufactured beings visually identical to humans, or in some cases 
uniting robotic parts with organic ones, is a common one in science fiction. R.U.R. 
clearly foreshadows, for example, the Blade Runner Replicants discussed in Chapter 2. 
Like Rossum’s Robots, Replicants are fabricated for service and visually 
indistinguishable from humans. Replicant Roy Batty driving a nail into his own palm to  
delay his pre-programmed senescence near the end of his lifespan even seems to quote an 
R.U.R. scene in which Rossum physiological engineer Gall  pricks a Robot’s hand to test 
the latter’s sensitivity following the “attack” that indicates emerging humanlike 
characteristics (fig. 13).  
The 1987 RoboCop also addresses the theme of robots revolting against their makers; 
the titular RoboCop (fig. 14) is created by merging murdered policeman Murphy with the 
“enforcement droid” ED-209 after the latter malfunctions during a boardroom 
demonstration and kills an attendee. With Murphy’s brain (and, it later turns out, at least 
some memories); a few of his body parts (including his face); and the droid’s hardware; 
the cyborg RoboCop is cleaning up a dystopian Detroit in no time. A final man/machine 
amalgam features in 1984’s iconic Terminator (fig. 15), released between Blade Runner 
and RoboCop. The eponymous Terminator, a single-minded assassin, is another cyborg: 
although his inner workings are entirely robotic, fueled by artificial intelligence, a living 
skin gives him a human appearance. Near the end of the film, however, the Terminator 
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emerges from a would-be fatal fire sans peau: an insect-like, chrome skeleton draped in 
cables; pneumatic joints wheezing; and glowing red pupils dilating and contracting 
menacingly. Any trace of the humanity his skin suggested has disappeared as he 
continues his relentless pursuit—dragging himself by his arms when both legs are blown 
off—until he is flattened by a hydraulic press.  
 Replicants and the Terminator bear some relation to the figure of the transhuman, 
as well as to the sort of super-intelligent machine Vernor Vinge and others imagine as 
arising in the Singularity. Their chiseled, muscle-bound bodies suggest pervasive 
perfection: they are finely tuned machinery in the form of the ideal human physique. 
RoboCop, on the other hand, is closer to Stelarc’s posttranshuman: he is aware that he is 
damaged goods, pieced together from fragments of man and machine, and becomes 
increasingly pensive as his memories begin to surface and  he considers the in-
betweenness of his life, body, and intelligence. 
 Stelarc’s Third Hand channels these science-fiction fantasies, powerful and even 
dangerous in the acrylic shell that showcases its robotic gears and cables. However, 
instead of baring the chiseled muscles of Batty, RoboCop, or the Terminator, the wearer 
of this cyborgian prosthetic is the thoroughly ordinary-looking; balding, yet otherwise 
rather hairy; middle-aged artist (fig. 16). The contrast is only intensified by the black 
portrait background of the studio shots showcasing the Third Hand and Stelarc’s 
theatrical poses. What is on display here is not the sci-fi fantasy, but the awkward and 
cumbersome reality of this extraneous extension of the self.  
 Mexican performance artist Guillermo Gómez-Peña highlights both the fantasy 
and the awkwardness of the robotic prosthesis in what Jones describes as “a direct parody 
  281 
of Stelarc’s heroicized robotic performances.” Here Gómez-Peña’s “El Mad Mex” 
character wears what he describes elsewhere as “My robotic, cerbo-controlled hand … 
with polished chrome and lasers for fingertips” (though, he clarifies, “It’s just for style”) 
(fig. 17).473 In the 2000 performance Jones describes, however, this hand (in reality a 
plastic toy) turns on him, pulling at his mouth. Gómez-Peña directly references Stelarc in 
his diary notes for the piece, which Jones quotes: “What if Stelarc had been born in 
Tijuana? His second (robotic) hand suddenly would betray him and deform his identity 
que no?”474 The whimsy and theatricality of Gómez-Peña’s performances nonetheless 
highlight the darker realities of technology as potentially uncontrollable and as 
distinctively unevenly globally distributed. 
Gómez-Peña’s parodic piece forms one end of a spectrum, with the Third-Hand-ed  
Stelarc in the middle and Hollywood’s chiseled science fiction characters at the other 
end. Compared to RoboCop, Stelarc’s technological enhancements appear laughably 
meager, the expanse of his soft flesh almost shameful under comparison with the 
former’s gleaming carapace. Compared to Gómez-Peña, Stelarc fares better; the 
“enhancement” the former wears not only lacks the fine sensors and controls of Stelarc’s, 
but then actively turns against him.  Considered together, this triplet represents a 
whimsical continuum that brings a dose of embodied reality to all three.  
 Stelarc takes the idea of robotic “enhancement” even further in his Exoskeleton: 
Event for Walking Machine performance, in which he is strapped onto the prosthesis, 
rather than vice versa (fig. 18). Stelarc developed Exoskeleton during a residency he 
                                                 
473
 Gómez-Peña in collaboration with Roberto Sifuentes and Matthew Finch, Aztechology “performance 
interview” transcript, 1998. Online at 
http://www.pochanostra.com/antes/jazz_pocha2/mainpages/page2.htm.  
474
 Jones, 190. 
  282 
completed in Hamburg, with the assistance of a group of artists and engineers known as 
F18,475 and first performed it there in late 1998. Exoskeleton places the artist in the center 
of what looks like a giant mechanical insect, with six jointed legs sprouting a profusion of 
cables. Nested amidst these legs, the artist stands on a rotating platform, a tall column 
behind him connected to a bundle of power cables hanging from the ceiling. The column 
provides structures that brace the artist’s arms, which he uses to control the movement of 
the machine. His right arm is extended with attenuated, mechanical fingers that flutter 
with alien dexterity. The column behind the artist also provides a waist belt that stabilizes 
him against Exoskeleton’s spastic lurching, which nonetheless shakes him t around. 
Indeed, the vibrations produced by the force with which the limbs strike the floor 
necessitated that this be, in Stelarc’s words, “the first performance I did with my clothes 
on”; shockproof boots were clearly essential, and he opted to dress as well.476  
In addition to providing locomotion, Exoskeleton functions as what Stelarc calls a 
“sound machine,” creating metallic, industrial sounds with each movement. In a video of 
the performance, the wheezing, grinding, and clicking of the machinery echoes off the 
concrete walls and floors, a flood of sound accompanying the convulsions of the machine 
as it reels forwards and skitters sideways. Even fully clothed, the artist appears small, 
vulnerable, and at the mercy of the machine he ostensibly controls. If the Third Hand can 
be compared to Terminator, providing a visual suggestion that mechanical body parts are 
destined to become part of the insufficient and outdated human machine, Exoskeleton is 
closer to Robocop, in which the human—or what remains of it—is transported and 
strengthened by the machine. In those science fiction imaginings, of course, the 
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connections are seamless, smooth, and powerful—a direct contrast to Stelarc’s jouncing 
atop the juddering Exoskeleton. 
Stelarc’s performances with these technologies of bodily extension –particularly 
given his claims about the needs of the body to keep up, physically, with a digital world 
that is passing it by—might superficially  be read as emphatically transhumanist, were 
not the awkwardness of their interfaces and contrast with the emphatically embodied 
nature of the artist not so prominently on display. Again, we can read apparent “failures” 
here—of the Third Arm to be wearable for longer than just performances; of the seizing 
Exoskeleton to run smoothly and efficiently; of the artist’s body to more closely resemble 
the HARD,  HOLLOWED, machinic body of science fiction cyborgs—but what is really 
on display is how posttranshumanism looks in practice. 
The Networked Posthuman  
The Third Hand and Exoskeleton cast Stelarc as a cyborg, intimately connected to 
machinery that he controls with his own body. In the performances to which I now turn, a 
series Stelarc refers to as the “Involuntary Body,” the equation shifts as Stelarc transfers 
control over his body to external sources. In these performances, completed between 
1995 and 1998, he is not, I argue, merely cyborg, but a posthuman figure in the 
posthumanist vein Cary Wolfe describes—despite the latter’s aversion477 to the 
transhumanism with which Stelarc’s work has been associated.  
I began this chapter with the characterization of Wolfe’s definition of posthumanism 
as a perspective. Wolfe conceives of posthumanism through the lens of second-order 
systems theory, specifically as read through German sociologist Niklas Luhmann and 
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Jacques Derrida.478 Luhmann calls his systems theory, nodding to Derrida’s best-known 
theoretical contribution, “the reconstruction of deconstruction.”479 The critical 
intervention Wolfe reads in Luhmann is the recognition and inclusion of “biological, 
social, and historical conditions of emergence and transformation” in understanding the 
connections in social and psychic systems.480 These networks define and create our 
understanding of nature, self, and society, which, as Wolfe points out, are neither separate 
spheres nor possible to disentangle. 
For Wolfe, the question of the posthuman is how we can think about what it means to 
be human from a position that isn’t entirely anthropocentric and humanist—to think from 
outside the networks we use to define ourselves as human, while remaining aware of our 
entwinement within them and definition by them. As he puts it, 
Posthumanism can be defined quite specifically as the necessity for any 
discourse or critical procedure to take account of the constitutive (and 
constituively paradoxical) nature of its own distinctions, forms, and 
procedures—and take account of them in ways that may be distinguished 
from the reflection and introspection associated with the critical subject of 
humanism. The “post-” of posthumanism thus marks the space in which 
the one using those distinctions and forms is not the one who can reflect 
on their latencies and blind spots while at the same time deploying them. 
That can only be done… by another observer, using a different set of 
distinctions—and that observer, within the general economy of autopoiesis 
and iterability, need not be human (indeed, from this vantage, never was 
“human”).481 
 
As Wolfe points out in the above passage, however, finding a place outside one’s own 
system from which to observe it is essentially impossible (in the same way that Luhmann 
says communication is impossible: “Humans cannot communicate; not even their brains 
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can communicate; not even their conscious minds can communicate. Only 
communication can communicate.”482). Individual, self-generating (autopoetic) psychic 
systems, within what Chilean biologist/philosophers Humberto Maturana and Francisco 
Varela call their “embodied action,” together “bring forth a world,” one necessarily 
different for every living being.483 
The idea that every living being creates its own environment, and even its own time, 
is one German biologist Jakob von Uexküll advanced in his 1933 book Streifzüge durch 
die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen, recently published in English as the 2010 A 
Foray Into the Worlds of Animals and Humans.484 In his introduction to the latter, writer 
and sleight-of-hand magician485 Dorion Sagan writes that Uexküll’s idea of umwelt 
(environment, in German) was 
popularized and developed by [semiotician] Thomas Sebeok, who spoke 
of a “semiotic web”—our understanding of our world being not just 
instinctive, or made up, but an intriguing mix, a spiderlike web partially of 
our own social and personal construction, whose strands, like those of a 
spider, while they may be invisible, can have real-world effects.486 
 
Uexküll doesn’t stop at human perception, either, but explores the realities—subjective 
and self-created—of living organisms from ticks to flowers. An object carries “meaning ” 
based on its particular environment, and an organism’s reality is defined by its interaction 
with that environment. As Uexküll puts it, “all the properties of things are nothing other 
than the perception signs imprinted upon them by the subject with which they enter into a 
relation.”487 This concept of umwelt is profoundly posthumanist in that it completely 
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decenters the human subject, replacing a world in which all objects and organisms are 
oriented toward rational human perception with a far more complex web populated with 
infinite versions of time and reality. 
Wolfe doesn’t cite Uexküll, but his influences488 are nonetheless felt in the former’s 
description of a world that is, because of the autopoietic nature of the systems delineating 
it, simultaneously virtual and real. Wolfe writes that if we follow Maturana and Varela’s 
concept of organisms’ “embodied enaction” generating unique environments that may be, 
in Wolfe’s words, “radically different, for different life forms,” then 
the environment, and with it ‘the body,’ becomes unavoidably a virtual, 
multidimensional space produced and stabilized by the recursive enactions 
and structural couplings of autopoietic beings who share what Maturana 
and Varela call ‘a consensual domain.’ …The world is thus a virtuality 
and a multiplicity; it is both what one does in embodied enaction and what 
the self-reference of that enaction excludes. Again, Luhmann: ‘Reality is 
what one does not perceive when one perceives it.’ Crucially, then, 
‘virtual’ does not mean ‘not real’; on the contrary, given the ‘openness 
from closure’ principle, the more virtual the world is, the more real it is, 
because the buildup of internal complexity made possible by autopoietic 
closure actually increases the complexity of the environment that is 
possible for any system.489 
 
The principle of “openness from closure” is one Wolfe identifies in Luhmann’s reading 
of Maturana and Varela on biological systems, which “must maintain their boundaries 
and integrity through a process of self-referential closure,” yet be open to the 
environment precisely in order to do so.490 Because an object and its environment are in a 
sense called into being by each other, these self-defining and -creating systems increase 
in complexity within that relationship. Both are “virtual,” in that their existence is 
predicated upon the meaning they hold for other objects in the system. Yet they define 
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the real, for Luhmann, by being precisely that which “one does not perceive when one 
perceives it.”  
  After setting up his interpretation of posthumanism in the first half of the book, 
Wolfe dedicates the second half to “engaging in detailed readings and interpretations of a 
range of cultural and artistic practices that exemplify a posthumanist sensibility or 
problematic.”491 These include Sue Coe’s Dead Meat and Eduardo Kac’s GFP Bunny, as 
might be expected from a scholar whose work has contributed to the emerging discipline 
of Animal Studies. In addition, he addresses non-traditional architecture with Rem 
Koolhaas and Bruce Mau’s Tree City plan and Diller + Scofidio’s amorphous Blur 
building; film with Lars von Trier’s Dancer in the Dark; and the relationship between 
analog and digital media in David Byrne and Brian Eno’s collaboration My Life in the 
Bush of Ghosts. Given his earlier distancing of himself from transhumanism or anything 
too close to it, it is not surprising that none of these projects addresses the idea of the 
posthuman—an imaginative figure or provocation that explores, through directly 
addressing the body (whatever it may mean—and which Wolfe is keen not to dismiss 
entirely) the implications for being human in a posthumanist milieu. I offer Stelarc, and 
particularly his Involuntary Body series to which I now turn, as a way to understand a 
material (yet virtual), embodied, posthuman.  
The Involuntary Body: Fractal Flesh, Ping Body, and Parasite  
 In his Involuntary Body performances, Stelarc pairs electrodes with complex 
computer systems to deliver current to different parts of his body, automatically 
activating those muscles, as outlined in a 1993 drawing (fig. 19). A faceless male body, a 
prosthetic right hand extending from his own, stands covered in electrodes and draped in 
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the cables sprouting from them. To the left of him a legend identifies the numbers that 
label various input and output sites on the body, divided into the categories “Amplified 
Body,” “Involuntary Body,” and “Third Hand.” The twelve items listed under Amplified 
Body include sensors for limb position, muscle flexion, and more. The Involuntary Body 
section lists the locations of electrical muscle stimulation (EMS) electrodes that activate 
different muscle groups. The Third Hand section lists the locations where muscles control 
the four functions of the hand, as well as where the hand’s sense of “touch” directs. 
 The body this drawing describes is one that is enhanced, extended, and intimately  
integrated with technology. Yet even in this cleanly diagrammed form, the effect is less 
of triumphant sci-fi hero and more of a soft body ensnared and invaded by foreign 
elements. If nothing else, this particular configuration—like the heavy Third Hand also 
displayed and earlier discussed—is  patently impractical for anything other than a stage 
performance. Stelarc had previously performed using the Third Hand, Amplified Body, 
and electrical muscle stimulation, both individually and in concert, but it was in the 
Involuntary Body performances that the three not only came together, but employed the 
element of external, divided, control. The result is what Stelarc describes as a “split 
body” or “split physiologies, operating with multiple agency,” 492  and first occurred at 
Telepolis in Luxembourg in November of 1995 in the performance Fractal Flesh. 493 
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 In Fractal Flesh, Stelarc appeared on stage in Luxembourg, wired up as shown in 
the diagram for the performance. In this diagram, the male figure from the Involuntary 
Body/Third Hand drawing reappears, this time schematically linked to a system captioned 
“Touch-screen Interface & Muscle-Stimulation Circuitry” (fig. 21). On the left, a 
computer, its touchscreen monitor displaying a simplified figure labeled with six black 
squares, links to more systems, one input and one output. In the former, rays with 
terminus points numbered from one to six, indicating “Remote Actuation Sites,” 
converge on a box labeled “Internet Upload,” which in turn feeds into the computer. On 
the output end, a rectangle framing the touchscreen figure, now with the six squares 
numbered, indicates a relay delivering data to the Involuntary Body figure.  
 The interface diagrammed here is Stimbod, through which individuals at remote 
sites—in this case the Centre Pompidou in Paris, the Media Lab in Helsinki, and the 
Doors of Perception conference in Amsterdam—could choreograph, via the Internet, 
Stelarc’s motions in Luxembourg (fig. 22)494 In the artist’s words, the sites “were 
electronically linked using modem connected Macs with picturetel ISDN channels 
providing visual feedback so that people could remotely access and actuate the body.”495 
That actuation was accomplished via the EMS electrodes the artist wore on both biceps, 
as well as on his left shoulder, forearm, quadriceps, and calf. Stelarc maintained control 
of his head; right leg (a necessity for maintaining balance); and his torso, through which 
he controlled the Third Hand (fig. 22). The electrodes delivered a charge of between zero 
and 60 volts over several seconds, an experience the artist described in a rare, yet 
                                                                                                                                                 
performance of Fractal Flesh at the Meridian Gallery in Melbourne on August 22, 1995, but there is no 
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pointedly impersonal summary: “The tingling, burning sensation of the stimulation has 
been described as producing a cramp-like experience as the muscle contracts. At a lower 
voltage level, it is merely a prompting system. At higher voltages, the limb moves 
involuntarily.” 496 Here, although the focus remains on the body as a machine to be 
controlled, we have at least a small admission of the discomfort suggested by the diagram 
and experienced by being “the body” in question.  
The artist, naked but for the Third Hand; electrodes, sensors, and attendant wires; and 
(in some performances) a head-mounted display, performed against a grid of nine screens 
displaying live video in a composite image. Live images of the performance were 
uploaded to a Web site, while Stelarc’s HMD “allow[ed] the artist to see the face of the 
person programming him—an intimacy,” as he put it, “without proximity.”497 All the 
while, sonic feedback from the “Amplified Body” sensors provided a steady soundtrack 
of whirring, pulsing, and creaking, which intensified the effect suggested by the headline 
of Lisa Spencer’s Independent newspaper article on the performance: “The Naked 
Robot.”498 Stelarc’s spastic movements, his electronics-enshrouded form, and the 
industrial soundtrack all evoke the mechanical humanoid that the word robot today 
suggests, an image that contrasts with, in the first words of Spencer’s article, Stelarc’s 
“flabby, balding” body: bare and vulnerable.  
In Ping Body, as in Fractal Flesh, Stelarc is again on stage—physically, as well as 
live on the Internet—while his muscles are controlled by external forces. This time, 
however, it is not individuals activating his muscles from multiple touchscreens, but the 
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  291 
flow of data itself: “ping” data from across the Internet. Ping is a program its developer, 
Mike Muus, likens to echolocation (with the onomatopoetic ping of sonar the program’s 
eponym). However, instead of measuring physical distances using sound, ping indicates 
“distances” in cyberspace by sending data “packets” to a target computer and measuring 
the return time.499 Ping data, then, reflect user traffic across the Internet as computers 
exchange data. According to Stelarc, describing the 1996 Digital Aesthetics performance 
in Sydney, “By pinging over 40 global sites live during the performance and measuring 
the reverberating signals, it was possible to map these to the body’s muscles with the 
muscle stimulation system” (fig. 23). He continues, “The body becomes a data dance; it 
becomes a barometer of Internet activity.”500 It was individuals—art-minded gallery-
goers and conference attendees, at that—who choreographed Stelarc’s movements in 
Fractal Flesh. Through the HMD, he was able to see them as they activated his body 
with their own, affording the aforementioned “intimacy without proximity.” Yet in the 
Ping Body performances, which occurred in different variations between 1996 and 1998, 
Stelarc relinquishes control of his body not just to another body, but to nobody at all. In 
this performance, he gives form and body to the Internet, which in 1996 was just entering 
the public consciousness, yet was already redolent of its own imminent ubiquity. In 
1984’s Neuromancer, William Gibson501 pictured Cyberspace as a locus for interaction 
not merely between the space cowboys who jacked in to navigate its flow of data, but by 
the Artificial Intelligences borne by it. Stelarc here makes his body—the breathing, 
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perspiring, twitching “meat prison” that hacker Case so disdains—the physical 
manifestation of that data. He literally embodies Cyberspace.  
Stelarc first performed Parasite, the third in the Involuntary Body series, in early 
April of 1997 at an international multimedia event called Virtual World Orchestra (fig. 
24). Its organizers, NVA (Nacionale Vita Activa), called it “the first genuinely global 
internet event,” and one can almost hear their breathless excitement as they describe the 
three-evening experience. “Glasgow’s Old Fruitmarket,” they write,  
was transformed into a vast, pulsating, techni-coloured, techno-saturated, 
audio-visual arena ... literally playing host to the world. Images, sounds 
and text from representatives of over 160 countries (more than half the 
countries in the world), ranging from Iceland to Mongolia, careered 
through the internet, packaged by Locofoco and Tomato (the indefatigably 
hip Soho design collective), and were blasted onto sculptor (and 
gyneacologist!) Dr. Graeme Tydeman's awesome configurations of 
screens - suspended, surrounding and shifting around this epic event. A 
spectacular digital montage of global life, VIRTUAL WORLD 
ORCHESTRA (VWO) was theatre company NVA's (Nacionale Vita 
Activa's) bid to make sense of that which unites and divides humanity, and 
fittingly crossed all boundaries - national, cultural, political, even generic, 
as the evening hurtled from clubland to installation art, from concert to 
performance art. For three nights and into the small hours, a live audience 
and a potential 30 million viewers worldwide watched the simultaneous 
internet and m-bone502 broadcasts, embarked on a multi-layered voyage 
through the rich diversity of global life and became a part of the first 
genuinely global internet event. Added to all this was live Betacam mixing 
onto mutiple moving screens, aerial staging, quadrophonic sound, 
robotics, mass drumming, individual performances and DJ's mixing sound 
sequences from 'found sounds' provided by an international bevvy of 
musicians, and produced at nva's digital recording studio-One Over 
Infinity.  
 VWO proved to be as unparalleled as it was unprecedented.503  
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The excitement palpable here lies not just in the diversity or even scale of the project, but 
in the fact that it is being facilitated by cutting-edge technology with the potential to 
unify global humanity. These are the hippest of the geeks—the sort iconized in 1995’s  
Hackers: precocious, attractive but misfit, youths enthralled by the possibilities (licit and 
il-) offered by technology still in the Wild West phase Gibson had imagined in 
Neuromancer (fig. 25). (Passages depicting the protagonists hacking into systems show a 
cyberspace clearly indebted to Gibson’s, with glowing skyscrapers of data rising from 
circuit-board highways.) As Rafael Moreu, who wrote Hackers, says of the film’s 
characters and what they represent, “Hacking itself is just part of something that's much 
bigger. In fact, to call hackers a counter culture makes it sound like they're a transitory 
thing; I think they're the next step in human evolution.”504 These youth represent a new 
generation of technological initiates—“digital natives,” as author and educator Mark 
Prensky calls them505—and technology is their playground and podium. 
Against this backdrop, Stelarc, and particularly in a performance like those in the 
Involuntary Body series, harnessing the will of the crowd and even Cyberspace itself,  
seems a natural fit (if, at the moment 51, the artist is perhaps a bit older than the mean). 
However, in what feels like a direct contrast to the optimistic tone of the event, he entitles 
his performance, debuting at VWO, Parasite—a word with distinctly negative 
connotations. The subtitle, Event for Invaded and Involuntary Body, strengthens that 
impression. A parasitic relationship, after all, is one that is specifically not equally 
beneficial to both organisms. Given the “invaded body” of the subtitle, one could be 
forgiven for assuming the Parasite in question is the technology inhabiting and 
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controlling Stelarc’s body. One might even think of his 1993 Hollow Body/Host Space: 
Stomach Sculpture (fig. 26), of which he writes that the “technology invades and 
functions within the body…. The hollow body becomes a host, not for a self, but simply 
for a sculpture—an alien, electronic object moving, flashing and beeping in a wet and 
vulnerable environment.”506 The host in Parasite, however, is not Stelarc’s own body; 
rather, he writes, “Plugged in, the body becomes a parasite sustained by an extended, 
external and virtual nervous system.”507 The “host” here is a massive, abstract, 
technological and virtual realm and the “parasite” the body itself. 
 Parasite, as the diagram for the Wood Street Galleries performance completed 
later that April indicates, uses much of the same technology as Fractal Flesh and Ping 
Body. Again electrodes activate the body’s muscles, while sensors record sounds 
(“generated by pressure, proximity, flexion and accelerometer sensors”508) the body 
generates voluntarily and autonomically. Instead of muscle activation occurring through a 
remote touchscreen or even machine communications, however, in this case the circle is 
completed. A “customized search engine has been constructed,” Stelarc writes, which 
“scans, selects, and displays images to the body”—which, itself, “functions in an 
interactive video field” (fig. 27).509 The web images are translated into movement of 
Stelarc’s body. Images from the performance are in turn uploaded to the web, where they 
become potential fodder for the search engine. For the first time an HMD, though it has 
been worn in some prior performances, is here part of the diagrammatic illustration, 
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further emphasizing the importance of both imagery and virtuality in this piece. Stelarc 
writes, 
Consider the body’s vision, augmented and adjusted to a parallel virtuality 
which increases in intensity to compensate for the twilight of the real 
world. Imagine the search engine selecting images of the body off the 
WWW, constructing a metabody that in turn moves the physical body. 
Representations of the body actuate the body’s physiology.510 
 
Here the loop, unlike in Fractal Flesh or Ping Body, closes. Image becomes data 
becomes body becomes movement becomes image again. 
 A video of the second performance of Parasite, which occurred on April 26 at the 
Wood Street Galleries in Pittsburgh, has been archived by the Studio for Creative 
Inquiry, which (along with the Carnegie Mellon University Department of Art and the 
Pittsburgh Cultural Trust) hosted the event (fig. 29). The video, which they have made 
available online at their own website, is a frenetic montage of Stelarc’s movements, 
performance diagram, prostheses, and interfacing equipment, all against an insistent 
industrial/electronic background interspersed with musical clips. Overlaying windows 
appear and fade: code processing against a black screen; a glowing human outline with 
light-up limbs; a jointed, color-coded stick figure that spins and twirls in space; clip-art 
and photographs of body parts, including Stelarc’s. Stelarc, shot in both close-up and in 
uncompromising aerial view, sweats and pants as he glissades his twitching limbs into a 
semi-coherent choreography, his own organicity in contrast to the shiny metal and cables 
of the machine. Of his Involuntary Body performances, Stelarc has said, “I wanted the 
effect of Alien Agency, possessing and performing with your body. I’m reconciled to the 
fact that in a complex technological terrain where there’s multiplicity of feedback loops, 
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it’s no longer meaningful to ask who’s in control.”511 Indeed, the organic and the 
technological are here set in counterpoise, and it’s not precisely clear which is indeed in 
control. 
 In the introduction to A Foray Into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, Uexküll 
directs his attention toward one of the better-known parasites, the tick. He describes how 
this “blind and deaf bandit” finds his prey through the scent of butyric acid, which all 
mammals release, and how a tick may remain dormant, awaiting this sole signal, for 
years.512 He uses the tick to stage a debate between a biologist and a physiologist on “a 
simple question: is the tick a machine or a machine operator? Is it mere object or a 
subject?”513 Uexküll argues that there is no “mere object” nor “subject,” but that “Every 
subject spins out, like the spider’s threads, its relations to certain qualities of things and 
weaves them into a solid web, which carries its existence.”514 The parasitic tick exists in a 
world of suspended animation; it perceives the days, weeks, or years before it feeds as a 
single “moment” ended by the arrival of the butyric acid-scented mammal (fig. 34). This 
arrival defines the tick’s existence. 
 The Parasite performance highlights webs of modern existence, with threads that 
connect humans not just to each other and the so-called natural environment, but to the 
Real and Virtual world of machines. If anything, Stelarc’s claim that the plugged-in body 
is a “parasite sustained by an extended, external and virtual nervous system” is today 
even more recognizable as the threads pull us tighter—though perhaps not in the way he 
expected. Stelarc asked us to imagine a figure “augmented and adjusted to a parallel 
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virtuality which increases in intensity to compensate for the twilight of the real world.”515 
The images the machine sought and showed him, while translating them into the 
movement of Stelarc’s limbs, are by today’s standards small, pixelated, and of degraded 
quality; the Internet now overflows with high-resolution still and motion pictures. Even 
so, these images—viewed not, generally, through HMDs, but on screens—have yet to 
dim the intensity of the real world.  
Instead, the newest developments in vision technology concern “Augmented Reality,” 
a way of adding a virtual dimension to regular sight. Google Glass, a wearable, Internet-
connected, integrated camera and head-up display, is at the forefront of this research and, 
as of early 2013, is available in prototype to street testers (fig. 35).516 Although the 
technology is impressive, however—coming from a company that produces driverless 
cars, no less—what is most salient about the augmentation is that it is not primarily 
visual, but consists in the ease with which it allows one to access the technology upon 
which we already increasingly depend. Google has allowed for the outsourcing of 
memory—access and creation—of everything from phone numbers to driving directions. 
In this way, all of us plugged-in humans do depend on this worldwide, virtual nervous 
system. 
Conclusion 
I’d like to conclude this chapter with an introduction: Stelarc’s, to his first 
monograph. In a departure from some of his more bombastic rhetoric, with its all-caps, 
“shouted” phrasing, Stelarc’s introduction to “Parasite Visions: Alternate, Intimate and 
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Involuntary Experiences,” published in his first monograph,517 is calm and measured as 
he explains some of his extended-body projects and philosophies. He seems to be 
addressing his critics as he writes, 
Instead of seeing the Internet as a means of fulfilling out-moded 
metaphysical desires of disembodiment, it offers on the contrary, powerful 
individual and collective strategies for projecting body presence and 
extruding body awareness. The Internet does not hasten the disappearance 
of the body and the dissolution of the self—rather it generates new 
collective physical couplings and a telematic scaling of subjectivity. 
 
A telematic scaling of subjectivity. Telematics, as artist and theorist Roy Ascott, one of 
the pioneers of telematic art, defined it in a 1990 essay, is “computer-mediated 
communications networking between geographically dispersed individuals and 
institutions… and between the human mind and artificial systems of intelligence and 
perception.”518 Subjectivity on a telematic scale means “spider threads” stretching 
beyond what is in one’s immediate environment and instead connecting to people, ideas, 
and machines around the world. 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire, published in 2000, is another study of 
connections. In it, they imagine contemporary globalization as an overarching form of 
domination so pervasive and consuming that its structures of power become invisible, 
united under the “single logic of rule” of global capitalism. 519 They dub this situation 
Empire. Because Empire lacks a single locus of control, as colonialism had, it cannot be 
resisted in the way earlier forms of sovereignty could be. Yet this web of interconnected 
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power doesn’t negate individuals’ (via the multitude’s) potential power of resistance; it 
just forces them to adopt new strategies within Empire for doing so.  
Hardt and Negri see the power of both navigating and resisting this new global 
“world system” (to borrow a phrase from Walter Mignolo520) as lying in what they call 
the “new barbarians.” These new barbarians, as Hardt and Negri describe them, are 
individuals whose “[b]odies themselves transform and mutate to create new posthuman 
bodies” through “creative evolution,” whose post-natural, radically mutant forms are 
“completely incapable of submitting to command”—yet enable the creation of a “new 
place in the non-place,” “a new mode of life” from which they can resist and “push 
through” Empire.521 This change is not primarily physical; rather, the “creative 
evolution” they imagine is primarily concerned with resistance to biopolitical control and 
the ability to produce in order to circulate.522 This occurs through the potential to render 
indistinct and thus denaturalize the assumed boundaries “between the human and the 
animal, the human and the machine, the male and the female, and so forth; it is the 
recognition that nature itself is an artificial [virtual, if we follow Wolfe] terrain open to 
ever new mutations, mixtures, and hybridizations.”523 To some extent, this transformation 
can be revealed physically, such as by dressing in drag, and Hardt and Negri write that  
We do certainly need to change our bodies and ourselves, and in perhaps a 
much more radical way than the cyberpunk authors imagine. In our 
contemporary world, the now common aesthetic mutations of the body, 
such as piercings and tattoos, punk fashion and its various imitations, are 
all initial indications of this corporeal transformation, but in the end they 
do not hold a candle to the kind of radical mutation needed here.524  
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If invisible the spider threads of the communally-created world form complexity in the 
closure of their relationships, they also provide the openness that allows for that radical 
mutation, mixing, and hybridization. They create space for a new barbarian as 
posttranshuman: a non-“perfected” figure representative of the posthumanism of Cary 
Wolfe as well as embody-able by the Australian artist with the evil villain’s laugh.  
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Figure 4.1 Stelarc at the University of Southern Queensland, August 22, 2012. Photograph by Doug 
Spowart, http://wotwedid.wordpress.com. 
Figure 4.2 Stelarc, Ear on Arm. Alex Phillips, http://www.theurbn.com/2012/02/ethics-of-bioart/  
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Figure 4.3 Surgeons place Stelarc's Third Ear, 2006. 
Figure 4.4 Vacanti Mouse, 1996. 
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Figure 4.5 Turning Point Project. "Who plays God in the 21st century?: This advertisement #1 in a 
series on genetic engineering.” Published in the New York Times, October 11, 1999. 
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Figure 4.6 "Chondrocytes seeded onto the polymer ear mold in vitro. (Above) Gross appearance of 
the ear polymer mold seeded with chondrocytes (15x107). (Below) Scanning electron micrograph 
showing adherence of chondrocytes to polyglycolic acid device before implantation. Note the 
rounded configuration of the cells and the presence of extracellular matrix secreted by the cells, 
indicative of their ability to perform differentiated function. (Scan provided by David J. Mooney, 
Ph.D.).”  
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Figure 4.7 Stelarc, Sitting/Swaying. Event for Rock Suspension. 
Figure 4.8 Stelarc, Ear on Arm Suspension, Scott Livesey Galleries, March 8, 2012. Photograph by 
Claudio Oryace. 
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Figure 4.9 Stelarc, Handswriting “Evolution,” Maki Gallery, Tokyo, 22 May 1982. Photo by Akiro 
Okada. 
Figure 4.10 Waseda University, Bipedal Walking Robot WHL-11 at Expo '85. 
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Figure 4.11 WASUBOT music-playing robot at Tsukuba Science Expo '85. Image from Bill Cotter, 
World's Fair Photos,  http://worldsfairphotos.blogspot.com/2011/01/robots-at-worlds-fairs-part-
5.html 
 
Figure 4.12 ASIMO is introduced in the Deep Space theater at Ars Electronica, 2010. 
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Figure 4.13 Roy Batty drives a nail into his palm in Blade Runner. 
Figure 4.14 Peter Weller as RoboCop: seeing himself in a mirror for the first time, and in his full 
suit.. 
  309 
 
Figure 4.15 The Terminator (Arnold Schwarzenegger), with and without his organic integument. 
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Figure 4.16 Stelarc with the Third Hand. Yokohama, Tokyo, 
Nagoya, 1980. Photograph by Simon Hunter. 
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Figure 4.17 Guillermo Gómez-Peña, “El Mad Max is Betrayed by his Robotic Hand,”. Dangerous 
Border Crossers New York: Routledge, 2000)  
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Figure 4.18 Stelarc, Exoskeleton, 1998. 
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Figure 4.19 Stelarc. Diagrammatical illustration for Involuntary Body/Third Hand, Yokohama, 
Melbourne, 1993. 
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Figure 4.20 Stelarc, Fractal Flesh, An Internet Body Upload Performance, Telepolis, 
Luxemboug, 10, 11 November, 1995. Monograph, p. 57. 
 
Figure 4.21 Stelarc demonstrates the touch-screen interface of Fractal Flesh. Aalto lecture, 2012. 
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Figure 4.22 Stelarc, Fractal Flesh, Telepolis, 1995. 
Figure 4.23 Diagrammatical illustration for Ping Body. 
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Figure 4.24 Stelarc and Merlin. Parasite Diagram. 
Figure 4.25 The eponymous Hackers, 1995. 
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Figure 4.26 Stomach Sculpture, Fifth Australian Sculpture Triennale, NGV, Melbourne, September 
11-October 24, 1993. Photo by Anthony Figallo. 
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Figure 4.27 Parasite: Computer interface and Stelarc with data processing window 
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Figure 4.28 Parasite: windows showing image search results. 
 
Figure 4.29 Jacob von Uexküll., “Tick,” A Foray Into 
the Worlds of Animals and Humans, 1933. 
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Figure 4.30 Google, Google Glass prototype and simulation of augmented reality. 
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“Has he lost his mind? Can he see or is he blind?” –Black Sabbath,” Iron Man”525 
Chapter 5 : Conclusion 
 
 Throughout this project, I’ve drawn on stories, many of them science fiction, to 
highlight ways in which we’ve imagined what it means to live in the future. These are 
stories that are both influenced by, and in turn influence, science as well as art. I conclude 
now by introducing one more story that highlights the themes I’ve discussed here and that 
allows me to summarize the claims I’ve made. This is 2013’s blockbuster Iron Man 3,526 
based on the Marvel comic book character brought to the screen in the highly successful 
2008 Iron Man, 2010 Iron Man 2, and 2012 The Avengers. The big-budget kickoff to the 
(increasingly early) summer film season, Iron Man 3 is primarily shiny, silly, escapist 
fun. Yet, as is the case with so much science fiction, it reflects fundamental truths about 
how we see the world and ourselves. Set apparently in the present day (though in an 
alternate reality in which Stark’s superhero cohort, the Avengers, has recently defeated an 
alien invasion), its technology is not highlighted as particularly futuristic, but blends 
seamlessly into familiar, present-day scenarios.  
 The world of Iron Man features a wireless communications system through which the 
eponymous hero can access his own computer system, personified by the AI entity Jarvis; 
multiple armored suits that are “coded” to his own body, flying to, and there assembling 
themselves on, his person on command (fig. 1); and an electro-biological virus called 
Extremis , capable of re-coding the body.  In the original graphic novel, Maya Hansen, 
the scientist who invented it, describes Extremis as: 
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a bio-electronics packaged, fitted into a few billion graphic nanotubes and 
suspended in a carrier fluid. A magic bullet, like the original Super-Soldier 
Serum—all in a single injection. It hacks the body’s repair center—the 
part of the brain that keeps a complete blueprint of the human body. When 
we’re injured, we refer to that area of the brain in order to heal properly. 
Extremis rewrites the repair center. In the first stage, the entire body 
essentially becomes an open wound. The normal human blueprint is being 
replaced with the Extremis blueprint. You see? The brain is being told that 
the body is wrong.527 
 
As Robert Downey, Jr., as Tony Stark, the human behind Iron Man, glosses it in the film, 
“Essentially you’re hacking the genetic operating system of the living organism.” Perhaps 
needless to say, given the humanist tendencies of much of science fiction (particularly in 
Hollywood’s hands), this tampering with the body goes horribly wrong, providing the 
film with a moral of sorts as well as its villain. Mad scientist Aldrich Killian injects 
Extremis, which his now-employee Hansen still hasn’t completed, into soldiers who had 
lost limbs. Although they regrow the limbs, an unresolved “glitch” causes some to 
spontaneously combust—explosions Killian covers up by manufacturing a terrorist plot.  
 As its title suggests, the eponymous Iron Man is a cyborg, part man, part iron: a 
more-or-less ordinary (though fabulously wealthy, through Stark Industries’ weapons 
technologies) human augmented by a highly technical, flying suit of armor. In the first 
film, wherein he builds his first suit in order to escape the insurgents who have taken him 
captive, he also fits himself with an electromagnet and arc reactor that both prevents the 
shrapnel embedded near his heart from killing him, and powers the suit. In the present 
film, Stark increases his cyborgization  by injecting microcomputers into his arms, 
allowing him to summon and control the suit from wherever he may be at the moment. 
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 Although Stark’s Iron Man suits, “cyberpathically” controlled and increasingly 
powerful, protect him when he wears them, he is plagued by insomnia and anxiety attacks 
in the wake of the aforementioned alien invasion. Nonetheless, he seeks to destroy a 
villain called the Mandarin, who seizes the television airwaves to take credit for the string 
of bombings and to promise more. Near the end of the film, Stark discovers that the 
Mandarin is simply a front for Killian, and is played by a clueless and hapless stoner of 
an actor.528 “The second you give evil a face,” Killian explains later, “you hand people a 
target”; he is interested in being the power behind the operation, not the face (and hence 
target) in front of it. Not only is the Mandarin merely a face—it’s not even an original 
one, having been modified by plastic surgery.  
 Indeed, the film plays with ideas of identity and visibility throughout; at one point, 
Stark meets a fan with an (all but unrecognizable) tattoo of Stark on his forearm (fig. 
2)—not the best likeness, the fan admits apologetically, as it was based not off a 
photograph, but a doll the latter made.  When Stark storms what he believes to be the 
Mandarin’s compound, it is not in his shiny metal suit, but in an insouciant hoodie 
sweatshirt, his weapons small grenades made from Christmas ornaments and a Tazer 
from a gardening glove. The U.S. government’s response to the Mandarin, the “Iron 
Patriot” (fig. 3), in turn a rebranding of the earlier “War Machine,” is essentially a 
bulked-up and less-colorful Iron Man suit. The suit is happily welcomed aboard Air 
Force One in the false belief its wearer is U.S. Colonel James Rhodes—only to prove a 
Trojan horse delivering a dangerous terrorist who kidnaps the president. The Iron Man 
suits even, at times, act on their own, without any occupant; in one early scene, Stark’s 
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Mohandas Gandhi, a Russian villain, and a Polish gangster. 
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girlfriend Pepper Potts is dismayed to discover that she has been interacting with an 
empty suit as a proxy for Stark, rather than the man himself. 
 These empty suits function in the film’s obligatory climactic battle scene as 
essentially drones, choreographed, and occasionally worn, in turns, by Stark.  He declines 
to give a suit to his compatriot Rhodes, explaining, “They’re coded only to me,” though 
he somehow manages to sic one on Killian and have Jarvis explode it. Thanks to 
Extremis, such a blow merely wounds, rather than destroys, Killian, but he is finally 
dispatched by the Extremis-enhanced Potts, who also wears part of one of the suits and is 
able to vaporize Killian with its blasters.  
 The battle won, Stark holds Potts tightly and promises he’s getting rid of his 
distractions—then orders Jarvis to run “the Clean Slate Protocol.” As the orchestra 
swells, the suits explode brightly against the dark sky, their self-destruction a beautiful 
fireworks display reflected in the river below. The film winds down with a montage, 
narrated by Stark: “sorting out” Potts’ Extremis injections; undergoing surgery himself to 
remove the shrapnel in his chest, along with his arc reactor; visiting the blasted 
foundations of his house and laboratory, leveled by Killian’s terrorists. “My armor was a 
cocoon,” he intonates, “and now I’m a changed man. You can take away my house, all 
my tricks and toys; one thing you can’t take away: I am Iron Man.” 
 Tony Stark, qua Iron Man, is a character of fantasy: a wise-cracking, genius inventor 
with wealth, respect, and irresistible charm. He is just imperfect enough, with his 
insomnia, anxiety attacks, and occasionally malfunctioning equipment, to be (in an even 
greater fantasy) identifiable. Yet Stark is what his creator Stan Lee calls “a quintessential 
capitalist”—a munitions merchant who is so cocky when we meet him in the first Iron 
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Man film that one can’t help but think that being captured by the insurgent group whom 
so many of his weapons have killed may in fact be only fair. His family’s fortune, and his 
personal wealth, have come from designing and producing tools of destruction; in the 
first pages of the Extremis graphic novel, he finds he can’t even look himself in the eye, 
let alone answer an interviewer’s questions about unexploded “bomblets” left after the 
Gulf War, or landmines in East Timor.529 Iron Man’s continued popularity (Iron Man 3 
is, as of this writing, the ninth highest-grossing film of all time, having crossed the $1 
billion global threshold within approximately three weeks of its initial release530) 
suggests that audiences do continue to identify strongly not just with Stark, but with the 
themes I’ve highlighted here: the uncertainly about who the enemy (or hero) is or what he 
even looks like; the inextricability of government and private industry; the pervasive and 
unavoidable power of capital; the possibilities and fears of nanotechnology and body 
modification;  the extraordinary possibilities of communication and connection offered 
by the global network of the Internet. 
 Iron Man embodies Weiner’s dream of cybernetics, the suit responding perfectly in 
direct response to not just Stark’s body, but his mind. His self-surgeries, far less messy—
or public—than Orlan’s, allow him to interface with his suit through his own skin; in the 
graphic novel, a secondary skin originates at the microcomputer insertion points, 
tessellating into a gold “undersheath” that gives him direct physical control over the suit. 
His multiple suits act as replaceable skins and, indeed, lives—the former lost in the 
defense of the latter. He experiences not just Virtual, but Augmented Reality through his 
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helmet, an advanced head-up flight display that is made visible to the audience by 
superimposing it over Stark’s features (fig. 5). Finally, the Iron suit is the epitome of the 
“hollow, hardened body” Stelarc claims is necessary, this one allowing for survival in the 
least hospitable of environments: underwater, extreme heat, and even outside earth’s 
atmosphere. These are the characteristics that make Iron Man a superhero, even if, unlike 
the rest of his Avengers cohort, his superpowers are external rather than inherent (such as 
Captain America’s enhanced strength and reflexes, or the Hulk’s ability to transform into 
a giant green monster) (fig. 6). What allows us to consider him a posthuman one is his 
failings: his post-traumatic stress induced anxiety attacks (not master of his own mind, as 
Freud would put it); his relative helplessness when separated from Jarvis, his outsourced 
brain (Haraway’s cyborgian wound); and his entanglement in the webs of global capital 
(Hardt and Negri’s Empire). 
  Iron Man is a character both fantastical and identifiable enough to represent wish 
fulfillment and escapism, yet just believable enough to act as a mirror to his audience, 
emphasizing that we are living in this future: as yet, one free from alien invasions and 
limb re-growing sera, but still under their threat—or  promise.  “Of course, there are 
those people who say progress is dangerous,” narrates Stark ironically as surgeons extract 
fragments of shrapnel from his unconscious form. In this case, “progress” represents, at 
least technologically, regress: just as he destroyed his Iron suits and “tinkered with” 
Potts’ re-coded DNA or perhaps brain531 to return her to the “normal” she craved, he now 
chooses to have, along with the shards threatening his heart, at least part of his own 
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cyborgian machinery, in the form of the arc reactor, removed—marking a return to what 
we can’t help but read as the more “natural,” and thus humanist. 
 Perhaps this is the “danger” in the “progress”; the idea that we can separate ourselves 
from not just our technology, but the networks that, here in the future, anchor and define 
us: that there is a “nature,” or purity, to which we could return.  Iron Man, thankfully for 
us, doesn’t entirely embrace this ideal of the “natural”; although the final scene begins 
with him throwing his arc reactor into the sea, it concludes with him driving away in his 
Audi R8 E-tron—a cutting-edge electric sports coupé—pulling a trailer of salvaged 
mechanical equipment, and asserting, “I am Iron Man.”  
 To recognize the posthuman in the hero and themes of a summer popcorn movie may 
indeed indicate that I’ve become entirely too absorbed in my research project. However, 
whether or not that is the case, I believe it also indicates that such themes are indeed 
increasingly pervading global culture, shaping how we understand ourselves, our bodies, 
and the technology around us. The stories we tell about ourselves, and the objects that 
show us to ourselves, matter. The figure of the posthuman provides a lens through which 
to make sense of living in the future, one that, I have argued, when understood correctly, 
allows us to recognize the rich entanglements that characterize our world and to 
appreciate the opportunities for agency and connection that it offers. 
 
 
  
  328 
 
Figure 5.1 Iron Man 3 poster showing Tony Stark in front of multiple Iron Man suits. 
 
Figure 5.2 Iron Man 3 film still. “Tony Stark” tattoo. 
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Figure 5.3 Iron Man 3 still. The Iron Patriot suit. 
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Figure 5.4 The Invincible Iron Man: Extremis. “Tony, what have you done?”  
“This. Supercompressed and stored in the hollows of my bones, Maya. I carry the crucial 
undersheath of the Iron Man suit inside my body now.” 
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Figure 5.5 Iron Man 3 still. Augmented Reality inside the Iron Man suit. 
 
Figure 5.6 Poster for The Avengers (Marvel, 2012) 
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